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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON CORRUPTION AND PREFERENCES
BY
ANGELINO CASIO GIOVANNI VICEISZA
December 2007
Committee Chair: Dr. James C. Cox
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation comprises three essays. The theme that unies them is
"experiments on corruption and preferences." The rst essay (chapter 2) reports
theory-testing experiments on the e¤ect of yardstick competition (a form of gov-
ernment competition) on corruption. The second essay (chapter 3) reports theory-
testing experiments on the e¤ect of e¢ ciency and transparency on corruption. Fur-
thermore, this essay revisits the yardstick competition question by implementing an
alternative experimental design and protocol. Finally, the third essay (chapter 4)
reports a theory-testing randomized eld experiment that identies the causes and
consequences of corruption.
The rst essay nds the following. Theoretically, the paper derives a main propo-
sition which suggests that institutions with more noise give rise to an increase in
corrupt behavior and a decrease in voter welfare. Empirically, the paper nds a few
key results. First, there are an initial nontrivial proportion of good incumbents in
the population. This proportion goes down as the experiment session progresses.
Secondly, a large proportion of bad incumbents make theoretically inconsistent
choices given the assumptions of the model. Third, overall evidence of yardstick
competition is mild. Yardstick competition has little e¤ect as a corruption-taming
mechanism when the proportion of good incumbents is low. Namely, an institu-
tion that is characterized by a small number of good incumbents has little room for
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yardstick competition, since bad incumbents are likely to be replaced by equally
bad incumbents. Thus, incumbents have less of an incentive to build a reputation.
This is also the case in which (1) yardstick competition leads to non-increasing
voter welfare and (2) voters are more likely to re-elect bad domestic incumbents.
Finally, a partitioning of the data by gender suggests that males and females ex-
hibit di¤erent degrees of learning depending on the payo¤s they face. Furthermore,
male voter behavior exhibits mild evidence of yardstick competition when voters
face the pooling equilibrium payo¤.
The second essay nds the following. First, e¢ ciency is an important determi-
nant of corruption. A decrease in e¢ ciency makes it more costly for incumbents
to do the right thing.This drives them to divert maximum rents. While voters
retaliate slightly, voters tend to be worse o¤. Secondly, increased lack of a partic-
ular form of transparency (as dened in terms of an increase in risk in the distrib-
ution of the unit cost) leaves corrupt incumbent behavior unchanged. In particu-
lar, if the draw of the unit cost is unfavorable, incumbents tend to be less corrupt.
Third, there is strong evidence of yardstick competition. On the incumbents side,
yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if the incumbent is
female. On the voters side, voters are less likely to re-elect the incumbent in the
presence of yardstick competition. Specically, voters pay attention to the di¤er-
ence between the tax signal in their own jurisdiction and that in another. As this
di¤erence increases, voters re-elect less. This gives true meaning to the concept
of benchmarking.Finally, the analysis sheds light on the role of history and be-
liefs on behavior. Beliefs are an important determinant of incumbentschoices. If
an incumbent perceives a tax signal to be associated with a higher likelihood of
re-election, he is more likely to choose it. On the voters side, history tends to be
important. In particular, voters are more likely to vote out incumbents as time pro-
gresses. This suggests that incumbents care about tax signals because they provide
xvii
access to re-elections while voters use the history of taxes and re-elections in addi-
tion to current taxes to formulate their re-election decisions.
Finally, the third essay nds the following. First, 19.08% of mail is lost. Sec-
ondly, money mail is more likely to be lost at a rate of 20.90% and this nding is
signicant at the 10% level. This nding suggests that loss of mail is systematic
(non-random), which implies that this type of corruption is due to strategic behav-
ior as opposed to plain shirking on the part of mail handlers. Third, we nd that
loss of mail is non-random across other observables. In particular, middle-income
neighborhoods are more likely to experience lost (money) mail. Also, female heads
of household in low-income neighborhoods are more likely to experience lost mail
while female heads of household in high-income neighborhoods are much less likely
to experience lost (money) mail. Finally, this form of corruption is costly to di¤er-
ent stakeholders. The sender of mail bears a direct and an indirect cost. The direct
cost is the value of the mail. The indirect cost is the cost of having to switch carri-
ers once mail has been lost. Corruption is also costly to the intended mail recipient
as discussed above. Finally, corruption is costly the mail company (SERPOST) in
terms of lost revenue and to society in terms of loss of trust. Overall, the ndings
suggest that public-private partnerships need not increase e¢ ciency by reducing
corruption; particularly, when the institution remains a monopoly. Increased ef-
ciency in mail delivery is likely to require (1) privatization and (2) competition;
otherwise, the monopolist has no incentive to provide better service and loss of mail
is likely to persist.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation comprises three essays. The theme that unies them is "cor-
ruption and preferences." In recent decades, corruption has taken a primary role
on the agenda of policymakers, international non-governmental organizations and
academia. Economic analyses of corruption have warranted a broad-based approach.
From theories of corruption (Aidt 2003) to empirical models of corruption (Martinez-
Vazquez, Arze and Boex 2007 and Tanzi 1998), the literature has grown in impor-
tant and signicant ways.
The rst essay in this dissertation studies the extent to which yardstick com-
petition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism in an experimental environment.
It contributes to the literature in a few signicant ways. First, it provides experi-
mental data on the e¤ect of yardstick competition on incumbent and voter behavior
and voter welfare. This is done in a controlled laboratory setting such that econo-
metric identication is relatively simple. In particular, the results can be compared
with those of Besley and Case, Dincer, Ellis and Waddell and Johnson in order to
say something about internal versus external validity of the theory.
Secondly, the study suggests ways in which to fortify the theory in order to use
it as a more meaningful tool for prediction. By conducting a strict theory-testing
experiment, I am able to identify some key areas in which the theory can be ex-
tended to better capture agent behavior. Specically, the results suggest that the-
oretical assumptions on preferences and types (in games) are crucial in deriving
meaningful predictions.
Third, the study contributes to the literature on experimental signaling (pos-
sibly in games), which includes but is not limited to studies on the plausibility of
sequential equilibria in signaling games (see for example Brandts and Holt 2005),
studies exploring the lemons phenomenon in markets (see for example Miller and
1
2Plott 1985) and other studies on signaling in di¤erent contexts such as voluntary
contributions (see for example Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund forthcoming), repu-
tation building (see for example Grosskopf and Sarin 2006) and board composition
and behavior (see for example Gillette, Noe and Rebello 2003).
Finally, the study contributes to our understanding of yardstick competition
as a mechanism for reducing corruption. This is relevant, since it informs policy
design and analysis not only in public economics contexts but also in other con-
texts. Namely, yardstick competition is a mechanismsometimes also referred to
as "benchmarking"that can be applied in many other contexts (see for example
Holmstrom 1982 and Schleifer 1985).
The main ndings are the following. First, there is an initial nontrivial propor-
tion of good incumbents in the population. This proportion goes down as the ex-
periment session progresses. Secondly, a large proportion of bad incumbents make
theoretically inconsistent choices given the assumptions of the model and the man-
ner in which preferences are theoretically specied. Finally, there is mild evidence
of yardstick competition. In particular, an institution with low proportion of good
incumbents has little room for yardstick competition, since bad incumbents are
likely to be replaced by equally bad incumbents. This is also the case in which (1)
yardstick competition leads to non-increasing voter welfare (as is observed in these
experiments) and (2) voters are more likely to re-elect bad domestic incumbents
due to the presence of equally bad foreign incumbents.
The second essay in this dissertation uses laboratory experiments to address
three main questions related to the determinants and control of corruption. First,
the study asks whether an increase in the marginal cost of public funds gives rise
to more or less corruption. Secondly, the study asks whether a decrease in trans-
parency (as modeled by a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of the unit
cost of public good provision) a¤ects corrupt behavior. Finally, the study returns to
3the main question addressed in Viceisza (2007a), which is whether an experimental
environment with yardstick competition gives rise to more or less corruption.
To understand the contributions of this study, it is useful to set the context
by focusing on two of Aidts (2003) main claims. Aidt distinguishes between four
types of theoretical studies on corruption: (1) those that model e¢ cient corruption,
(2) those that model corruption in the presence of a benevolent principal (e.g., the
voter) that delegates decision-making power to a non-benevolent agent (e.g., the in-
cumbent), (3) those that model corruption with a non-benevolent principal and (4)
those that model self-reinforcing corruption in that history may play a role. Also,
Aidt posits that two important considerations unite these four categories of models
of corruption: (1) the degree of benevolence of the government o¢ cial and (2) the
role of institutions versus history as a determinant of corruption.
These arguments are cited here because they provide the main rationale for
conducting the experiments reported in this study. Namely the theoretical model
that guides the experimental design is a prime example of studies pertaining to
Aidts second category. In particular, Besley and Smarts (2007) theoretical polit-
ical agency model is one in which a principal (the voter) delegates decision-making
authority to a potentially non-benevolent agent (the incumbent or the challenger)
by means of an election. So, these theory-testing experiments provide laboratory
experimental data that is relevant to a large class of models as categorized by Aidt.
Furthermore, by experimentally operationalizing Besley and Smarts model, this
study explores the validity of the two considerations that unite Aidts four cate-
gories. With regard to the rst consideration, the experimental treatments explore
the extent to which an agents benevolence (i.e., the incumbent politicians corrupt-
ibility) is a¤ected by two key changes: (1) an increase in the marginal cost of public
funds, which represents an increase in tax ine¢ ciency and (2) an increase in risk
(noise) in the distribution of the unit cost of the public good, which represents a
4form of lack of transparency on the incumbents side. With regard to the second
consideration, the experimental treatments explore the rivalry between a potential
corruption-taming institution (i.e., yardstick competition) and "history."
These experimental treatments are also of further independent interest since the
data resulting from them have policy implications for developing countries. Since
the marginal cost of public fundswhich is a measure of tax e¢ ciencyis closely re-
lated to the choice of tax instruments within a country (Dahlby 1998), the exper-
imental marginal cost treatment is interesting since it sheds light on the extent to
which an external increase in the marginal cost of public fundspossibly caused by
a change in tax mixa¤ects corruptibility. This has policy implications for devel-
oping countries since these are known to have relatively di¤erent tax mixes com-
pared to developed countries and under certain circumstances can be hypothesized
to have higher marginal costs of public funds (Warlters and Auriol 2005.)
Furthermore, if the distribution of the unit cost of public good provision is taken
to represent transparency in the political system, analyzing the e¤ects of a less
transparent institution on corrupt behavior is clearly of interest to developing economies.
So, the experimental treatments that are characterized by a mean preserving spread
of the distribution of the unit cost of the public good (i.e., a noisier distribution
and therefore, a less transparent institution) address the question how a certain
type of transparency a¤ects corruption.
Finally, we explore the interaction between yardstick competition and "history,"
which is relevant to all economiesdeveloping and developed alike. While Viceisza
(2007a) has reported some experiments addressing this question, the experimental
treatments conducted in this study are based on a di¤erent design and protocol.
In any type of theory-testing experiment, there are numerous ways to opera-
tionalize the assumptions of the theory and very few are the theories that provide
su¢ cient (institutional) detail such that all ambiguities with regard to their imple-
5mentation is ruled out. Viceisza (2007a) found that using a within-subjects design
to test the yardstick hypothesis does not lead to signicant treatment e¤ects. As
discussed in the conclusion to that study, part of this may be due to the within-
subjects nature of the experimental design.
So, this new set of experiments asks whether a between-subjects design gives
rise to any signicant treatment e¤ects. Furthermore, the experimental design and
protocol are amended to reect some crucial changes. First, these experiments op-
erationalize the distribution of the unit cost of the public good using a physical de-
vice. Secondly, the experiments reduce the information set arising from yardstick
competition to one random choice made by another politician as opposed to a dis-
tribution of choices made by all politicians. Finally, the experiments implement a
trial, quiz and summary of the task to enhance subject understanding in addition
to a post-questionnaire that can be used to control for it.
The study nds the following main results. First, tax ine¢ ciency is an impor-
tant determinant of corrupt incumbent behavior. In particular, an increase in the
marginal cost of public funds makes it more costly for incumbents to equalize rst-
period payo¤s. This drives them to separate and divert maximum rents in the rst
period. While voters retaliate slightly by ousting incumbents, they are worse o¤.
Secondly, we nd that increased lack of a particular form of transparency (as
dened in terms of an increase in risk in the distribution of the unit cost) leaves
corrupt incumbent behavior unchanged. If the draw of the unit cost is unfavor-
able, incumbents tend to be less corrupt. So, the results suggest that lack of trans-
parency (as dened in Viceisza 2007a) need not always make voters worse o¤.
While this nding may seem counterintuitive, it is not given the parameteriza-
tion of the experiments. First, we must not ignore the importance of assumptions
on types and preferences as discussed in Viceisza (2007a). Contrary to Besley and
Smarts (2007) assumption that incumbents are either good or bad, incumbents are
6known to behave strategically. Since the mean-preserving spread in the distribution
of the unit cost reduces the cost of equalizing rst-period payo¤s in the favorable
state, it makes sense why incumbents behave less corruptly if the unit cost is low.
Furthermore, Viceisza (2007a) models lack of transparency on the incumbent side.
This can be contrasted with lack of transparency on the voters side as discussed in
Besley and Smart (2007).
Third, the experiments nd strong evidence of yardstick competition. On the
incumbents side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if
the incumbent is female. On the voters side, voters are less likely to re-elect the in-
cumbent in the presence of yardstick competition. Specically, voters pay attention
to the di¤erence between the tax signal in their own jurisdiction and the signal in
another jurisdiction. As this di¤erence increases, voters re-elect less.
Fourth, history is an important determinant of corruption and of re-election
decisions. Incumbents are likely to make choices as they did in previous repeti-
tions and voters are likely to vote out increasingly as the repetitions go by. In other
words, they distrust the political system more signicantly as time goes by and
yardstick competition does not a¤ect that. Finally, we nd that individual-specic
factors such as gender and beliefs play a signicant role in incumbent behavior. In
particular, female incumbents are more likely to divert rent when the unit cost is
unfavorable. Furthermore, incumbentsbeliefs are more important than votersbe-
liefs in decision-making. Voters focus mainly on taxes charged (i.e., payo¤s).
Finally, the third essay in this dissertation reports a theory-testing randomized
eld experiment that makes use of an existing public institutionthe postal system
in Lima, Perúto identify and measure corruption, its causes and its consequences.
Furthermore, the ndings suggest policy implications that could be e¤ective in con-
trolling this type of corruption. Thus, our study contributes to the literature by
providing contextual answers to four of the above ve questions.
7The study is in the same area of the literature as Olken (2007) and Bertrand
et al. (forthcoming); namely, randomized eld experiments that aim at identifying
and measuring the causes and consequences of corruption. Thus, it contributes to
a fast-emerging literature on eld experiments that are of interest to policymakers
in general with a particular focus on development (Duo 2006) and experimental
economists (Harrison and List 2004.)
Specically, we implement a (2x2)-design in which each household within a
stratied sample of households across Lima is sent four envelopes: (1) an enve-
lope with money with same sender and recipient last name, (2) an envelope without
money with same sender and recipient last name, (3) an envelope with money with
distinct sender and recipient last name and (4) an envelope without money with
distinct sender and recipient last name. The envelopes are sent in four batches (on
average, one month apart) and for each household the four envelopes are randomly
assigned to batch. The envelopes are also randomly assigned other systematic char-
acteristics, which are elaborated upon below.
We compare receipt of money and non-money envelopes to learn whether loss
of mail is nonrandom. Furthermore, we compare receipt across same and di¤erent
sender/recipient last names to learn whether or not family mail is more likely to
be lost because its content is perceived to be of higher value. Also, we control for
household-specic characteristics (such as neighborhood welfare and head of house-
holds gender) to learn whether loss of mail a¤ects social groups di¤erently. Finally,
we quantify the costs of corruption and loss of e¢ ciency based on the value of lost
mail and the costs of an alternatively popular carrierWestern Union.
We nd the following. First, 19.08% of mail is lost. Secondly, money mail is
more likely to be lost at a rate of 20.90% compared to no-money mail which dis-
appears at a rate of 14.37% (this di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 10%
level). This nding suggests that loss of mail is systematic (non-random), which im-
8plies that this type of corruption is due to strategic behavior as opposed to plain
shirking on the part of mail handlers.
Third, we nd that loss of mail is non-random across other observables. Cor-
ruption is more costly to certain societal groups. Middle-income neighborhoods are
more likely to experience lost (money) mail (these di¤erences are statistically sig-
nicant at the 10% level). These ndings are informed by the predictions of the
model, which suggest that mail handlers may perceive the benets (costs) of lost
mail to be higher (lower) in middle-income neighborhoods compared to low- and
high-income neighborhoods.
We also nd that female heads of household in low-income neighborhoods are
more likely to experience lost mail. This is not necessarily a surprising result, since
this group may be perceived to be vulnerable (this di¤erence is statistically signif-
icant at the 10% level). Furthermore, female heads of household in high-income
neighborhoods are much less likely to experience lost (money) mail (these di¤er-
ences are statistically signicant at the 5% level).
Finally, this form of corruption is costly to di¤erent stakeholders. The sender of
mail bears a direct and an indirect cost. Corruption is also costly to the intended
mail recipient. Middle-income neighborhoods and female heads of household in low-
income neighborhoods are more likely to su¤er. Finally, corruption is costly the
mail company (SERPOST) in terms of lost revenue and to society in terms of loss
of trust as a form of social capital (Fukuyama 1995). Overall, the ndings suggest
that public-private partnerships need not increase e¢ ciency by reducing corruption;
particularly, when the institution remains a monopoly. Increased e¢ ciency in mail
delivery is likely to require (1) privatization and (2) competition.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters 2, 3 and
4 represent the rst, second and third essays respectively. The back matter of the
dissertation comprises the conclusion, appendices, references and vita.
AN EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECT OF YARD-
STICK COMPETITION ON CORRUPTION
Introduction
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
the Nigerian President recently estimated the total cost of corruption at a quarter
of Africas total income.1 Nigeria is not alone. As suggested by Transparency Inter-
nationals indices, many other countries (particularly, developing countries) all over
the world are coping with this problematic phenomenon.2
The nature and causes of corruption have been studied in many contexts. Some
general survey pieces include Martinez-Vazquez, Arze and Boex (2004), Aidt (2003),
Tanzi (1998) and Bardhan (1997). Much like any other form of (economic) behav-
ior, corrupt behavior can be seen as the result of an interaction between an agents
environment and the institution in which such agent makes decisions.3 In particu-
lar, it is interesting to know how (changes in) institutions a¤ect corrupt behavior in
key areas of society such as politics and the economy.
Recently, economists have become interested in almost self-correcting mecha-
nisms for (political) corruption that fall under the category of scal decentralization
(see for example Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005). The main question addressed in
this study is related to one such mechanism. We ask whether an experimental insti-
1The World Bank (1997) denes corruption as: "The abuse of public o¢ ce for private gain."
2Corruption is termed problematic because there is generally widespread consensus among
(social) scientists across many disciplines that corruption is costly to society, since it hinders eco-
nomic growth and thus promotes poverty and income inequality. See for example Mauro (1995).
3There are many ways to dene the terms environment and institution. This paper adopts
Smiths (1989) denitions. The environment consists of the collection of all agentscharacteristics;
that is, tastes and technology, which in traditional economics are represented by utility or prefer-
ence functions, resource endowments and production or cost functions. The institution denes the
language (messages or actions) of communication. The institution also species the order in which
economics agents move, or that there is no form (moves are free form), and the rules under which
messages become contracts and thus allocations. Culture can also be seen as part of an agents
environment. Even though culture may have an e¤ect on corrupt behavior, this is not a central
question in this paper.
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tution with yardstick competition (a form of government competition) has an e¤ect
on corruption and if so, in what direction.4 In particular, we adopt the Besley and
Smart (2007) political agency model to conduct a theory-testing experiment on this
main question.
The main hypothesis is that since yardstick competition gives rise to an infor-
mation externality that amplies the voters information set, the voter is generally
better able to judge incumbent behavior in the presence of yardstick competition.
The bad incumbent being aware of this will restrain corrupt behavior in an attempt
to gain re-election. Thus, it can be argued under reasonable assumptions that yard-
stick competition reduces corruption and in most cases, increases voter welfare.
Theoretically, the link between yardstick competition and corruption has been
addressed in several studies including but not limited to Besley and Smart (2007),
Belleamme and Hindriks (2005), Bodenstein and Ursprung (2004) and Bordignon
et al. (2004). The results do not always agree. For example, Besley and Smart and
Belleamme and Hindriks both study the main question using a political agency
model of elections with the possibility for moral hazard and adverse selection. Yet,
they nd opposite e¤ects.
Since their models are setup to study the combined e¤ect of adverse selection
and moral hazard, the role for an election is twofold: First, to restrain rent diver-
sion by bad incumbents as in the pure moral hazard problem (the discipline e¤ect)
and secondly, to separate bad incumbents from good incumbents as in the pure ad-
4Yardstick competition is a form of government competition as reviewed in Viceisza (2004).
The government competition literature in public economics includes models of tax, tax base, scal
and yardstick competition. For a published review on models of tax competition, see for exam-
ple Wilson (1999). Besley and Case (1995a) were one of the rst to dene yardstick competition
in public economics. Yardstick competition between incumbent politicians arises when voters in
one jurisdiction use the performance of incumbents in other jurisdictions as a benchmark. In this
study, we are neither concerned with the accuracy of the information transmission mechanism nor
with the mechanism itself. In particular, we are not concerned with how information is distributed
to voters or whether or not such information is correct. Since these separate questions lead into
the role of media objectivity and media transparency which are beyond the scope of this study, we
control these aspects (ow and accuracy of information) as part of the experimental design.
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verse selection case (the selection e¤ect). In the Besley and Smart model, these can
be two competing e¤ects. While "mimicking" reduces rent-seeking in the short run
(the discipline e¤ect), it also reduces selection between good and bad politicians in
the long run (the selection e¤ect). In the Belleamme and Hindriks model, how-
ever, the electoral incentive and the desire for re-election on the part of the bad in-
cumbent politician are themselves the source of ine¢ ciency. As a consequence, the
two e¤ects are reinforcing and yardstick competition always improves voter welfare
by taming corrupt behavior.
Empirically, the link between yardstick competition and corruption has been ad-
dressed using eld data; however, it has not been addressed experimentally. Besley
and Case (1995a), Dincer, Ellis and Waddell (2006) and Johnson (2006) have all
studied yardstick competition using U.S. eld data. While the rst two studies
found evidence of yardstick competition, the third study nds only very limited evi-
dence of yardstick competition. So, the empirical results are mixed.
Furthermore, since eld data areby their very naturenoisy and based on an
unknown data-generating process, it is not straightforward to econometrically iden-
tify a causal e¤ect of yardstick competition. This poses a signicant di¢ culty when
pinpointing as subtle a phenomenon as yardstick competition, which can relatively
easily be confounded with other forms of government competition.
Experimentally, as reviewed in Abbink (2005b) and Dusek, Ortmann and Lizal
(2005), no studies have addressed the main question, which is the e¤ect of yardstick
competition on corruption. While Potters et al. (2004) address the question of col-
lusion under yardstick competition, they do not address the main question as such.
This study thus contributes to the literature in a few signicant ways. First,
it provides experimental data on the e¤ect of yardstick competition on incumbent
and voter behavior and voter welfare. This is done in a controlled laboratory set-
ting such that econometric identication is relatively simple. In particular, the re-
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sults can be compared with those of Besley and Case, Dincer, Ellis and Waddell
and Johnson in order to address internal versus external validity of the theory.
Secondly, the study suggests ways in which to fortify the theory in order to use
it as a more meaningful tool for prediction. By conducting a strict theory-testing
experiment, we are able to identify some key areas in which the theory can be ex-
tended to better capture agent behavior. Specically, the results suggest that the-
oretical assumptions on preferences and types (in games) are crucial in deriving
meaningful predictions.
The general notion of operationally meaningful theorems is of course not new
and dates back to Samuelson (1947). However, recently it has been addressed by
Weibull (2004) and Cox (2004) in the context of testing game theory when using
experimental methods. Both authors allude toamong other issuesthe importance
of assumptions on preferences when interpreting experimental data and results.
This is particularly relevant in other-regarding-preferences-like experiments.5
Third, the study contributes to the literature on experimental signaling (pos-
sibly in games), which includes but is not limited to studies on the plausibility of
sequential equilibria in signaling games (see for example Brandts and Holt 2005),
studies exploring the lemons phenomenon in markets (see for example Miller and
Plott 1985) and other studies on signaling in di¤erent contexts such as voluntary
contributions (see for example Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund forthcoming), repu-
tation building (see for example Grosskopf and Sarin 2006) and board composition
and behavior (see for example Gillette, Noe and Rebello 2003).
Finally, the study contributes to our understanding of yardstick competition
as a mechanism for reducing corruption. This is relevant, since it informs policy
design and analysis not only in public economics contexts but also in other con-
5Cox (2004) denes the term other-regarding preferences as opposed to self-regarding prefer-
ences (i.e., traditional economic man preferences). Basically, experiments on other-regarding pref-
erences include but are not limited to experiments on fairness, trust and reciprocity; the so-called
social preferences literature.
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texts. Namely, yardstick competition is a mechanismsometimes also referred to
as "benchmarking"that can be applied in many other contexts (see for example
Holmstrom 1982 and Schleifer 1985).
Despite these main contributions, the study has some limitationssome of which
are addressed in Viceisza (2007c). First, the experimental design is based on a within-
subject design.6 Secondly, we have not conducted any sensitivity-type treatments.7
Finally, the experimental design does not induce types. In other words, experimen-
tal subjects are allowed to enter the experiments with their own homegrown types.8
This may impact the e¤ect of yardstick competition and will be elaborated upon
later in the paper.
The main ndings are the following. First, there is an initial nontrivial propor-
tion of good incumbents in the population. This proportion goes down as the ex-
periment session progresses. Secondly, a large proportion of bad incumbents make
theoretically inconsistent choices given the assumptions of the model and the man-
ner in which preferences are theoretically specied. Finally, there is mild evidence
of yardstick competition. In particular, an institution with low proportion of good
incumbents has little room for yardstick competition, since bad incumbents are
likely to be replaced by equally bad incumbents. This is also the case in which (1)
yardstick competition leads to non-increasing voter welfare (as is observed in these
experiments) and (2) voters are more likely to re-elect bad domestic incumbents
due to the presence of equally bad foreign incumbents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses
the theory of yardstick competition proposed by Besley and Smart and a main
proposition on transparency. Then, we discuss the experimental design and how
it relates to the theory. Thereafter, we summarize the ndings and conclude.
6This is opposed to a between- or across-subject design (see Viceisza 2007c).
7The data from these treatments are reported by Viceisza (2007c).
8An induced-type treatment may be part of an upcoming paper.
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Theoretical Model
Game Description: Players, Information, Actions and Payo¤s
Players and Periods. The theory is based on a game theoretic model of elec-
tions that is cast in a principal-agent framework. There are two "active" playersa
principal (the voter) and a rst agent (the rst-period incumbent), and one "pas-
sive" playera second agent (the challenger). An agents type (i) can be good (g)
or bad (b). Each agent knows his or her own type; however, the principal and the
other agent do not. The model comprises two periods. At the end of the rst pe-
riod, there is an election. The second agent is "passive," since this agent only plays
a role during elections and during the second period if elected.9
The above describes a dynamic game of incomplete information. It is dynamic
because it encompasses two periods and decisions made in the rst period a¤ect
outcomes in the second period. There is incomplete information, since at least one
player is uncertain about another players payo¤s. In particular, the voter is uncer-
tain about the politicianspayo¤s, since such payo¤s are type-dependent.
Information Revelation and Actions. Following Harsanyi (1967, 1968),
the game can be transformed into a dynamic game of imperfect information by let-
ting the timing and information revelation proceed as follows.
First Period
1. Nature draws the types of the incumbent and the challenger from i.i.d. distri-
butions such that Pr (i = g) = . This information is common knowledge.
2. Nature reveals the politicians type only to the respective politician.
3. Nature draws the unit cost of public good provision  from i.i.d. distributions
9If elected, the challenger will behave in one of the following ways: If good, the challenger will
maximize voter welfare; if bad, the challengers behavior will be dictated by the lame-duck e¤ect.
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such that Pr ( = H) = q, Pr ( = L) = 1   q, H > L. This information is
common knowledge.
4. Nature reveals the level of  to the incumbent politician but not to any other
player.
5. The "active" agents action set. After observing , the incumbent politician
chooses the level of the public good (G) and the amount of rent diversion
(r), which together determine the total tax collection, t = G + r. Un-
der the assumption that there is a maximum feasible level of government
tax collections (T ) in any period, the incumbent politicians action set AI is
AI  f(G; r) jG+ r = t 2 [0; T ] ; G  0; r  0g. This sets the maximum level
of rent diversion at r = T .
6. The voter observes the level of the public good (G) and the total tax collec-
tion (t) and pays t. The voter does not observe the rent diverted.
7. The principals action set. At the end of the rst period, after the voter has
observed (G; t), there is an election. The voter chooses to re-elect or not by
comparing the signals received from the "active" agent (rst-period incum-
bent) with the prior belief that the "passive" agent (challenger) is good or
bad.10 So, the voters action set AV  fre-elect, not re-electj	g, where 	 is
some information set of the form fG; t; ; qg.
8. If the voter re-elects, the incumbent politician is in o¢ ce again. If the voter
does not re-elect, the challenger is elected to o¢ ce.
10The model assumes that one voter determines whether or not the incumbent is re-elected to
o¢ ce. While this may seem contrary to standard majority-voting models, we can interpret this
model as a median voter or representative voter type model in which the median or representative
voter is decisive.
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Second Period
1. The type of the second-period incumbent politician is determined.
2. Nature draws the unit cost of public good provision  as described previously.
3. Nature reveals the level of  only to the second-period incumbent.
4. The second-period incumbent chooses (G; r).
5. The voter observes (G; t), pays t and does not get to vote.
6. The game comes to an end.
PlayersPayo¤s. The playerspayo¤ functions are as follows:
1. Voter welfare is given by W (G; t) = G   C (t), where G; t are dened as be-
fore,  is an exogenous parameter indexing the marginal cost of public funds
and C is a strictly convex and increasing function with C (0) = 0. 11 ;12
2. Politician welfare is type dependent:13
(a) A good politician only cares about voter welfare and thus she has the
same welfare function as the voter, W (G; t) = G  C (t).14
11Browning (1976) denes the marginal cost of public funds as the direct tax burden plus the
marginal welfare cost produced in acquiring the tax revenue.
12Intuitively, the assumption that the tax cost function is increasing makes sense. The higher
the tax rate, the higher the cost that is imposed on the voter. However, why must the tax cost
function also be strictly convex? This is related to the marginal cost of taxation. The higher the
tax rate, the higher the marginal (added) cost of each unit taxed. Mathematically, this gives rise
to well behaved (strictly convex) preferences for the voter and the good type.
13A politicians complete type is determined by the pair (i; ).
14Lockwood (2005) partly discusses what might happen if the good type also behaves strategi-
cally. In particular, he nds that the hybrid equilibrium need not be stable in the Cho and Kreps
(1987) sense.
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(b) A bad incumbent is not concerned with the provision of the public good
and always diverts rent for private purposes.15
First-period bad incumbent. Given a discount factor of 0 <  < 1 and
a probability of re-election equal to  , the incumbents payo¤ function is
R = r1 +  r2, where R is the discounted expected total rent diversion
by the incumbent if re-elected and rj denotes the rent diverted in period
j for j = 1; 2.16
Second-period bad incumbent. The incumbents payo¤ function is equal
to the rent diverted in period 2, r2.
Solution to the Game: Equilibrium Strategies
The game is most easily solved by some type of backward induction argument.
This leads to perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of the kind discussed by Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991).
Good Incumbent. A good second-period incumbent chooses rent diversion
equal to zero and solves:17
max
G
W (G; t) s.t. t = G =) max
G
[G  C (G)] . (1)
15This can be motivated as follows: A priori and regardless of the level of , the bad incumbent
faces an alternative between setting r1 = 0 or r1 = r. If the bad incumbent sets r1 = 0, the total
two-period payo¤ is r if re-elected and zero otherwise. If the bad incumbent sets r1 = r, the total
two-period payo¤ is (1 + ) r if re-elected and r otherwise, which is greater than r since  is
assumed to be strictly less than one. Hence, it is always in the bad types best interest to choose
r1 > 0.
16 represents the probability of re-election when the voter observes high tax spending, tH .
17Note that under this interpretation an incumbent (good or bad) is not concerned with the
choice of t. The level of tax collection is indirectly determinedvia budget balancingby the choice
of (G; r), rendering the latter two variables the choice variables.
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This maximization problem has the following rst-order and second-order condi-
tions:
1  @C
@t
(G) = 0 (2)
 2@
2C
@t2
(G) < 0. (3)
Statements 2 and 3 imply:18
G (; )  G () = argmax
G
[G  C (G)] . (4)
By the implicit function theorem:
dG
d
=   
@C
@t
(G)  G@2C
@t2
(G)
 2 @2C
@t2
(G)
< 0 and (5)
dG
d
=    
@C
@t
(G)
 2 @2C
@t2
(G)
< 0. (6)
So, a good second-period incumbent chooses as follows in the second period and
maximizes voter welfare:
fGL; r2 = 0j2 = Lg =) tL = LGL (7)
fGH ; r2 = 0j2 = Hg =) tH = HGH . (8)
The associated equilibrium welfare levels are:
WL  W (GL; tL) = GL   C (LGL) (9)
WH  W (GH ; tH) = GH   C (HGH) . (10)
18As a matter of notation, G is associated with rj = 0 and thus a good type. Any other G
(such as G ; GT ) is associated with rj > 0 and thus a bad type. Any tax level associated with
a good type is seen as the true low or true high levels (tL; tH respectively) except for when type
(b; L) mimicks type (g;H) and spends tH . In any other circumstance, tax levels associated with
bad types are either t H or T .
19
A good rst-period incumbent behaves identically to a good second-period in-
cumbent. The voter and good-type equilibrium levels can be analyzed graphically
as shown in gure 1. Fix W = W, and let W = G   C (G) such that
G = W + C (G). Recalling that G = t, we can plot such indi¤erence curve
in (G; t)-space.
A few important properties can be derived for such indi¤erence map:
1. The indi¤erence curve in (G; t)-space can be represented as an increasing and
strictly convex function of t since C (:) is increasing and strictly convex.
2. WH Q WL depending on the trade-o¤ between the level of  and G. These
represent two competing forces.19
3. Given preferences of the good and the bad type, signaling is more costly for
(g;H) than for (g; L). This results in a single-crossing property like that of
Spence (1973).20
Bad Incumbent and Voter Beliefs. The behavior of a bad second-period
incumbent is dictated by the lame-duck e¤ect. The incumbent diverts maximum
rents by setting G = GT = 0 and r2 = t = T .21 The associated equilibrium welfare
19Recall that WH = GH   C (tH) and WL = GL   C (tL) such that WH   WL = GH  
C (tH)   (GL   C (tL)), which equals WH  WL = GH   GL   ( (C (tH)  C (tL))) Q 0 as
tH R tL, which in turn depends on the levels of H versus L and GH versus GL.
20This single-crossing property comes from the fact that the bad type always diverts some rent.
So, the economically rational voter knows that whenever she observes (GL; tL)which leads to an
equilibrium welfare level of WLthe incumbent must be of type (g; L). So, it is implicitly more
costly for type (g;H) to send a signal than it is for type (g; L). So, the indi¤erence curves associ-
ated with equilibrium level WH are steeper than those associated with WL.
21There is an implicit assumption that a bad incumbents welfare is una¤ected by the choice of
G even though he or she lives in the society and will benet from the public good. This should be
clear from the specication of preferences discussed previously. This assumption allows us to set
the level of the public good when type b diverts maximal rents (GT ) equal to zero as a result of
equilibrium; i.e., since the bad types welfare is una¤ected by the public good, the incumbent loses
nothing by providing zero of the public good.
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Figure 1: Indi¤erence Map for Voter and Good-type Welfare
0 t
G
WL=Wl
WH=Wh
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(GT,T)
level for the voter is:
WT  W (GT = 0; T ) =  C (T ) . (11)
This point is represented in gure 1 by the point with coordinates (GT = 0; t = T ).
At this point, the voter has minimum utility as calculated above. Note that the
voter has no retaliation measure (strategic move) in the second period, since the
game comes to an end. The voter pays the associated maximum tax level and en-
dures the associated "disutility."
The behavior of a bad rst-period incumbent is cost-dependent. When the cost
is high (i.e.,  = H), type (b;H) will charge higher taxes than necessary for provi-
sion of the associated public good. While the politician chooses a public good pro-
vision level of GH , a tax higher than tH must be charged in order for the incumbent
to divert rent. The voter observes a tax level that is "too high" and concludes with
certainty that a bad type is in o¢ ce. Thus, in equilibrium the voter does not re-
elect the incumbent since t > tH while G = GH . Type (b;H) realizes this and
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consequently diverts maximal rents (T ) in the rst period in anticipation of being
voted out of o¢ ce. The corresponding public good provision level is thus GT = 0.
On the other hand, when the unit cost is low (i.e.,  = L), the bad incumbent
will never engage in low spending of tL since it is always in his or her best interest
to divert some rent. Consequently, the voter will re-elect whenever (GL; tL) is ob-
served. In other words, Pr (i = gjtL) = 1 since low tax collections (tL) must be the
result of the good type being in o¢ ce. The more complicated question is how much
rent type (b; L) will divert. On the one hand, type (b; L) may want to restrain rst-
period rent diversion (corruption) with some probability  in an attempt to fool
the voter by pooling with type (g;H). If so, the incumbent will choose a high pub-
lic good provision GH , charge high taxes tH and divert rst-period rents equal to
r1 = tH   LGH . On the other hand, type (b; L) may decide to divert maximum
rents in the rst period if the incumbent believes chances of re-election to be small
or if the incumbent is impatient.
These alternative scenarios are part of the PBE strategy prole discussed below.
Whether or not type (b; L) exercises restraint ( > 0) and thus whether or not the
equilibrium will be strictly pooling depends on the rst-period incumbents payo¤
function. In particular, type (b; L) restrains in the rst period only if
r1 +  r2  r () r1 +  r  r () r1  (1   ) r. (12)
When inequality 12 is strict, type (b; L) exercises restraint with certainty ( = 1).
Notice that the expression in 12 depends on  and .
The probability of re-election  depends on the voters posterior belief that such
spending was generated by type (g;H). The posterior probability that spending tH
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was generated by such type is calculated by the voter using Bayesrule as follows:
p = Pr (gjtH) = Pr (tH jg)
Pr (tH jg) + Pr (tH jb)
=
q
q + (1  ) (1  q) . (13)
The voter re-elects with positive probability ( > 0) only if
p = Pr (gjtH)   () q
q + (1  ) (1  q)  
()   q
1  q . (14)
When this inequality is strict, the voter re-elects with certainty. Notice that this
expression depends on the incumbents restraint probability .
Thus, inequalities 12 and 14 jointly characterize the possible equilibrium cong-
urations when a bad type faces low costs. Inequality 12 determines the bad politi-
cians rule for exercising restraint and is a function of the voters re-election prob-
ability  . In turn, inequality 14 determines the voters re-election rule upon ob-
serving tH and is a function of the incumbents restraint probability . Besley and
Smart characterize the possible equilibrium congurations in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 An equilibrium exists for all values of parameters and is generally unique.
1. A pooling equilibrium, with  =  = 1, exists i¤
q  1
2
& r1 ()  (1  ) r (15)
2. A separating equilibrium, with  = 0 and  = 1, exists i¤
r1 ()  (1  ) r (16)
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3. A hybrid equilibrium, with  = q
1 q and  =
(r r1)
r
, exists i¤
q <
1
2
& r1 ()  (1  ) r (17)
Proof. See Besley and Smart.
Intuitively, these equilibrium congurations say the following:
1. The pooling equilibrium corresponds to the case in which it is optimal for
type (b; L) to exercise restraint with certainty ( = 1) since r1 is high enough
or  is high enough (i.e., the incumbent is su¢ ciently patient). Both types
send the same message and the voter observes high taxes tH regardless of the
type of politician that is in o¢ ce. The voter re-elects with certainty when ob-
serving tH such that  = 1.
2. The separating equilibrium corresponds to the case in which r1,  or  is low
enough so that it is optimal for type (b; L) to divert maximal rents ( = 0)
in the rst period. The voter observes high taxes tH if type (g;H) is in o¢ ce
and maximal taxes T if type (b; L) is in o¢ ce. The bad incumbent is detected
with certainty ex post. If the voter observes tH , the voter re-elects with cer-
tainty, since such spending will only be chosen by type (g;H).
3. The hybrid equilibrium corresponds to a mix. In the hybrid equilibrium, type
(b; L) adopts a strictly mixed strategy between restraint and maximal rent
diversion. The voter will observe (tH ; tH) some of the time and (tH ; T ) some
of the time.22
22If the incumbent has a very low discount factor , the pooling and hybrid equilibria are less
likely to occur and the separating equilibrium is more likely to occur. So, implicitly, it is assumed
that  is high enough such that all three possible equilibria congurations can occur.
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Propositions
Four main propositions are discussed below. The rst two are Besley and Smarts
main propositions on the e¤ect of yardstick competition on incumbent behavior and
on voter welfare. The third and the fourth are related to two key parameters of in-
terest: the marginal cost of public funds () and the unit cost of the public good
().
Before stating the yardstick propositions, it is useful to discuss what it means to
model yardstick competition. In order to consider yardstick comparisons, one must
introduce another jurisdictionthe foreign jurisdiction.
In particular, Besley and Smart focus on symmetric equilibria among incum-
bents and voters in the two jurisdictions by assuming that the joint probability
mass function of cost shocks Pr (; 0) is symmetric. Furthermore, they assume
that the cost shocks in the two jurisdictions are positively correlated by letting
Pr (H;H) = Pr (L;L) = 
2
and Pr (H;L) = Pr (L;H) = 1 
2
for  > 1
2
.
Under such conditions, the voters strategy involves yardstick competition when
re-election occurs with positive probability if spending is high in both jurisdictions,
but the probability of re-election is zero if domestic spending is high and foreign
spending is low; i.e.,  (tH ; tH) =  for some  > 0 and  (tH ; tL) = 0.
Proposition 2 Suppose that r1 () > (1  )T . Then, voters use yardstick compe-
tition in equilibrium. A pooling equilibrium exists if and only if   1
2
, and a hybrid
equilibrium exists if and only if  < 1
2
.
Proof. See Besley and Smart.
Intuitively, this proposition tells us that the case with yardstick competition
di¤ers from the one jurisdiction case in three essential ways:
1. A bad incumbent may not be re-elected when she chooses tH , if the foreign
incumbent is type (g; L).
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2. A good domestic incumbent is retained in o¢ ce when costs are high, and the
foreign politician chooses maximal rents.
3. Pooling may no longer be optimal for incumbents when the foreign incumbent
has a poor initial reputation.
Proposition 3 There exist parameters 0 < ~a < ~b < 1=2 such that voter welfare
is lower when yardstick comparisons are available than when they are not if  < ~a,
and the converse is true if  > ~b.
Proof. See Besley and Smart.
This result shows that voters who are better informed about the scal environ-
ment may be worse o¤ in equilibrium, since bad incumbents will make less of an ef-
fort to build a reputation when they rst take o¢ ce. Namely, in some casesin par-
ticular, when  is lowvoters would be better o¤ if they could commit to ignoring
the scal performance in the other jurisdiction in the course of a domestic election.
Yardstick competition is welfare decreasing when politiciansreputations are poor
since rents are increased with little advantage from the improved information gener-
ated as most politicians who are voted out of o¢ ce are replaced by an incumbent of
the same type.
Proposition 4 Increased ine¢ ciency in the tax institution (as represented by an
increase in ) that leaves equilibrium strategies (;  ) unchanged reduces voter wel-
fare, even if it reduces rent diversion by bad politicians.
Proof. See Besley and Smart.
The key assumption underlying the above result is that the equilibrium strate-
gies remain unchanged. Yet, this need not be the case. The type of equilibrium may
induce a change in strategy, which in turn can give rise to competing selection and
discipline e¤ects. In particular, we may nd that an increase in  (depending on
the value of ) induces a shift from pooling or hybrid to separating.
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Proposition 5 A less transparent public goods provision institution (as represented
by an increase in risk of  in the second-order stochastic dominance sense) is asso-
ciated with an increase in expected equilibrium rent diversion for the whole game.
Furthermore, a less transparent institution (as dened above) is associated with
a decrease in equilibrium voter welfare in all possible equilibrium congurationsif
they existas long as the marginal social cost of taxation is less than the inverse of
the product of the marginal cost of public funds and the unit cost of the public good.
Proof. See appendix A.
Intuitively, this proposition says that in a less transparent institutioni.e., an
institution in which  has a noisier distributionequilibrium rent diversion is ex-
pected to increase and equilibrium voter welfare is expected to decrease as long as
the marginal cost of taxation is low enough.
Experimental Design
From Theory to Experiments
The experimental treatments discussed in this paper are theory-testing in the
sense that their designs are dictated by the theory of corruption and yardstick com-
petition presented in the previous section. Furthermore, the questions they are de-
signed to answer follow directly from the propositions (and lemma) discussed previ-
ously. This section explains how we make the transition from theory to experiments
and thus how the experimental design relates to or departs from the aforementioned
theory. In the process, we shall indicate some limitations of the experimental de-
sign. Some of those will be addressed in upcoming experiments.
We construct a dynamic experimental signaling game to capture the agency
model of elections discussed previously.23 Brandts and Holt (1992), Banks, Camerer
23Unlike in the main text, we maintain neutral terminology throughout the subject instruc-
tions. Incumbents are termed "Player X" and voters are termed "Player Z."
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and Porter (1994) and more recently, Brandts and Holt (2005) discuss the possi-
ble complications associated with testing equilibrium behavior in experimental sig-
naling games. In particular, the latter reference nds that there is mixed evidence
about the adequacy of equilibrium renements to predict what players will do in
signaling games. They nd that the deviation of subjectsdecisions from equilib-
rium predictions is explained by a simple Bayesian learning process. This may be
relevant when implementing an experimental test of the model discussed here, since
the model assumes that players Bayesian update. Grether (1980) also discussed is-
sues relating to a lack of Bayesian updating on the part of subjects.
We are slightly less concerned about such issues in these experiments due to two
main reasons. First, since subjects in the experiments engage in several rounds of
decision-making, we expect them to learn over the course of the experiment. Con-
sequently, averaged decisions (as considered here) may be less noisy than repitition-
based decisions. Secondly, since we are ultimately interested in the di¤erential ef-
fect between the baseline treatment (Treatment B) and the yardstick treatment
(Treatment Y), any lack of Bayesian updating (if applicable) is likely to be present
in both treatments and a¤ect both treatments at similar rates. So, we implement
an experimental signaling game as discussed below.
An incumbents type is assumed to be determined by a pair (i; ). We start by
discussing the rst component. The rst component (i) is either "good (g)" or "bad
(b)" and is allowed to be homegrown. In other words, the experimental environ-
ment does not induce upon subjects that they be good or bad. We choose not to
induce this component upon subjects for two main reasons. First, while the pri-
mary aim of the experiment is to test a model of corruption and yardstick compe-
tition that rests on the assumption that there is some positive proportion of good
types in the population, a secondary aim is to test whether this assumption is em-
pirically valid to begin with. In fact, in accordance with parallelism to the naturally
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occurring world, it is sensible to ask whether assuming existence of a positive pro-
portion of good types in the population is a plausible assumption. For if it is not,
then the model discussed in the previous section must be called into question, since
its predictions crucially rely on the proportion of good types in the population be-
ing greater than zero. So, data resulting from the current design give a verdict as to
the empirical validity of this assumption.
Secondly, an induced-type environment represents a di¤erent way of testing the
model. While such environment still enables us to study of the e¤ect of yardstick
competition on the voter side, it rules out the possibility of inferring incumbents
types from the population. In particular, it rules out the ability to study the ef-
fect of yardstick competition on corrupt incumbent behavior, which is obviously a
question of interest in this study. The future research agenda is likely to include
experiments based on an induced-type environment.
The second component of this pair  represents the unit cost of public good pro-
vision and is controlled ("induced") as part of the experimental environment. This
is done for numerous reasons. First, to be consistent with the information revela-
tion described previously. As the game describes,  is determined exogenously by
nature. So, controlling the determination of  is consistent with the theory. Sec-
ondly, not inducing the value of  as part of the experimental environment would
result in a relatively complicated game for subjects. Finally, by inducing (control-
ling)  in this sense, we guarantee that the correlation between the levels of  in
di¤erent jurisdictions (i.e., between the di¤erent subject pairs) is as required by
the theoryrecall the condition that shocks be positively correlated. Specically,
subjects are informed of the following. Incumbents are choosing from two possible
screens. The screen the incumbent observes is determined by a virtual ip of a coin.
If the coin lands "heads" (i.e.,  is low), the incumbent chooses from one screen and
if the coin lands "tails" (i.e.,  is high), the incumbent chooses from another screen.
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So, the draw of  is revealed to the incumbent before he or she makes a choice. The
voter is informed of the distribution of  and Pr (; 0), however, he or she is not
informed of the exact realization of  and 0. While the current experimental pro-
tocol does not physically portray the determination of  in the baseline and yard-
stick treatments, the discussion is implicit. This was done to maintain the subject
instructions and experimental protocol relatively short and simple. While this is
one advantage of this protocol, a possible disadvantage is that the current revela-
tion of cost shocks is not su¢ ciently transparent in order for voters to meaningfully
understand the information that is conveyed to them in the yardstick competition
treatments (Treatment Y). It remains an empirical question whether a more ex-
plicit discussion of the the cost determination, Pr () and Pr (; 0), will enable vot-
ers to make a more informed decision. Viceisza (2007c) takes on this question.
Given the above design, the incumbent knows the complete characterization of
his or her typei.e., (i; )prior to making a decision. However, since part of the in-
cumbents type is homegrown, the complete characterization of the subjects type
is a priori unknown to the experimenter. This implies that the incumbents prefer-
ences are also unknown a priori. So, the experiment is designed such that the ex-
perimenter can learn incumbentstypes from observing subjectschoices. This is
important sincecontrary to an induced-type environmentthe present environment
enables us to test a compound hypothesis that relates to (1) the proportion of types
in the incumbent population and (2) the e¤ect of yardstick competition on incum-
bent and voter behavior. Furthermore, a homegrown-type environment implies that
voter subjects are a priori uninformed about the proportions of good and bad types
in the incumbent population. They learn this as the experiment progresses.
Specically, the payo¤ pairs presented to the experimental subjects are based
on the following parameterizations. The bad-type incumbents per-period payo¤
function is characterized by r = t  G, where all notation is as dened previously.
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So, if we observe such a choice, the subject is inferred to behave "as if he is bad."
The good-type incumbents per-period payo¤ function is the same as the voters,
which is an explicit form of the voters theoretical welfare function. Contrary to the
assumption that the tax-cost function be strictly convex, we choose a linear tax-
cost parameterization and let C (t) = t. This parameterization is chosen because
it provides su¢ cient behavioral separation and gives rise to tractable payo¤s from
a practical standpoint. In particular, this parameterization in combination with
the condition that GT > 0 (see below) avoid having to deal with negative payo¤s
based on the choice of signals. Thus, the voters payo¤ function is characterized by
W (G; t) = G   t, where all notation is as dened previously.24 So, if we observe
such choice, the subject is inferred to behave "as if he is good."
As discussed below, the treatments of interest (B and Y) consist of ve repeti-
tions of the one-shot play of the theoretical game. One such signaling game con-
sists of two periods.25 In the rst period, the incumbent chooses a signal payo¤
pair (px; pz), which is based on a signal pair of the form (t; G). All payo¤ pairs are
common information. Once the incumbent makes his or her choice, the voter ob-
serves his or her payo¤ (pz) and the possible payo¤s for the incumbent. The voter
then responds by either accepting (re-electing) or rejecting (not re-electing) this
payo¤. Regardless of whether the voter accepts or rejects, rst-period payo¤s are
determined by the incumbents choice. However, the voters decision to accept or
reject a¤ects payo¤s in the second period of the repetition. If the voter accepts, the
24A linear tax-cost function a¤ects the good-types maximization problem in expression 1.
In particular, we get maxG [G  G], which reduces to maxG [G (1  )]. If the parameter
(1  )  0, then G > 0. If not, then G = 0. So, in order to have an interior solution, we
need  and  to satisfy the following relation:   1 . This condition is satised in all parame-
terizations. A linear tax-cost function also leaves conditions 5 and 6 una¤ected. Namely, suppose
the condition   1 holds. Now, consider a slight increase in either  or  such that  becomes
strictly greater than 1 . Then, G
 goes from strictly positive to zero in a discrete manner. The
relationships captured by expressions 5 and 6 are maintained.
25Note that the rst (second) part in the experimental game corresponds to the rst (second)
period in the theoretical game. One repetition of such game is called a period in the experimental
game. This is due to z-trees terminology.
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incumbent chooses between another set of alternative payo¤ pairs. That choice de-
termines the payo¤s in the second period and the voter does not get to accept or
reject this second-period choice. If the voter rejects, the incumbent does not get to
play in the second period and he or she gets zero payo¤. In turn, the "challengers
type" is determined at random and modeled as a move of nature. In other words,
the challenger is not an actual person in the experimental game. This is also why
the challenger was termed "passive" in the theoretical game. If the challengers
type is (g; L)i.e., if the two coin tosses land (heads; heads)the voter gets a high
payo¤ with twenty ve percent chance. If the challengers type is (g;H)i.e., if the
two coin tosses land (heads; tails)the voter gets a medium payo¤ with twenty ve
percent chance. If the challengers type is badi.e., if the coin tosses land either
(tails; heads) or (tails; tails)the voter gets a low payo¤ with fty percent chance.
The following additional parameterizations and theoretical guidelines are rele-
vant for the treatments discussed below.
1. The marginal cost of public funds is strictly positive;  = 1
4
> 0.
2. The unit cost of the public good () equals one or two with equal probability.
3. There is a maximal level of tax collection, T . In particular, T = 4:00.
4. There is a negative relationship between the unit cost of public good provision
and the level of public good provision; i.e., G

< 0 within the same treat-
ment.
5. The payo¤ pairs presented in the experimental game are on the equilibrium
path according to the specied preferences. In other words, the incumbent
and the voter are not faced with alternatives that are o¤ the equilibrium path.
Finally, one additional theoretical implication guides the experimental design. It
departs slightly from the theory and thus is described separately. In the theoreti-
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cal game, GT is zero. This follows from the assumption that the bad type does not
care about public good provision. In particular, when the bad type diverts maxi-
mal rents of T , is it optimal and economically rational to set public good provision
equal to zero (i.e., GT = 0). From a practical standpoint, this is problematic since
GT = 0 automatically implies negative payo¤s for the voter whenever the incum-
bent makes a choice associated with such signal. Since negative experimental pay-
o¤s tend to introduce complications for subjects, we would rather avoid such para-
meterization. Consequently, in the experimental game, the minimum level of public
good is set equal to one, i.e., GT = 1.
What does this imply for the theoretical model? Well, GT = 0 is the result
of an equilibrium condition. In other words, the incumbent that "separates" will
never set GT > 0 without an additional assumption in the model. So, we introduce
the additional theoretical assumption that the bad type must provide at least some
level of the public good when diverting maximum rents. This can be seen as a com-
plementary assumption to that of maximum rents equal to T . So, let GT = , for
some  > 0. What restrictionsif anyshould be placed on ? Well, theoretically 
must be small enough such that all equilibrium congurations still exist. In other
words,  cannot be so large that it rules out the possibility of a separating equilib-
rium occurring a priori.26 Experimentally,  must be large enough such that voter
welfare is nonnegative in Treatment B and Treatment Y. GT equal to one satises
this condition given the above parameterizations.
26To derive bounds for , consider the restraint rule in expression 12. Replace r = T by r =
T  for  2 fH;Lg, where H > L. The pooling equilibrium exists as long as   (1 )T r1H(1 ) while
the separating equilibrium exists as long as   (1 )T r1L(1 ) . Thus, (1 )T r1H(1 )    (1 )T r1L(1 ) .
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Treatments
The experimental design is based on two treatments:27
1. A Baseline treatment (Treatment B).28 This treatment tests the basic predic-
tions of the theory as captured by the discussion pertaining to lemma 1.
2. A Yardstick competition treatment (Treatment Y). This treatment tests the
predictions arising from the model as captured by propositions 2 and 3.
Treatment B. During the rst period of the repetition, the incumbent is pre-
sented with a choice between three or two alternatives. Whether the incumbent
chooses between three or two alternatives depends on the level of . If  = 1, the
incumbent chooses between three alternatives. If  = 2, the incumbent chooses
between two alternatives. The rationale comes from the fact that we only consider
choices that are on the equilibrium path according to the specied preferences.
If  = 1, the incumbent can behave according to one of the following types: (1)
the incumbent can behave as type (g; L), set rents equal to zero and thus equalize
payo¤s or (2) the incumbent can behave as type (b; L) and play according to the
pooling or separating equilibrium depending on the incumbents discount factor and
expected probability of acceptance. If  = 2, the incumbent can behave accord-
ing to one of the following types: (1) the incumbent can behave as type (g;H) by
setting rents equal to zero and thus equalizing payo¤s or (2) the incumbent can be-
have as type (b;H) and divert maximum rents in equilibrium under the expectation
of being rejected.
27Viceisza (2007c) reports two additional treatments: (1) a Marginal cost of public funds treat-
ment (Task M) and a stochastic (unit) cost of public goods or Risk treatment (Task R). Treat-
ment M is the same as Treatment B with the only exception that the marginal cost of public
funds () has increased. The treatment tests the predictions arising from the model as captured
by proposition 4. Treatment R is the same as Treatment B with the only exception that the unit
cost of the public good () has undergone an increase in risk in the second-order stochastic domi-
nance sense. This treatment tests the predictions arising from the model as captured by proposi-
tion 5.
28In the subject instructions (appendix B), the term "Treatment" is replaced by "Task."
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Each alternative that the incumbent faces consists of a payo¤ pair of the form
(px; pz). The payo¤s for a good incumbent are dictated by preferences as specied,
pgx = pz = G  14t under the assumption that rent is equal to zero. The payo¤s for a
bad incumbent are dictated by preferences as specied, pbx = t   G.
Table 1 shows the rst-period payo¤ pairs faced by type (i; ) if this type sends
a signal of the form (t; G). Subjects face these payo¤s in the experiment sessions
(see subject instructions).29 From the table it is clear that the incumbent can equal-
ize payo¤s if good or behave according to the pooling or separating equilibrium if
bad depending on (1) the draw of , (2) the subjects (subjective) discount factor
() and/or (3) the subjects expected probability of acceptance (re-election).
It should be noted that even though it seems costless for type (b; L) to choose
Alternative 1 rather than Alternative 2 when  = 1, these payo¤ pairs are based on
completely di¤erent signal pairs according to the specied preferences. In particu-
lar, preferences as specied by the model dictate that a bad incumbent never equal-
izes payo¤s, since payo¤s can only be equal when r = 0. So, a choice that gives rise
to equal payo¤s for incumbents and voters is inherently the result of a character-
istic of the good type by assumption of the model. It is important to keep this in
mind when the results are discussed.
Furthermore, it should be clear that the pooling equilibrium is only an option
when  = 1. Again, this is the result of the experimental design which only takes
into account actions that are on the equilibrium path. In particular, the pooling
equilibrium corresponds to the case in which the incumbent of type (b; L) chooses
A2 in the rst period by "pooling" with type (g;H), "fools" the voter, gets ac-
cepted (re-elected) and "slams" the voter in the second period by choosing A5 (be-
haves like a lame duck).
29All payo¤s shown hereas well as those shown in the instructionsare in experimental dollars.
Each experimental dollar is a quarter of a real U.S. dollar. This was done to maintain the payo¤s
predicted by the signaling gamegiven the current parameterizationwhile still enabling a¤ordable
subject payments.
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On the other hand, the separating equilibrium corresponds to the case in which
the incumbent of type (b; L) or type (b;H) diverts maximum rents in the rst pe-
riod of the repetition with the expectation of being rejected. If accepted, both types
will "slam" the voter in the second period of the repetition. In table 1 the separat-
ing equilibrium is represented by the incumbent choosing A3 or A2 depending on
the draw of  with the expectation of being rejected but the intent to "slam" the
voter by choosing A5 or A4 if accepted.
Once the incumbent makes a choice, the voter observes his or her payo¤. The
voter is informed of the range of possible payo¤s for the incumbent. The voter then
accepts or rejects the incumbents choice. Either way, the incumbent and the voter
get the rst-period payo¤s chosen by the incumbent. However, the voters accep-
tance or rejection decision a¤ects payo¤s in the second period of the repetition. If
the voter accepts the incumbents choice, the incumbent gets to choose another al-
ternative which will determine second-period payo¤s. These alternatives are shown
in table 2.30
If the voter rejects the incumbents choice, the incumbent gets zero payo¤ for
the second period of the repetition and the voters payo¤s are randomly determined
as follows: (1) with twenty ve percent chance, the voters payo¤ is 1.50 experimen-
tal dollars, (2) with twenty ve percent chance, the voters payo¤ is 0.75 experimen-
tal dollars or (3) with fty percent chance, the voters payo¤ is 0.16 experimental
dollars.
30The alternatives in table 2 are termed Ai or Aj , for j = i + 1 since the subscript depends on
the draw of  in the rst period of the repetition. For example, if  was 1 in the rst period, then
the incumbent had a choice between three alternatives fA1; A2; A3g in the rst period. Conse-
quently, if accepted, the incumbent would face a choice between Alternative 4 (A4) or Alternative
5 (A5) in the second period of the repetition. On the other hand, if  was 2 in the rst period,
then the incumbent would face a choice between Alternative 3 (A3) or Alternative 4 (A4) in the
second period.
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Table 1: First Period Payo¤s (Treatments B and Y)
 = 1  = 2
Alternative (g; L) sends (2; 2) Alternative (g;H) sends (3; 1:50)
A1 (1:50; 1:50) A1 (0:75; 0:75)
(b; L) sends (3; 1:50)
A2 (1:50; 0:75) not applicable*
(b; L) sends (3:35; 1) (b;H) sends (3:35; 1)
A3 (2:35; 0:16) A2 (1:35; 0:16)
* No comparable alternative due to "on the equilibrium path" assumption.
Table 2: Second Period Payo¤s (Treatments B and Y)
2;L= 1 2;H= 2
Alternative (g; L) sends (2; 2) Alternative (g;H) sends (3; 1:50)
A3 or A4 (1:50; 1:50) A3 or A4 (0:75; 0:75)
(b; L) sends (3:35; 1) (b;H) sends (3:35; 1)
A4 or A5 (2:35; 0:16) A4 or A5 (1:35; 0:16)
The rst and second periods of the experimental game together constitute a rep-
etition. Treatment B consists of ve such repetitions that comprise two periods.
Each period  is randomly drawn and revealed to the incumbent accordingly. The
voter knows the distribution of  each and every period. Note that repetition is in-
troduced to avoid complications as discussed in Brandts and Holt (2005). As al-
luded to previously, they nd that subjects follow a Bayesian learning process when
playing signaling games. One way to partly exploit this nding is to introduce rep-
etition. The choice of ve periods is based on a trade-o¤ between "optimality of
subject understanding and learning" and length of the experiment sessions. Since
the theory is not one of repeated play, subjects are paired with di¤erent partners
each and every period. They are informed accordingly before the experiment begins
(see subject instructions).
Treatment Y. This treatment represents the yardstick competition treat-
ment. As suggested by the model, we enable voters to use yardstick comparisons by
37
amplifying their information set. In particular, the voter gets to see the distribution
of rst-period choices made by all incumbents in the previous treatment (Treat-
ment B). This additional information can be seen as the amplication of the voters
information set that arises due to yardstick competition. The subject instructions
indicate exactly how this information is presented to subjects.
This treatment thus di¤ers from the previous only for the voter. It can be ques-
tioned whether the information conveyed in Treatment Y is inconsistent with the
theory of yardstick competition. Namely, the theory of yardstick competition dis-
cussed previously assumes existence of one other ("foreign") jurisdiction from which
information is observed. Nonetheless, the model is not explicit whether such "for-
eign" jurisdiction must be one other jurisdiction or an aggregate (representative-
type) jurisdiction. we chose to convey aggregate o¤ers/choices as opposed to one
other incumbents o¤er/choice, since the latter signal seems relatively uninformative
and inconsistent with what a voter would observe in the naturally occurring envi-
ronment. Regardless, to perform a stricter test of the theory, we plan to conduct
some sessions in which voters are shown the o¤er/choice made by just one other
randomly chosen incumbent.
Finally, it is important to note that due to the nature of the main question, it is
necessary to have a distribution of the incumbentsdecisions in order to run Treat-
ment Y. In other words, if the voters information set is to be amplied, the ques-
tion "where does this information come from" must be addressed. From a practical
standpoint, there are a couple of possibilities: (1) The voter can observe a distribu-
tion of rst-period aggregated choices made by some external group of incumbents
that participated in Treatment B or (2) the voter can observe the distribution of
rst-period aggregated choices made by incumbents in a preceding Treatment B in
which he or she actually participated as a voter.
The rst possibility entails a design in which voters in Treatment Y observe
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a distribution of incumbent rst-period choices that comes from a session other
than their own. Even though this possibility gives rise to the ability to implement a
standard BY-YB design for decomposing learning e¤ects from treatment e¤ects, it
is more intricate to motivate to voter subjects why they will be observing decision-
making from an experiment session other than their own. Furthermore, the nature
of the question and how it relates to the setup of the theoretical model really re-
quires a subject to rst participate in Treatment B and then take part in Treat-
ment Y. So, we chose for a within-subjects design.
While this facilitates motivation of Treatment Y to subjects, it also rules out
the possibility of adopting the above mentioned BY-YB design. So, in order to
tease apart learning/sequencing e¤ects from treatment e¤ects, an alternative de-
sign is needed. The experimental design in this paper is based on a within-subject
design in which subjects participate in four treatments, two Treatments B and two
Treatments Y. In particular, subjects participate in the four treatments in the fol-
lowing order, B1Y1B2Y2. So, in total, subjects participate in twenty repetitions,
each consisting of two periods.
By comparing behavior in Treatment B1 (B2) with behavior in Treatment Y1
(Y2) and separately comparing behavior in Treatment B1 (Y1) with behavior in
Treatment B2 (Y2), treatment e¤ects can be partly separated from learning e¤ects.
As part of the experimental protocol, subjects are informed that they will partici-
pate in four treatments; however, they are not informed as to the nature of all four
treatments before beginning the experiment (see subject instructions). The nature
of each treatment (task) is only revealed to subjects as they are about to enter the
respective treatment.
While the above within-subjects design has its advantages, it also has its dis-
advantages. Namely, one might expect the e¤ect of yardstick competition to be
mitigated by this design. Specically, by the time voters enter Treatments Y1 and
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Y2, they may have su¢ cient experience facing di¤erent incumbentsdue to random
re-pairingthat they no longer respond to additional information arising from yard-
stick competition.
To see whether this aspect of the experimental design is indeed clouding the
treatment e¤ect, we plan to run across-subject experiments. While such design may
give rise to a treatment e¤ect, it also has its relative disadvantages. The main one
is that if subjects in Treatment Y did not participate in Treatment B, they are less
likely to believe the yardstick information conveyed to them.
Brief Recapitulation
Before proceeding to the experimental ndings, it is necessary to stress two is-
sues. First, it should be noted that the unit cost of public good provision  plays
an important role in the general game as well as in the interpretation of the exper-
imental results. So, the reader should familiarize him or herself with this random
variable in order to properly consume the experimental ndings.
Secondly, it is important for the reader to keep in mind the steps involved in
one repetition of the game. Thus, we briey recapitulate the steps below. Essen-
tially, Treatments B and Y di¤er only by the information given to voters (see sub-
ject instructions). Both treatments consist of ve repetitions each consisting of two
periods. By random re-pairing, we aim to reduce any repeated-play-of-the-game ef-
fects. One repetition involves the following steps:
1. Subjects are randomly assigned to be an incumbent or a voter. Once assigned
a role, the subject maintains this role throughout the experiment.
2. Subjects are allowed to behave according to their homegrown types i, which
can be "good (g)" or "bad (b)."
3. The computer virtually tosses a coin and the unit cost of public good provi-
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sion  is revealed to incumbents by means of the screen that they observe.
4. The voters are implicitly informed of the distribution of  and the correlation
between the shocks.
5. The incumbent chooses a payo¤ pair that represents a tax-public good signal.
6. The voter observes his or her part of the payo¤ and the range of possible pay-
o¤s for the incumbent.
7. The voter chooses to accept or reject such payo¤.
8. If the voter rejects such payo¤, the incumbent is not re-elected to o¢ ce and
the challengers type is determined by means of a lottery.
9. If the voter accepts such payo¤, the incumbent moves to the second period.
10. The second-period incumbents alternatives are determined by a draw of .
11. The voters second-period payo¤s are determined by the incumbents choice.
The voter has no acceptance/rejection decision.
Implementation
The experiments took place in the experimental laboratory at the Experimental
Economics Center (ExCEN) at Georgia State University. Subjects were recruited
using ExCENs online recruiter system, which contains names of students taking
courses in many di¤erent areas including but not limited to accounting, economics,
nance, geology, nursing and political science. The experiments were programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
Four experiment sessions were run. Two sessions consisted of twenty four sub-
jects, one session consisted of twenty two subjects and one session consisted of eigh-
teen subjects. In each session, half of the subjects were incumbents and half of the
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subjects were voters. Subjects were randomly assigned to seats as they entered the
experimental laboratory. This implied random assignments of roles as well. Once
assigned to a role, subjects maintained that role throughout the whole experiment.
Subjects were informed accordingly (see subject instructions).
An experiment session lasted one hour and a half and paid on average of $19.09
(standard deviation $2.28). Of these payo¤s, $10 was certain and determined by a
$5 show-up fee, a $2 payment for participating in a trial and a $3 payment for com-
pleting a post-questionnaire (see elaboration below). The remaining payo¤s were
determined by participating in the sequence of four tasks described previously.
Recognizing that the nature of the experimental game is relatively complicated,
two additional steps were undertaken to promote and test for subject understand-
ing. First, subjects participated in a trial. This was a ve minute opportunity for
subjects to familiarize themselves with the software (i.e., the game). Subjects "played"
with themselves and got to see the screens that both the incumbent and the voter
would see once the treatments started.
After subjects completed the trial they were asked if there were any questions.
If so, these were addressed person by person before Task B1 started. Subjects were
informed before initiating the trial that the trial paid one xed fee. In particu-
lar, they were informed that payment was not dependent on how fast they went
through the trial and that they should pay close attention to the screens in the trial
(see subject instructions).
Secondly, to further test and control for subject understanding, subjects partic-
ipated in a post-questionnaire. The post-questionnaire prompted the subjects for
understanding using specic questions. It indicated that a relatively small propor-
tion of subjects were confused ex-post. Excluding these subjectsresponses from
the analysis did not a¤ect any of the main results discussed below.
42
Experimental Findings
This section is dedicated to the discussion of the main experimental ndings.
First, it discusses issues in aggregating the data. Secondly, it presents a graphical
overview of subjectschoices. Third, it considers a one-shot analysis of the game.
Fourth, it addresses the main experimental ndings arising from Treatments B
and Y. Finally, it discusses some gender di¤erences that are distinguishable in the
data.31
The following demographic characteristics describe the average subject prole.
Almost 55% of subjects are female. The average subject age is 20.02 years with a
standard deviation of 1.62 years. The maximum annual income range reported is
$10,001 to $30,000. Finally, 7.95% of the subjects are economics majors.
Data Aggregation
As mentioned previously, four experiment sessions were run in order to gather
su¢ cient data for statistical signicance. Before aggregating the data to do within-
subject comparisons, we tested whether the variables of interest were comparable
across sessions. The main variables of interest are Choice, Accept and Choice2.
"Choice" represents the rst-period choices made by the incumbent, "Accept" rep-
resents the acceptances by the voter and nally, "Choice2" represents the second-
period choices made by the incumbent if the voter accepted the rst-period choice.
An Epps-Singleton and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on these three variables (at
the session level) suggested no statistically signicant di¤erences across sessions
one, three and four. However, for session two, we rejected the null hypothesis that
the "Choice" observations were from the same distribution as the observations from
31Other demographic characteristics such as income (wealth) and major of study have also
been shown to have an e¤ect on corrupt behavior. See for example Frank and Schulze (2000),
Abbink and Ellman (2005) and Chakrabarti and Subramanian (2006). We do not consider such
issues here due to a lack of variation in the sample.
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the other sessions. Consequently, we addressed each of the questions below using
both the complete aggregate data set that includes session two and the aggregate
data set that excludes session two. It turns out that the main results are the same
irrespective of which data set is used. So, we use the complete aggregate data set
that includes session two to support the conclusions.
Graphical Overview of SubjectsChoices
Before proceeding to the main analyses, it is useful to look at an overview of
subjectschoices. The gures below summarize the progression of three types of
behavior over time. First, gure 2 summarizes incumbentsaveraged rst-period
choices conditional on  being low. Secondly, gure 3 summarizes incumbentsav-
eraged rst-period choices conditional on  being high. Finally, gure 4 summarizes
votersaveraged acceptance rates conditional on the incumbentso¤ers.
In interpreting the graphs, it is important to keep the following in mind. Rep-
etitions 1 through 5 represent Treatment B1, repetitions 6 through 10 represent
Treatment Y1 and so on. The treatments are separated by vertical lines. Further-
more, in any given period the draw of  was either high or low. So, there are pe-
riods in whichfor examplethe 1.50 payo¤ could not have been o¤ered/accepted,
since it was not available (recall the payo¤ pairs discussed in table 1).
Similarly, the 0.75/0.16 payo¤s could have arisen due to the fact that  was
low or due to the fact that  was high. This is particularly relevant when consid-
ering the votersdecision-making. In order to compare the relevant points on the
graph, gure 4 conditions the relevant periods on the draw of  by assigning them
the same color.
The following patterns seem to be distinguishable. Figures 2 and 3 both show
strong convergence between o¤ering the high and low payo¤s conditional on the
draw of . In other words, gures 2 and 3 suggest that as the experiment session
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progresses, incumbents are becoming more corrupt by o¤ering lower payo¤s. As for
voter behavior, gure 4 suggests that voters are accepting the 1.50 payo¤ at lower
rates. On the other hand, conditional on the draw of  acceptance rates seem to be
relatively stable for the 0.75 and 0.16 payo¤s, with a mild downward trend.
Figure 2: IncumbentsFirst-Period Choices When Unit Cost is Low
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Figure 3: IncumbentsFirst-Period Choices When Unit Cost is High
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One-Shot Analysis of The Game
Essentially, a strict test of the theoretical model entails conducting a one-shot
play of the game. In other words, a game in which subjects would only participate
in Treatments B1 and Y1 both consisting of just one period. The future research
agenda may comprise a "one-shot-play" design of this type, which would serve as a
control treatment.
However, as explained previously, the current design involves repetition to miti-
gate subject confusion. As a result, two important disclaimers are necessary. First,
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Figure 4: VotersAcceptance Rates Conditional on O¤er and Unit Cost
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in the sections below several results will be interpreted empirically since the the-
oretical model cannot explain behavior beyond the rst repetition. Secondly, to
reduce the noise of possible subject confusion and/or dependence on past experi-
ences, we consider subjectsaveraged decisions when analyzing the data and when
teasing apart learning and treatment e¤ects. Regardless of repetition, it is impor-
tant to note that random re-matching of subjects does reduce the concern about
repeated play. Nonetheless, the subjects are learning something about the popula-
tion of types as the experiment session progresses.
In the current design, subject behavior that is most consistent with the theoret-
ical game seems to be rst-period behavior in Treatments B1 and Y1. These rep-
etitions are the closest approximations to a one-shot play of the game with and
without yardstick competition. A Mann-Whitney test comparing the rst periods
of Treatments B1 and Y1 rejects the null that the votersacceptances in the two pe-
riods are the same when voters face the 1.50 and 0.16 payo¤s (p-values are 0.0751
and 0.0662 respectively).
However, this result is neither replicated for the 0.75 payo¤ nor for rst-period
decision-making in Treatments B2 and Y2. The latter is supported by the Mann-
Whitney tests conducted in the next section on subjectsaveraged choices across all
repetitions.
To further tease apart a treatment e¤ect, we compare behavior in the fourth
46
repetition of Treatment B1 with behavior in the rst repetition of Treatment Y1.
We choose to study fourth-repetition behavior in Treatment B1, since later repeti-
tions are expected to be less a¤ected by learning. However, since an end-of-treatment
e¤ect is expected to a¤ect behavior in the last repetition (repetition ve), we con-
sider fourth- as opposed to fth-repetition behavior. It is reasonable to expect that
di¤erences between behavior in the fourth repetition of B1 and the rst repetition
of Y1 are due to yardstick competition.
A Mann-Whitney test on choices made during the aforementioned two repeti-
tions suggests that there is no evidence of yardstick competition when voters make
decisions with respect to any of the proposed payo¤s (p-values are all greater than
0.49). Furthermore, a Mann-Whitney test conducted on the rst and fourth repeti-
tions of B1 suggests that behavior in the two repetitions is not the same. These two
results suggest that learning rather than yardstick competition is driving the dif-
ferences in rst-repetition behavior across Treatments B1 and Y1. Finally, it should
be noted that the incumbents rst-repetition behavior does not seem to di¤er from
Treatments B1 (B2) and Y1 (Y2).
Treatment B
To further test the basic theoretical model, we analyze the results arising from
Treatment B. In doing so, the following main questions are addressed:
1. Are there good incumbents in the subject population and if so, what is the
proportion of good types ?
2. Are there bad incumbents in the population and if so, do they play according
to the equilibria in lemma 1?
3. Do voters play according to the equilibria in lemma 1?
47
The incumbent: Good-Type Behavior. To obtain an estimate of the pro-
portion of good types in the population, it is necessary to be clear what is meant
by a good type. In the theoretical game, the good type is assumed to set rents
equal to zero and therefore, he or she equalizes payo¤s in both periods conditional
on the level of . In particular, when  is low, the preferences of the good type dic-
tate that he or she charges low taxes of tL. As a consequence, the voter infers that
observing a low tax (tL) must be the result of the good type being in o¢ ce, i.e.,
P (i = gjtL) = 1.
In the empirical game, it turns out that this is no longer the case. Given the
assumption on preferences, the above reasoning would predict that when  is low
a bad incumbent would "pool" or "separate" and never equalize payo¤s. However,
this prediction fails. It turns out that the incumbent goes to Alternative 1 in the
rst period of the repetition and acts as if he or she is good, gets accepted most of
the time and then "slams" the voter in the second period.
While this strategy will be elaborated upon at a later point, for now it is rele-
vant since this empirical strategy forces us to re-think the concept of a good versus
a bad type in the empirical game. In particular, the incumbent is now of the good
type if and only if he or she equalizes payo¤s in both periods of the repetition. This
is in contrast to the theoretical game in which the incumbents type can be inferred
from observing only the rst period choice.
Only given this understanding is it sensible to ask whether there is a positive
proportion of good types in the population, since the good type is now character-
ized by an incumbent that equalizes payo¤s in both periods. Since  is induced, we
can infer the incumbents homegrown type (i = fg; bg) from the subjects choices.
A nal noteworthy comment is that since the game on which the theory is based
is a two-period game, the theory has no prediction as to how subjects (in particu-
lar, incumbents) will behave beyond the rst repetition. In other words, the theory
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has no prediction as to how subjects will behave in repetitions two through twenty.
So, to remain in line with testing the theory, we proceed in a couple of ways. First,
to get an estimate of the proportion of types in the population without confound-
ing learning or treatment e¤ects, we use the data from the rst two periods (i.e.,
the rst repetition) of all sessions to infer incumbentstypes. Secondly, we ask the
stronger empirical question to what extent there is a positive proportion of incum-
bents that remain good throughout the whole experiment; rather than just one
given repetition.
As for the rst question, we nd that 25% of incumbents chose equal payo¤s
during both periods of the rst repetition in treatment B1; i.e., ^ = 14 , which sug-
gests that 25% of incumbents are good in the sense that they maximize societal
welfare in an equitable manner when re-elected. For purposes of comparison, table
3 contains proportions of good types for the nth repetition, where n represents the
rst and last repetition in treatments B1, B2, Y1 and Y2 respectively. These propor-
tions answer the question what happens to ^ as the experiment session progresses.
Note that this is an empirical question, since the theory has no prediction in this
respect.
The reasoning for calculating these proportions is discussed next. First, ^ is cal-
culated for the beginning of the treatment, since it is expected that there is some
type of "restart" e¤ect in the rst repetition of a new treatment. Furthermore, ^ is
calculated for the end of the treatment, since subjects know this is the last repeti-
tion and are less likely to "play ctitiously." Table 3 conrms these expectations.
The level of ^ goes down as a treatment progresses and the level of ^ jumps upward
when a new treatment begins. More specically, ^ goes down to 2.27% in the nal
repetition.
It is worth mentioning that there seems to be a "structural break" in the pro-
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portion of good types when Treatment B2 is initiated.32 In fact, this result is recog-
nizable in many of the tables that are upcoming. We discuss possible causes in
the Treatment Y section below. Finally, it should be noted that the theory rules
out the possibility that incumbents "turn bad" (and vice versa) by assuming that
players have a "xed" type. These results suggest otherwise; in particular, subjects
"change types" (i.e., alter their behavior) as they advance through the experiment.
While this nding can be disclaimed by the fact that the theory is not one of
multiple repetitions, it should be noted that this behavior is nonetheless exhibited
in the rst repetition already. One way to control for this is to have subjects play
a one-shot version of this game. If incumbents are found to behave like the good
type in the rst period and "slam" the voter in the second period in a one-shot ver-
sion of this game as well, such nding would optimally support the conclusion that
subjects are "changing types."33
Table 3: Proportion of Good Types within a Repetition
N = 44
Repetition 1 5 6 10 11 15 16 20
^ 25.00% 6.82% 22.73% 4.55% 6.82% 6.82% 4.55% 2.27%
We now turn to the second question posed above, which asks to what extent
there is a positive proportion of incumbents that remain good throughout the ex-
periment session (i.e., Treatments B1, Y1, B2 and Y2). Table 4 answers this ques-
tion.
In this table, ^0K represents the proportion of incumbents that equalized pay-
o¤s during both periods of a repetition more than K% of the time given the oppor-
tunity to do so. For example, ^075 is the percentage of incumbents that equalized
32The term "structural break" has a technical denition in the econometrics literature; in par-
ticular, the time series literature. In this paper, the term is used loosely to indicate a situation in
which subject behavior undergoes a signicant "jump"i.e., change.
33This same disclaimer applies for upcoming sections where we relate the ndings of the
twenty-repetition game with the predictions from the model.
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payo¤s in both periods of a repetition more than 75% of the time given the oppor-
tunity to do so. So, the proportion ^075 includes the proportion of incumbents who
equalized payo¤s 100% of the time as well. The same holds for the other propor-
tions.
The table shows that 4.55% of incumbents equalized payo¤s during the whole
experiment whenever they had the opportunity to do so. Empirically, these are
the truly "good" incumbents, since they equalize payo¤s during the whole experi-
ment session. The table also reports the complement proportion to ^00. This is the
proportion of incumbents that never equalized payo¤s in both periods even though
they had the opportunity to do so. These can be considered the "truly bad types,"
sinceat no point during the experiment sessiondid they behave like a good type.
This proportion is equal to 50% of the subjects; i.e., 50% of subjects never chose to
equalize payo¤s in both periods of a repetition.
Table 4: Proportion of Good Types within a Session
N = 44
Proportion ^0100 ^
0
75 ^
0
50 ^
0
25 ^
0
0 1  ^00
% 4.55% 11.36% 13.64% 36.36% 50% 50%
The incumbent: Bad-Type Behavior. Thus far, we have mainly focused
on the proportion of good types in the subject population. Even though this en-
ables inference on the proportion of bad types, it is necessary to look at the follow-
ing issues: (1) the progression of bad types and (2) their behavior. In doing so, it is
important to address both rst- and second-period behavior.
First-period behavior can indicate whether an incumbent is a bad type and if
so, whether he or she plays according to the theoretical equilibriai.e., whether he
or she "pools" or "separates." Second-period behavior conditional on rst-period
behavior indicates whether an incumbent is a good type or a bad type that "pools",
"separates" or makes theoretically inconsistent choices.
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Table 5 presents rst-period behavior for the incumbent. In particular, the table
conveys the percentage of times that incumbents made (un)equal choices during the
rst period of all repetitions conditional on the draw of . The table reects a few
key aspects. First, many incumbents choose to equalize payo¤s in the rst period.
On average, incumbents choose to equalize payo¤s 75% of the time in Treatment B1
when  = 1. This proportion goes down to 53.79% in Treatment Y2. It seems that
incumbents are moving from equalizing to "separating" as the experiment session
progresses. This can be conrmed by observing the progression of P (A3j = 1).
This nding is robust to the draw of  as illustrated by the table. Furthermore, on
average incumbents are "pooling" 3.32% of the time and "separating" 33.76% of
the time. These values are not shown in the table.
Finally, it can also be inferred from table 5 that the majority of incumbents (on
average, 62.92%) chose equal payo¤s during the rst period of the repetition. As
discussed previously, the theoryat least for the rst periodwould conclude that
those subjects were good. However, table 6 leads to a di¤erent conclusion.
Table 5: Distribution of IncumbentsFirst-Period Choices
N = 44 Treatment (Task)
B1 Y1 B2 Y2
Probability [1-5]* [6-10] [11-15] [16-20]
P (A1j = 1) 75.00** 71.97 60.61 53.79
P (A2j = 1) 6.82 8.33 4.55 6.82
P (A3j = 1) 18.18 19.70 34.84 39.39
P (A1j = 2) 73.86 67.05 53.41 47.73
P (A2j = 2) 26.14 32.95 46.59 52.27
* The values in brackets represent repetitions.
** These values are in percentages.
Table 6 presents the percentage of times that incumbents made equal or unequal
choices during the second period of the repetition conditional on having been ac-
cepted in the rst period and conditional on the draw of  in the rst period. The
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table suggests many actions that are o¤ the equilibrium path.
First, a main result is that many incumbents choose to equalize payo¤s in the
rst period of the repetition and then "slam" voters in the second period of the
repetition. These are termed theoretically inconsistent choices. They are inconsis-
tent with the theory, since the theory requires that a bad type divert rent in both
periods of the repetition as opposed to just one period of the repetition. In par-
ticular, the theory predicts that the conditional probabilities P (A5jA1; 1;L) and
P (A4jA1; 1;H) will be equal to zero.34 Clearly, this is not the case.
The main explanation seems to be that the assumption that the incumbent is
either good or bad and that the incumbent maintains such type within the two-
period game fails. This further implies that a key aspect of the theoretical and ex-
perimental environmentnamely, that the incumbents preference structure is spec-
ied by either pgx or p
b
x (dened previously)is called into question. Note that this
should be disclaimed by the fact that this nding may not be robust to alterna-
tive parameterizations of the experiment. For example, when 1 = 1, if Alternative
2 (A2) in table 1 were "costly" to the incumbent in the sense that the payo¤ pair
were (2:00; 1:00) as opposed to (1:50; 0:75) and Alternative 1 conditional on 1 = 2
were (1:00; 1:00), it would be an empirical question whether this nding would still
arise.35
Nonetheless, it should be recognized that the specication of preferences in the
theoretical model may need to be re-thought. Since theoretically payo¤ equalization
is a characteristic of the good type, the sole fact that we observe bad incumbents
choosing to equalize payo¤s, is an indication that the incumbents preferences can-
not just be characterized by either a good- or a bad-types preferences. Instead, a
"correct" characterization is most likely a mixture of these two types of preferences.
34Recall that 1;L represents the rst-period level of  which is lowi.e., L = 1. Similarly, 1;H
indicates that  is high (H = 2) in the rst period.
35This question will be addressed in a future set of experiments.
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This issue is partly addressed by Lockwood (2005).
Finally, the table suggests that some good incumbents are "turning bad." This
can be concluded by observing the decrease in P (A4jA1; 1;L) and P (A3jA1; 1;H)
as the experiment session progresses. Partially, this nding also goes against the
theory, since the theory assumes thatat least in the rst repetitionincumbents
would have a xed type. The theory is further violated in that subjects "switch"
types in other directions as well. Namely, the theory predicts that the conditional
probabilities P (A4jA2; 1;L), P (A4jA3; 1;L) and P (A3jA2; 1;H) will be zero. How-
ever, this is not the case. In other words, some incumbents "pool" or "separate" in
the rst period of the repetition and equalize thereafter.
Table 6: Second-Period Conditional on First-Period and on Theta
N = 44 Treatment (Task)
B1 Y1 B2 Y2
Probability [1-5] [6-10] [11-15] [16-20]
P (A4jA1; 1;L) 33.33 28.99 20.83 17.95
P (A5jA1; 1;L) 66.67 71.01 79.17 82.05
P (A4jA2; 1;L) 14.29 0.00 50.00 100.00
P (A5jA2; 1;L) 85.71 100.00 50.00 0.00
P (A4jA3; 1;L) 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00
P (A5jA3; 1;L) 100.00 100.00 66.67 100.00
P (A3jA1; 1;H) 32.26 25.00 40.00 20.00
P (A4jA1; 1;H) 67.74 75.00 60.00 80.00
P (A3jA2; 1;H) 0.00 0.00 12.50 12.50
P (A4jA2; 1;H) 100.00 100.00 87.50 87.50
Voter Behavior. Thus far, the voters behavior has not been explicitly ad-
dressed. While the voters behavior can be inferred from the discussion so far, this
section is explicitly dedicated to the votersacceptance (A) and rejection decisions.
A couple tables guide the discussion.
Table 7 shows the percentage acceptances conditional on the rst-period choices
that were available to the incumbent based on the draw of . The probabilities in
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the table should be interpreted as follows: P (A; 1:50j1;L) is the probability of ac-
cepting a payo¤ of 1.50 when 1.50 was available since the draw of  was low in the
rst period. Similarly, P (A; 0:75j1;L) is the probability of accepting a payo¤ of
0.75 when 1.50 was available since  was low. Similar interpretations can be associ-
ated with the remaining probabilities.
The table suggests a few key results: First, the majority of voters initially ac-
cept the 1.50 payo¤, as the theory would predict. However, as the experiment ses-
sion progresses, voters accept this payo¤ at lower rates. In this sense, voters most
denitely play according to the theoretical equilibrium in the rst period.
Secondly, voters fail to play according to the equilibrium prediction when the
incumbent "separates." Equilibrium behavior would predict that P (A; 0:16j1;L)
and P (A; 0:16j1;H) be equal to zero. Yet, they are not.36
Finally, voters seem to be better at detecting the bad incumbent when he or
she "pools" according to the theoretical equilibrium only as the experiment session
progresses. This e¤ect can be seen by observing P (A; 0:75j1;L), which decreases to
11.11% by the end of the experiment session. This is consistent with ndings in the
literature. On the other hand, P (A; 0:75j1;H) does not change much through the
course of the experiment session.
It is also worth noting that contrary to the theoretical game in which the level
of  is common knowledge so that voters can update according to Bayesrule, the
experimental game is silent in this respect. This is due to the fact that the experi-
mental design does not induce good or bad behavior upon the subjects. In particu-
lar, voters need to "somehow" create a belief with respect to the incumbents type
since the incumbent is allowed to have his or her homegrown type. From table 7 it
is clear that voters initially perceive  as being higher than later in the experiment
session.
36The questionnaire indicates that these decisions are partly due to a conscious choice by some
voters to accept all rst-period choices.
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Table 7: Distribution of VotersAcceptances Conditional on theta
N = 44 Treatment (Task)
B1 Y1 B2 Y2
Probability [1-5] [6-10] [11-15] [16-20]
P (A; 1:50j1;L) 84.85 72.63 60.00 54.93
P (A; 0:75j1;L) 77.78 54.55 33.33 11.11
P (A; 0:16j1;L) 8.33 11.54 6.52 7.69
P (A; 0:75j1;H) 47.69 40.68 42.55 35.71
P (A; 0:16j1;H) 13.04 27.59 19.51 17.39
The set of probabilities discussed in the previous table give rise to the possibil-
ity to gauge whether the voter is able to detect bad incumbents and thus whether
the voter behaves according to the "pooling" equilibrium. A more intuitive way of
thinking about the votersdecisions is to consider the percentage of acceptances
that are conditional on the voters payo¤ rather than the draw of . After all, such
probabilities are more consistent with the voters information set in the sense that
when accepting or rejecting a rst-period choicethe voter does not know the draw
of . Table 8 displays this alternative set of probabilities. The patterns remain un-
altered. Acceptance rates continue to go down for payo¤s of 1.50 and 0.75 while
they tend mildly upwardly for the payo¤ of 0.16.
Table 8: Distribution of VotersAcceptances Unconditional on theta
N = 44 Treatment (Task)
B1 Y1 B2 Y2
Probability [1-5] [6-10] [11-15] [16-20]
P (A; 1:50) 84.47 75.38 59.52 52.08
P (A; 0:75) 52.03 42.06 35.19 31.82
P (A; 0:16) 9.60 23.04 12.29 9.72
Treatment Y
This section is dedicated to the main question, which is to what extent yard-
stick competition has an e¤ect on corruption. The rst part discusses some stylized
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facts and trends that are distinguishable from the data tables discussed thus far.
The second part revisits Besley and Smarts two main propositions on the e¤ect
of yardstick competition on voter and incumbent behavior as well as voter welfare.
Finally, the third part attempts to tease apart learning from treatment e¤ects by
exploiting the B1Y1-B2Y2 experimental design.
Stylized Facts Across Treatments. Thus far, the paper has not explicitly
paid much attention to the time trends arising in the data. This section addresses
that by summarizing a set of stylized facts. These are useful when thinking about
the e¤ect of yardstick competition on corruption. In doing so, it is important to
keep in mind that the e¤ect of yardstick competition should reect itself in the in-
cumbents and the voters decision-making. The following stylized facts can be dis-
tinguished.
1. The incumbentGood Type. The proportion of good types in the subject
population (^) is decreasing as the experiment session progresses (see table
3). In particular, only 4.55% of subjects are "truly good" from an empirical
standpoint in the sense that they equalize payo¤s throughout the whole ex-
periment session when given the opportunity to do so (see table 4). Further-
more, there seems to be a signicant drop in the percentage of rst-period
good types when making the transition from Treatment B2 to Treatment
Y1. This was previously termed a "structural break" in behavior. While the
"restart e¤ect" is noted when transitioning from B1 to Y1, it is not noted
when transitioning from Y1 to B2.
2. The incumbentBad Type in First Period. It is very clear that as the experi-
ment session progresses, incumbents are starting to show their true colors. In
expectation of being rejected more often, incumbents start to "separate" more
often. This is shown in table 4 by observing the progression of P (A3j = 1)
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and P (A2j = 2). Again, the "structural break" in behavior is exhibited when
transitioning from Y1 to B2.
3. The incumbentBad Type in Second Period. There seems to be some evi-
dence of "slamming" the voter more frequently as the experiment session pro-
gresses. An interesting pattern arising from table 6 is that bad incumbents
seem to "slam" the voter more frequently in the yardstick competition treat-
ments than in the baseline treatments. This is generally true for both draws
of  and may have to do with the fact that incumbents retaliate for being re-
jected more often in the Y treatments. Furthermore, the "structural break"
remains present when making the transition from Y1 to B2.
4. The voter. As voters "learn" and observe other incumbents choices arising
from yardstick competition, they start to reject more frequently (see table 7).
An interesting pattern is that as the session progresses, more voters tend to
accept the low payo¤ of 0.16. This is very much a violation of the theory on a
repetition by repetition basis. Further disaggregated analysis and responses in
the post questionnaire suggest that this result is not due to subject confusion.
5. "Structural Break in Behavior." It is worth asking what the cause of this
so-called "structural break" in behavior may be. Recalling that this occurs
when transitioning from Y1 to B2, we take this as mild evidence of yardstick
competition. How so? Well, once the third treatment is announced as an-
other Treatment B, incumbents and voters may realize that the fourth treat-
ment will most likely be another Treatment Y. Therefore, decisions made in
Treatment B2 will very much have an e¤ect on the votersinformation sets in
Treatment Y2. Consequently, incumbents may alter their behavior. This nd-
ing should be disclaimed by the fact that subjects may be getting tired at this
point in the experiment session. So, part of the "structural break" may also
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be caused by their desire to end the game. If so, incumbents are expected to
"separate" more often and voters are expected to reject more often. Regard-
less, responses in the post questionnaire regarding the length of the experi-
ment suggest that this "structural break" in behavior cannot be explained by
subject "fatigue" alone.
Propositions 2 and 3 Revisited. The theoretical model discussed previ-
ously has some clear predictions with respect to the e¤ect of yardstick competition.
These were established in the form of propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 2 has several theoretical predictions for the case with yardstick com-
petition. First, the proposition claims that in the presence of yardstick competi-
tion we observe a pooling equilibrium if ^ > 1
2
and a hybrid equilibrium otherwise.
From tables 3 and 4, it is safe to infer that ^ < 1
2
. So, if the theory were correct,
incumbents should be adopting a mixed strategy over pooling and separating in the
presence of yardstick competition.
From a relative standpoint, this seems to be the case. On average incumbents
play according to the pooling and separating equilibria more often in Y1; Y2 in com-
parison to B1; B2. In particular, in Y1, incumbents "pool" 8.33% of the time and
"separate" 19.70% of the time as opposed to 6.82% and 18.18% respectively in B1.
Similarly, they "pool" 6.82% of the time and "separate" 39.39% of the time in Y2
in comparison to 4.55% and 34.84% in B2. In turn, voters are able to react accord-
ingly by accepting less often as illustrated by table 7.
Furthermore, proposition 2 also has the implication that the theoretical pooling
equilibrium will occur less often when the foreign incumbent has a poor initial rep-
utation. This aspect is more di¢ cult to infer from the data, since incumbents seem
to violate this type of equilibrium to begin with. Yet, there is some evidence to sug-
gest thatas the experiment session progresses, which also implies that ^ is going
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down (i.e., the foreign incumbent has a worse reputation)the theoretical pooling
equilibrium is less likely to occur. At the same time, support for proposition 2 is
found by considering the empirical "analogue" of the theoretical pooling equilib-
rium. Namely, as the (foreign) incumbentsreputations worsen, incumbents are less
likely to make the theoretically inconsistent choices discussed previously and "sep-
arate" by diverting maximum rents in the rst period of the repetition. Voters are
also more likely to reject such theoretically inconsistent choices as compared to be-
fore; i.e., they reject the 1.50 payo¤ more often as shown by table 7.
Proposition 3 basically predicts that if ^ is low, voter welfare will be lower when
yardstick comparisons are available than when they are not. The rationale is that
bad incumbents will do little to build a reputation. They will be voted out with lit-
tle gain for the voter, since they are replaced by politicians of the same type. This
proposition also seems to be supported in the data. As shown in table 9, average
voter welfare is decreasing in the presence of yardstick competition. However, stan-
dard Mann-Whitney tests performed on average incumbent payo¤s between treat-
ments nd that the di¤erences between the average payo¤s are not statistically sig-
nicant (p-values are 1.000). In other words, voter welfare is statistically unchanged
in the presence of yardstick competition.
This result is in line with two main ndings. First, recall that ^ is relatively
low. Even at the initial stage of the game, ^ was estimated to be 25%. So, propo-
sition 3 would suggest that voter welfare is non-increasing with yardstick compe-
tition. Secondly, as is discussed further below, the learning e¤ect dominates the
treatment (i.e., yardstick competition) e¤ect in the experiment sessions. This is
most likely due to (1) the small proportion of good types in the population and (2)
the learning on the part of voters that this is the case.
60
Table 9: VotersTotal Average Welfare
N = 44
Treatment Average Payo¤s
B1 7.56*
Y1 7.35
B2 6.87
Y2 6.69
* Payo¤s are in experimental dollars.
The above discussion suggests that even though subjects do not play according
to the theoretical equilibria in Treatment B, minor modications of the theoretical
hypotheses enable interpretations of the case with yardstick comparisons. In partic-
ular, the experimental yardstick games are characterized by a key environment pa-
rameter: a level of ^ that is below 50% and low enough that yardstick comparisons
leave welfare levels unchanged. This is also the case in which yardstick comparisons
have little e¤ect on corrupt incumbent behavior.
Finally, it is worth noting that these results suggest some evidence against the
Belleamme and Hindriks (2005) model. While their model is not an explicit ob-
ject of study in the paper, the fact that welfare seems to be non-increasing in the
presence of yardstick competition provides some evidence against their model.
Learning or Treatment E¤ects: Averaged Analysis. Previously, we
considered treatment and learning e¤ects for rst-period behavior in isolation. In
this section, we consider averaged choices over all repetitions. Two tables support
the main conclusion that yardstick competition has little e¤ect on incumbent and
voter behavior. All tables report Mann-Whitney p-values for the two variables of
interestin this case "Choice" and "Accept"in order to distinguish any treatment
e¤ects.
Both tables suggest that the main e¤ects observed in the data are due to learn-
ing and not due to yardstick competition. Table 10 reports Mann-Whitney tests for
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the incumbents averaged choices conditional on the draw of .37 The table suggests
uniformly that there are no statistically signicant di¤erences between Treatments
B1 (B2) and Y1 (Y2), but that there are statistically signicant di¤erences between
B1 (Y1) and B2 (Y2). This implies that the incumbents behavior is una¤ected by
yardstick competition, but strongly a¤ected by learning.
Table 11 reports the same test for the voters averaged choices conditional on
the voters payo¤ resulting from the incumbents rst-period choice. This table is
slightly less conclusive. For the payo¤ of 1.50, the results align with those above.
In particular, there is a strong learning e¤ect that mitigates the treatment e¤ect.
However, when the payo¤ is 0.75, there is only marginal evidence of learning. The
treatment e¤ect remains non-existent. Finally, when the payo¤ is 0.16 there is nei-
ther evidence of learning nor of yardstick competition.
These results should be interpreted carefully; especially in light of the previous
discussion on the one-shot analysis of the game. As suggested, there seems to be
an evidence of yardstick competition, which is cluttered by a learning e¤ect. This
gives rise to the immediate question: If we observe a partial treatment e¤ect when
comparing rst-period behavior in Treatments B1 and Y1, why do we not observe
such e¤ect when comparing averaged choices across all repetitions in the respective
treatments?
There are a couple of possibilities. First, when comparing rst-period behavior,
there seems to be a learning e¤ect in addition to this treatment e¤ect. It is possible
that when decisions are averaged across repetitions, the learning e¤ect dominates
the treatment e¤ect. Secondly, as the game progresses, it is possible that subjects
gather su¢ cient information so that they are less likely to use the information aris-
ing from yardstick competition. In other words, voters are much more likely to re-
ject the incumbentso¤ers by the time they enter Treatments B2 and Y2 without
37These results are supported by t-tests.
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paying attention to the yardstick information.
So, the above does not imply that yardstick competition has no e¤ect in general,
but it does imply that the current theoretical model may be an intricate manner of
representing a model of corruption and yardstick competition in a laboratory en-
vironment. Furthermore, it is possible that the evidence of yardstick competition
is mitigated by too much repetition (ve repetitions) and a "break-down" of the
game. In other words, by playing the game repeatedly, voters learn that there is
a su¢ ciently large proportion of bad types among the incumbent population and
thus they ignore the additional information provided in Treatment Y2. Besley and
Smarts proposition on the e¤ect of yardstick comparisons on voter welfare (propo-
sition 3) seems to be partly informative in this respect given the current level of ^
that is to be inferred from the incumbent population (recall tables 3, 4 and 9).
This suggests a couple of areas for future research: First, a design in which
subjects participate in the trial (possibly, for a longer period) and then proceed
to playing the treatments for a total of for example eight repetitions; i.e., let each
treatment consist of only two repetitions as opposed to ve. Secondly, a design in
which subjects participate in the trial and then play a one-shot version of the game
as dictated by the theoretical model. Such treatments should then shed some light
on whether the e¤ects observed in the current data are due to the treatment, the
sequencing (learning) or the repetitive nature of the experimental design.
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Table 10: Incumbents First-Period Choice Conditional on theta
N = 44
Comparison Mann-Whitney Test (p-values)
B1Y1j1;L 0.5826
B1B2j1;L 0.0335
B2Y2j1;L 0.4872
Y1Y2j1;L 0.0183
B2Y1j1;L 0.0857
B1Y1j1;H 0.2472
B1B2j1;H 0.0116
B2Y2j1;H 0.5211
Y1Y2j1;H 0.0315
B2Y1j1;H 0.1027
Table 11: Voter Acceptance Conditional on Proposed First Period Payo¤
N = 44
Comparison Mann-Whitney Test (p-values)
B1Y1j1:50 0.4580
B1B2j1:50 0.0132
B2Y2j1:50 0.4992
Y1Y2j1:50 0.0214
B2Y1j1:50 0.0929
B1Y1j0:75 0.2657
B1B2j0:75 0.1049
B2Y2j0:75 0.4620
Y1Y2j0:75 0.1485
B2Y1j0:75 0.5267
B1Y1j0:16 0.2195
B1B2j0:16 0.7796
B2Y2j0:16 0.7384
Y1Y2j0:16 0.1366
B2Y1j0:16 0.2312
Learning or Treatment E¤ects: Disaggregated Analysis. As a nal check
for yardstick competition, we return to disaggregated data from the four experi-
ment sessions. While several of the discussions that follow are based on statistically
insignicant results, they are still interesting. Table 13 recapitulates by session (i.e.,
14) and treatment (i.e., B, Y) the average rst-period decisions made by incum-
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bents (i.e., Choice) and voters (Accept). These distributions are not conditioned
on the draw of the unit cost , since it is useful to look at these results from the
voters perspective. Namely, the "Choice" distributions in Treatments B1 and B2
represent the actual information conveyed to voters in Treatments Y1 and Y2.
First, note that the proportion of incumbents that equalize rst-period payo¤s
with certainty is always less than 50%. Even though voters do not know this infor-
mation a priori, they observe it once they are in the Y-treatments. Thus, according
to proposition 3 we would expect voters to be weakly worse o¤ in the yardstick ses-
sions than in the baseline sessions. This nding was established previously.
Secondly, while voter welfare is lower in the presence of yardstick competition
due to the proportion of types in the incumbent population, this nding is also
driven by votersdecision-making. In particular, table 13 indicates that except
for one treatment (viz. session 4, Treatment Y2), voters tend to re-elect more fre-
quently in the presence of yardstick comparisons upon observing the lowest payo¤
of 0.16. While these di¤erences are not statistically signicant (lowest p-value is
0.12), this is a striking result. Why would voters re-elect bad incumbents at any
higher rates in the Y-treatments unless they are confused?
To rule out the latter as a possibility, we perform Epps-Singleton tests com-
paring the distribution of votersactual re-election decisions in the Y-treatments
with random distributions of re-election decisions. Generally, these tests reject the
nullhypothesis that votersre-election decisions are distributed randomly (p-values
range from 0.00 to 0.007). In other words, votersre-election decisions are not ran-
dom. So, the above nding is taken as evidence of yardstick competition. In partic-
ular, this nding supports the claim that bad domestic incumbents are more likely
to be retained in o¢ ce when voters observe equally bad foreign incumbents. Fi-
nally, it should be noted that with the exception of Treatment Y1 in session 3, yard-
stick competition never seems to push incumbents towards better behavior.
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Table 12: Distribution of Choices and Re-elections by Session and Treatment
N = 24 Session 1, B1 Session 1, Y1 Session 1, B2 Session 1, Y2
Payo¤ Choice Accept Choice Accept Choice Accept Choice Accept
1.50 50* 86.67 45 70.37 35 66.67 33.33 8
0.75 38.33 34.78 30 27.77 20 25 25 20
0.16 11.67 0 25 13.33 45 7.41 41.67 8
N = 18 Session 2, B1 Session 2, Y1 Session 2, B2 Session 2, Y2
1.50 42.22 78.95 33.33 80 22.22 80 26.67 41.67
0.75 26.67 50 26.67 58.33 26.67 50 13.33 16.67
0.16 31.11 21.43 40 22.22 51.11 13.04 60 14.81
N = 22 Session 3, B1 Session 3, Y1 Session 3, B2 Session 3, Y2
1.50 45.45 84 49.09 74.07 45.45 56 38.18 38.10
0.75 23.64 76.92 30.91 58.82 21.82 50 20 58.33
0.16 30.91 5.88 20.00 27.27 37.73 16.67 41.82 21.73
N = 24 Session 4, B1 Session 4, Y1 Session 4, B2 Session 4, Y2
1.50 41.67 88 43.33 69.23 40 50 30 55.55
0.75 43.33 53.85 38.33 34.78 28.33 41.18 31.67 42.11
0.16 15 11.11 18.33 22.22 31.67 15.79 38.33 4.35
* All values are in percentages. T = 20 in all cases.
Gender Di¤erences
It is well-known that gender (or sex) tends to a¤ect subjectschoices. This nding
has been discussed in corruption studies (see for example Frank and Schulze 2000)
and in other types of studies (see for example Cox and Deck 2006).
The tables below suggest the following main results. For both incumbents and
voters yardstick competition does not seem to have a signicant e¤ect on subjects
choices. However, in terms of learning, the results are disjoint. While male incum-
bents exhibit learning in Treatments Y conditional on  = 1, female incumbents
exhibit learning in Treatments B and Y conditional on  = 2. There is also a case
in which neither male nor female incumbents exhibit learning (see B1B2j1;L).
As for the voter, the e¤ects of learning seem to be mixed as well. Female voters
only learn in Treatment B when conditioned on 1:50. However, male voters exhibit
learning in Treatment Y and B conditional on respectively 1.50 and 0.75. When the
voters payo¤ is 0.16, neither male nor female voters exhibit learning.
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Finally, table 17 suggests some mild evidence of yardstick competition for male
voters when transitioning from Treatment B1 to Treatment Y1 when the payo¤ is
0.75. This is also captured by table 15. However, table 18 shows that the e¤ect of
yardstick competition here is not economically signicant. This is reected by the
mild change in averaged payo¤s from 1.08 to 0.99. It should be noted that one of
Besley and Smarts yardstick propositions (proposition 2) informs the statistically
signicant nding. In particular, the proposition claims that voters will use yard-
stick competition in equilibrium when "pooling" as long as   1
2
. Thus, the fact
that male voters do not "pool" as frequently (i.e., reject more frequently) in Treat-
ment Y1 as compared to Treatment B1 may suggest that voters are using yardstick
comparisons to update their beliefs regarding the level of . Consequently, they re-
ject the 0.75 payo¤ more frequently in the presence of yardstick competition.
Table 13: Distribution of IncumbentsFirst-Period Choices
N = 44 Treatment (Task)
Male Female
B1 Y1 B2 Y2 B1 Y1 B2 Y2
Probability [1-5]* [6-10] [11-15] [16-20] [1-5] [6-10] [11-15] [16-20]
P (A1j = 1) 82.35** 74.51 64.71 54.90 70.37 70.37 58.02 53.09
P (A2j = 1) 1.96 9.80 3.92 7.84 9.88 7.41 4.94 6.17
P (A3j = 1) 15.69 15.69 31.37 37.26 19.75 22.22 37.04 40.74
P (A1j = 2) 82.35 73.53 67.65 58.82 68.52 62.96 44.44 40.74
P (A2j = 2) 17.65 26.47 32.35 41.18 31.48 37.04 55.56 59.26
* The values in brackets represent repetitions.
** These values are in percentages.
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Table 14: Second-Period Choices Conditional on First-Period Choices and theta
N = 44 Treatment (Task)
Male Female
B1 Y1 B2 Y2 B1 Y1 B2 Y2
Probability [1-5] [6-10] [11-15] [16-20] [1-5] [6-10] [11-15] [16-20]
P (A4jA1; L) 31 43 33 31 35 18 11 9
P (A5jA1; L) 69 57 67 69 65 82 89 91
P (A4jA2; L) 0 0 100 100 17 0 0 n/a
P (A5jA2; L) 100 100 0 0 83 100 100 n/a
P (A4jA3; L) n/a 0 50 0 0 0 0 0
P (A5jA3; L) n/a 100 50 100 100 100 100 100
P (A3jA1; H) 46 30 447 14 22 21 36 25
P (A4jA1; H) 54 70 56 86 78 79 64 75
P (A3jA2; H) n/a 0 20 0 0 0 0 14
P (A4jA2; H) n/a 100 80 100 100 100 100 86
n/a means this "option" was never chosen.
Table 15: Distribution of Voter Acceptances Unconditional on theta
N = 44 Treatment (Task)
Male Female
B1 Y1 B2 Y2 B1 Y1 B2 Y2
Probability [1-5] [6-10] [11-15] [16-20] [1-5] [6-10] [11-15] [16-20]
P (A; 1:50) 77.54 81.88 54.55 50.00 92.06 68.25 65.00 54.63
P (A; 0:75) 60.00 38.46 35.71 23.68 45.83 47.92 39.47 35.71
P (A; 0:16) 17.39 27.08 9.38 13.96 6.25 15.91 14.52 7.78
Table 16: IncumbentsFirst-Period Choices
N = 44 Mann-Whitney Test (p-values)
Comparison Male Female
B1Y1j1;L 0.6828 0.7207
B1B2j1;L 0.1530 0.1138
B2Y2j1;L 0.5103 0.7096
Y1Y2j1;L 0.0777 0.1037
B2Y1j1;L 0.2593 0.1903
B1Y1j1;H 0.4497 0.4167
B1B2j1;H 0.2471 0.0233
B2Y2j1;H 0.5739 0.6776
Y1Y2j1;H 0.3336 0.0380
B2Y1j1;H 0.6714 0.0635
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Table 17: Voter Acceptance Conditional on Proposed First Period Payo¤
N = 44 Mann-Whitney Test (p-values)
Comparison Male Female
B1Y1j1:50 0.5858 0.1379
B1B2j1:50 0.1192 0.0326
B2Y2j1:50 0.7545 0.5296
Y1Y2j1:50 0.0231 0.3565
B2Y1j1:50 0.0527 0.6851
B1Y1j0:75 0.1060 0.8865
B1B2j0:75 0.0863 0.5609
B2Y2j0:75 0.3346 0.8536
Y1Y2j0:75 0.2290 0.3522
B2Y1j0:75 0.8297 0.5193
B1Y1j0:16 0.3776 0.3015
B1B2j0:16 0.7006 0.3520
B2Y2j0:16 0.8133 0.4601
Y1Y2j0:16 0.2066 0.3815
B2Y1j0:16 0.1419 0.8573
Table 18: Voter Average Payo¤s Conditional on First Period Payo¤
N = 44
Condition Average Payo¤s* Condition Average Payo¤s*
Accept (A) Male Female Reject (R) Male Female
A; 1:50jB1 2.06 1.96 R; 1:50jB1 2.27 2.33
A; 1:50jY 1 1.96 1.91 R; 1:50jY 1 2.26 2.21
A; 1:50jB2 1.92 1.87 R; 1:50jB2 2.06 2.22
A; 1:50jY 2 1.97 1.76 R; 1:50jY 2 2.03 2.14
A; 0:75jB1 1.08 1.08 R; 0:75jB1 1.54 1.48
A; 0:75jY 1 0.99 1.06 R; 0:75jY 1 1.49 1.30
A; 0:75jB2 1.12 1.18 R; 0:75jB2 1.65 1.32
A; 0:75jY 2 1.03 1.14 R; 0:75jY 2 1.40 1.50
A; 0:16jB1 0.32 0.32 R; 0:16jB1 0.79 0.88
A; 0:16jY 1 0.32 0.32 R; 0:16jY 1 0.99 0.99
A; 0:16jB2 0.59 0.42 R; 0:16jB2 0.88 0.93
A; 0:16jY 2 0.32 0.47 R; 0:16jY 2 0.99 0.99
* Payo¤s are in experimental dollars
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Conclusion
This study is a contribution to the literature both theoretically and empirically.
Theoretically, the study contributes a main proposition on the e¤ect of a mean-
preserving spread in the distribution of the unit cost of the public good () on
incumbent behavior and voter welfare. In particular, the study nds that a public-
goods institution with more noise gives rise to more corruption and lower voter
welfare.
Empirically, the study is a contribution in the following ways: (1) it provides
experimental data on the e¤ect of yardstick competition on incumbent and voter
behavior and voter welfare; (2) it suggests ways in which to fortify the theory in
order to use it as a more meaningful tool for prediction; (3) it contributes to the
literature on experimental signaling (in games) and (4) it contributes to our under-
standing of yardstick competition as a potential corruption-taming mechanism.
Specically, the study nds the following. First, there is an initial nontrivial
(positive) proportion of good incumbents in the population. This proportion goes
down as the experiment sessions progress. Secondly, a large proportion of bad in-
cumbents make theoretically inconsistent choices given the assumptions of the model
and the manner in which preferences are theoretically specied. In particular, such
choices are inconsistent with the theory, since they are the result of a subject that
"chooses to be good" in the rst period of the repetition and then "chooses to be
bad" in the second period of the repetition.
This has a few main implications: (1) the denition of a good and bad type
must be re-thought, (2) the theoretical model is unable to handle this empirical
phenomenon and must therefore be reformulated and (3) since the model is un-
able to account for these theoretically inconsistent outcomes, it can be called into
question as a completely predictive tool for subject behavior in the baseline and
yardstick games.
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Third, evidence of yardstick competition is mild. Averaged choices across all
repetitions suggest that yardstick comparisons have little e¤ect on incumbent and
voter behavior. In particular, the results indicate that these experiments are char-
acterized by an institution with low proportion of good incumbents, which leaves
little room for yardstick competition. This nding is informed by one of Besley and
Smarts main propositions, which is recalled in this paper as proposition 3.
In this type of an institution with low , there is little opportunity for yard-
stick comparisons since bad incumbents are likely to be replaced by equally bad
incumbents. So, the voter would be better o¤ if he or she could ignore the informa-
tion arising from yardstick competition. This also turns out to be the case in which
yardstick competition leads to unchanged or decreasing voter welfare as observed in
the experiments.
Further evidence of yardstick competition is indicated by the fact that subjects
are more likely to re-elect a truly bad incumbent in the yardstick sessions as op-
posed to the baseline sessions. In other words, if voters observe a su¢ ciently large
proportion of foreign incumbents separating (i.e., o¤ering a rst-period payo¤ of
0.16), they are more likely to re-elect domestic incumbents that separate. They do
so at their own cost.
Finally, a partitioning of the data by gender suggests that male and female sub-
jects learn in di¤erent settings. Furthermore, there seems to be mild evidence of
yardstick competition for male voters when they face a payo¤ of 0.75. This gives
some support to Besley and Smarts other main yardstick propositionproposition
2. In particular, there seems to be some evidence that male voters use yardstick
comparisons to update their beliefs when facing the pooling equilibrium payo¤ of
0.75. They tend to reject it more frequently in the presence of yardstick compar-
isons.
71
The results of the experiments should be disclaimed by the limitations of the
study, which are intimately related to some of the extensions considered in Viceisza
(2007c). First, the yardstick competition e¤ect may be mitigated by the within-
subjects design. This can be "remedied" by running a between-subjects design.
Secondly, the theoretically inconsistent choices may be overwhelming because the
current payo¤ structure makes it non-costly for type (b; L) to equalize payo¤s. This
suggests an alternatively parameterized treatment.
Third, voters may currently be unclear how the unit cost of public good provi-
sion is determined in the sense that the process lacks transparency. This suggests a
treatment in which the distribution of the unit cost is operationalized by means of
physical devices. Furthermore, voters may be unclear how to interpret a distribu-
tion of rst-period o¤ers as opposed to just one such o¤er. This suggests conduct-
ing a treatment in which a voter observes just one other incumbents o¤er chosen
at random. Finally, these ndings may not be robust to alternative parameteriza-
tions of the experiment. This suggests conducting Treatments M and R (see Vi-
ceisza 2007c).
EFFICIENCY, TRANSPARENCY AND YARDSTICK
COMPETITION
Introduction
In recent decades, corruption has been placed highly on the economic policy
agenda. Specically, international organizations such as the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development all have supported and
continue to support numerous anti-corruption initiatives across the globe.
While at some point there was debate in the economics literature whether or
not corruption actually enhances economic e¢ ciency by "greasing the wheels of
society," recent literature seems to agree on two main arguments. First, weak in-
stitutions are at the heart of corruption be it "good" or "bad" (Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi forthcoming). Secondly, there are cases in which corruption can be
argued to be "bad" in the sense that it reduces growth (Mauro 1995) and increases
poverty and inequality (see Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Teme 1998) and in such
cases, anti-corruption mechanisms are necessary.
With a phenomenon that is so common (Transparency Internationals 2007
Corruption Perceptions Index) and that has been argued to be e¢ ciency-reducing
both theoretically (Rose-Ackerman 1978, Klitgaard 1991, Shleifer and Vishny 1993,
Djankov et al. 2002) and empirically (previous references, Olken 2007, Betrand et
al. forthcoming and Viceisza 2007b), it is important that academics, policymakers
and the general public have a thorough understanding of its determinants, conse-
quences and possible mechanisms for taming it.
Thus, a scientically comprehensive approach to analyze corruption is war-
ranted. In other words, it is useful to study corruption theoretically, empirically
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using eld data and empirically using experimental data.38 While the majority of
inquiries into corruption have been theoretical or empirical using eld data, one of
the principal roles for laboratory experiments on corruption is to test theories of
corruption more strictly than is otherwise possible by either using eld experiments
or standard applied econometric techniques. In turn, such laboratory experimental
data can suggest ways in which theories of corruption can be improved for doing
more meaningful policy development and analysis.
This study uses laboratory experiments to address three main questions re-
lated to the determinants and control of corruption. First, the study asks whether
an increase in the marginal cost of public funds gives rise to more or less corrup-
tion.39 Secondly, the study asks whether a decrease in transparency (as modeled
by a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of the unit cost of public good pro-
vision) a¤ects corrupt behavior. Finally, the study returns to the main question
addressed in Viceisza (2007a), which is whether an experimental environment with
yardstick competition gives rise to more or less corruption.
To understand the contributions of this study, it is useful to set the context
by focusing on two of Aidts (2003) main claims. Aidt distinguishes between four
types of theoretical studies on corruption: (1) those that model e¢ cient corruption,
(2) those that model corruption in the presence of a benevolent principal (e.g., the
voter) that delegates decision-making power to a non-benevolent agent (e.g., the in-
cumbent), (3) those that model corruption with a non-benevolent principal and (4)
those that model self-reinforcing corruption in that history may play a role. Also,
Aidt posits that two important considerations unite these four categories of models
of corruption: (1) the degree of benevolence of the government o¢ cial and (2) the
38Some general survey pieces are: Aidt (2003) for theories of corruption, Martinez-Vazquez,
Arze and Boex (2007) and Tanzi (1998) for eld empirics on corruption and Abbink (2005b) for
experiments on corruption.
39Browning (1976) denes the marginal cost of public funds as the direct tax burden plus the
marginal welfare cost produced in acquiring the tax revenue.
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role of institutions versus history as a determinant of corruption.
These arguments are cited here because they provide the main rationale for
conducting the experiments reported in this study. Namely the theoretical model
that guides the experimental design is a prime example of studies pertaining to
Aidts second category. In particular, Besley and Smarts (2007) theoretical polit-
ical agency model is one in which a principal (the voter) delegates decision-making
authority to a potentially non-benevolent agent (the incumbent politician or the
challenger) by means of an election. So, these theory-testing experiments provide
laboratory experimental data that is relevant to a large class of models as catego-
rized by Aidt.
Furthermore, by experimentally operationalizing Besley and Smarts model, this
study explores the validity of the two considerations that unite Aidts four cate-
gories. With regard to the rst consideration, the experimental treatments explore
the extent to which an agents benevolence (i.e., the incumbent politicians corrupt-
ibility) is a¤ected by two key changes: (1) an increase in the marginal cost of public
funds, which represents an increase in tax ine¢ ciency and (2) an increase in risk
(noise) in the distribution of the unit cost of the public good, which represents a
form of lack of transparency on the incumbents side. With regard to the second
consideration, the experimental treatments explore the rivalry between a potential
corruption-taming institution (i.e., yardstick competition) and "history."
These experimental treatments are also of further independent interest since the
data resulting from them have policy implications for developing countries. Since
the marginal cost of public fundswhich is a measure of tax e¢ ciencyis closely re-
lated to the choice of tax instruments within a country (Dahlby 1998), the exper-
imental marginal cost treatment is interesting since it sheds light on the extent to
which an external increase in the marginal cost of public fundspossibly caused by
a change in tax mixa¤ects corruptibility. This has policy implications for devel-
75
oping countries since these are known to have relatively di¤erent tax mixes com-
pared to developed countries and under certain circumstances can be hypothesized
to have higher marginal costs of public funds (Warlters and Auriol 2005.)
Furthermore, if the distribution of the unit cost of public good provision is taken
to represent transparency in the political system, analyzing the e¤ects of a less
transparent institution on corrupt behavior is clearly of interest to developing economies.
So, the experimental treatments that are characterized by a mean preserving spread
of the distribution of the unit cost of the public good (i.e., a noisier distribution
and therefore, a less transparent institution) address the question how a certain
type of transparency a¤ects corruption.
Finally, we explore the interaction between yardstick competition and "history
of play," which is relevant to all economiesdeveloping and developed alike. While
Viceisza (2007a) has reported some experiments addressing this question, the ex-
perimental treatments conducted in this study are based on a di¤erent design and
protocol. This is motivated below.
In any type of theory-testing experiment, there are numerous ways to opera-
tionalize the assumptions of the theory and very few are the theories that provide
su¢ cient (institutional) detail such that all ambiguities with regard to their imple-
mentation is ruled out. Viceisza (2007a) found that using a within-subjects design
to test the yardstick hypothesis does not lead to signicant treatment e¤ects. As
discussed in the conclusion to that study, part of this may be due to the within-
subjects nature of the experimental design.
So, this new set of experiments asks whether a between-subjects design gives
rise to any signicant treatment e¤ects. Furthermore, the experimental design and
protocol are amended to reect some crucial changes. First, these experiments op-
erationalize the distribution of the unit cost of the public good using a physical de-
vice. Secondly, the experiments reduce the information set arising from yardstick
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competition to one random choice made by another politician as opposed to a dis-
tribution of choices made by all politicians. Finally, the experiments implement a
trial, quiz and summary of the task to enhance subject understanding in addition
to a post-questionnaire that can be used to control for it.
The study nds the following main results. First, tax ine¢ ciency is an impor-
tant determinant of corrupt incumbent behavior. In particular, an increase in the
marginal cost of public funds makes it more costly for incumbents to equalize rst-
period payo¤s. This drives them to separate and divert maximum rents in the rst
period. While voters retaliate slightly by voting incumbents out of o¢ ce, they are
worse o¤.
Secondly, we nd that increased lack of a particular form of transparency (as
dened in terms of an increase in risk in the distribution of the unit cost) leaves
corrupt incumbent behavior unchanged. If the draw of the unit cost is unfavor-
able, incumbents tend to be less corrupt. So, the results suggest that lack of trans-
parency (as dened in Viceisza 2007a) need not always make voters worse o¤.
While this nding may seem counterintuitive, it is not given the parameteriza-
tion of the experiments. First, we must not ignore the importance of assumptions
on types and preferences as discussed in Viceisza (2007a). Contrary to Besley and
Smarts (2007) assumption that incumbents are either good or bad, incumbents are
known to behave strategically. Since the mean-preserving spread in the distribution
of the unit cost reduces the cost of equalizing rst-period payo¤s in the favorable
state, it makes sense why incumbents behave less corruptly if the unit cost is low.
Furthermore, Viceisza (2007a) models lack of transparency on the incumbent side.
This can be contrasted with lack of transparency on the voters side as discussed in
Besley and Smart (2007).
Third, the experiments nd strong evidence of yardstick competition. On the
incumbents side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if
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the incumbent is female. On the voters side, voters are less likely to re-elect the in-
cumbent in the presence of yardstick competition. Specically, voters pay attention
to the di¤erence between the tax signal in their own jurisdiction and the signal in
another jurisdiction. As this di¤erence increases, voters re-elect less.
Fourth, history is an important determinant of corruption and of re-election
decisions. Incumbents are likely to make choices as they did in previous repeti-
tions and voters are likely to vote out increasingly as the repetitions go by. In other
words, they distrust the political system more signicantly as time goes by and
yardstick competition does not a¤ect that. Finally, we nd that individual-specic
factors such as gender and beliefs play a signicant role in incumbent behavior. In
particular, female incumbents are more likely to divert rent when the unit cost is
unfavorable. Furthermore, incumbentsbeliefs are more important than votersbe-
liefs in decision-making. Voters focus mainly on taxes charged (payo¤s) and the
history of those taxes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section dis-
cusses the design, protocol and implementation. Then, we report the main ndings.
The nal section concludes.
Experimental Design
Experimental Game: Basics, Players, Information, Actions and Payo¤s
The theoretical model that underlies the experimental design follows Besley and
Smart (2007). It is a game theoretic model of elections that is cast in a principal-
agent framework. There are two "active" playersa principal (the voter) and a rst
agent (the rst-period incumbent), and one "passive" playera second agent (the
challenger). An agents type (i) can be good (g) or bad (b). Each agent knows his
or her own type; however, the principal and the other agent do not. The model is
comprised of two periods. At the end of the rst period, there is an election. The
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second agent is "passive," in the sense that this agent only plays a role during elec-
tions and during the second period if elected.
This describes a dynamic game of incomplete information. It is dynamic be-
cause it encompasses two periods and decisions made in the rst period a¤ect out-
comes in the second period. There is incomplete information, since at least one
player is uncertain about another players payo¤. In particular, the voter is uncer-
tain about the politicianspayo¤s, since such payo¤s are type-dependent. Following
Harsanyi (1967, 1968), the game is transformed into a dynamic game of imperfect
information by introducing moves of nature that determine types. For a detailed
explanation of the theoretical game, see Viceisza (2007a). The experimental game
described below is a strict adaptation of this theoretical game.
The experimental game is a ten-time repeated one-shot dynamic signaling game
in which incumbents and voters face alternatives that are "on the equilibrium path."
In order to minimize repeated-game e¤ects, subjects are told and guaranteed that
they will not interact with the same player for more than one repetition (see imple-
mentation and protocol section as well as subject instructions.) Subjects are ran-
domly assigned to be an incumbent or a voter. Once assigned such role, a subject
maintains the same role throughout the entire experiment.
The following steps describe one full repetition:
1. Nature moves and the incumbents type (i) is determined to be good (g) or
bad (b).
2. Nature moves again and the unit cost of public good provision () is deter-
mined to be high or low and revealed to the incumbent.
3. The incumbents typewhich is private informationis determined by two
components (i; ), i.e., whether he or she is by nature good or bad and whether
the unit cost of public good provision is by nature high or low.
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4. The voter knows the distribution of good and bad types and the distribution
of the unit cost of the public good. He or she does not know the actual draw
of the unit cost.
5. Having observed his or her type and preferences, the incumbent chooses a
payo¤ pair from a set of alternatives. Each alternative represents a tax-public
good (t; G) signal.
6. The voter observes his or her payo¤ and the range of possible payo¤s for the
incumbent.
7. The voter re-elects (accepts) or votes out (rejects) the incumbent.
8. If the incumbent is voted out, he or she gets a second-period payo¤ of zero
and the challengers type is determined by a lottery.40 The result of the lot-
tery determines the voters second-period payo¤.
9. If the incumbent is re-elected, the incumbent is in o¢ ce for a second period.
10. The second-period alternatives that he or she chooses from are a¤ected by
another draw of the unit cost of the public good  as determined by nature.
Second-period payo¤s for both players are determined by the incumbents
second-period choice.
11. There is no election at the end of the second period.
12. This entire process is repeated ten times. In each repetition, the incumbent
faces a di¤erent voter and vice versa.
In operationalizing this game, some main issues in experimental design need to
be addressed. First, we must answer the question whether or not types and prefer-
ences are to be induced. On the voter side, this is less of an issue. While voters are
40Since the challenger is a move of nature and therefore a "passive" player in the theoretical
game, the challenger is introduced experimentally as a lottery.
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theoretically assumed to have the same preferences as the good incumbent, experi-
mentally voters are allowed to have their own homegrown preferences. This is part
of what we want to learn from conducting the experiments.
On the incumbent side, the question is slightly more involved. As explained
above, the incumbents type is determined by two componentswhether he or she
is good or bad and whether the unit cost is high or low. The latter is induced by
physically tossing a coin and inputting the result into the computer. The former
however is not induced. The rationale for not inducing good or bad behavior is ex-
plained in detail in Viceisza (2007a) and hinges on what we hope to learn from con-
ducting the experiments. In particular, by not inducing the incumbent to be good
or bad, we are able to learn the proportion of good and bad types in the population
and thus we are able to test one of the most basic assumptions of the theory (viz.
that the proportion of good types is strictly greater than zero.)
Allowing incumbents to behave according to their homegrown types has another
important implication: Contrary to the assumption that theoretical voters know the
exact distribution of types within the population, the voters in the experiment do
not. In particular, voter subjects must create their own beliefs with regard to the
proportion of good versus bad types in the population. Aggregate re-election (ac-
ceptance) rates enable us to infer such beliefs from the data. Furthermore, incum-
bentsactual choices enable us to infer the true proportion of good and bad types
within the subject population. This can in turn be compared to votersbeliefs.
Secondly, we must decide how to specify payo¤s and parameterize the experi-
ments. While we summarize these parameterizations here, we refer the reader to
Viceisza (2007a) for further motivation. Table 19 provides a summary of the para-
meterizations for the baseline game. All treatments reported in this experiment rely
on these parameterizations with possibly some minor modications as explained in
the next section.
81
Table 19: Baseline Parameterizations
Basic Denitions: t = tax; Gt = public good provision associated with tax (t)
Good-Type/Voter Payo¤ W (G; t) = G  t1:001
Bad-Type Payo¤ R = t   Gt
Unit Cost () With equal probability,  = 1 (low) or  = 2 (high)
Marginal Cost ()  =1
4
Max. Tax Collection (T ) T = 4
Min. Public Good (GT ) GT= 1
Treatments
To address the three main questions posited in the introduction, we must rst
conduct a baseline treatment from which we can infer deviations. This leads to a
total of four treatments: (1) the Baseline treatment (Treatment B), (2) the Mar-
ginal cost treatment (Treatment M), (3) the unit cost Risk treatment (Treatment
R) and (4) the Yardstick treatment (Treatment Y.) As mentioned previously, all
four treatments are based on the above game and parameterization with possibly
some minor modications.
This section serves two purposes: First, to describe the theoretical propositions
that inform each of these treatments. Secondly, to describe how each of these treat-
ments di¤er from each other in terms of parameterizations and payo¤ alternatives
faced by the subjects. As a nal comment, it should be noted that all experimen-
tal treatments were conducted using a between-subjects design. In other words, any
given pair of subjects (politician-voter) participated in one and only one of these
treatments. This is a primary di¤erence between the current design and that imple-
mented in Viceisza (2007a).
The Baseline Treatment (Treatment B). Besley and Smart (2007) derive
one main proposition that can be used to make inferences from the data resulting
from Treatment B. Given the specied game form and payo¤s, they derive three
equilibrium congurationsa pooling, separating and hybrid equilibrium.
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Intuitively, these say the following:
1. The pooling equilibrium corresponds to the case in which it is optimal for the
bad incumbent that faces low unit cost to exercise restraint in the rst period.
In this case, this type sends the same message as the good type that faces
high cost and the voter observes high taxes regardless of the type of politician
that is in o¢ ce. The voter re-elects with certainty upon observing this level of
taxes.
2. The separating equilibrium corresponds to the case in which it is optimal for
the bad type that faces low unit cost to divert maximal rents in the rst pe-
riod. The voter observes high taxes if the good type that faces high cost is in
o¢ ce and maximal taxes if the bad type is in o¢ ce. The bad incumbent is de-
tected with certainty ex post. Thus, if the voter observes high taxes, the voter
re-elects with certainty; however, upon observing maximum taxes, the voter
does not re-elect the incumbent to o¢ ce.
3. The hybrid equilibrium corresponds to a mix between these two equilibria.
In the hybrid equilibrium, the bad type that faces low cost adopts a strictly
mixed strategy between restraint and maximal rent diversion. The voter ob-
serves high taxes some of the time and maximum taxes some of the time.
The data resulting from Treatment B will be tested against these predictions.
Treatment B is based on the parameterizations in table 19. Given these parame-
terizations, incumbents and voters face the following alternatives during the exper-
imental treatments (see table 20). These alternatives apply to the rst period of
each repetition and represent the incumbents and voters payo¤s respectively. For
second-period alternatives, see subject instructions.
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Table 20: First-Period Alternatives faced by Incumbent in Treatment B
Alternative If Unit Cost is Low ( = 1) Alternative If Unit Cost is High ( = 2)
A1 (1:50; 1:50) A1 (0:75; 0:75)
A2 (1:50; 0:75) not applicable*
A3 (2:35; 0:16) A2 (1:35; 0:16)
* There is no comparable alternative due to the "on the equilibrium path" assumption.
The Marginal Cost Treatment (Treatment M). Besley and Smart (2007)
derive one main proposition with regard to the marginal cost of public funds. In
particular, they show that an increase in the marginal cost of public fundswhich
represents increased ine¢ ciency in the tax institutionreduces voter welfare even if
it reduces corrupt incumbent behavior. This main result rests on the assumption
that the incumbent and voter equilibrium strategies remain unchanged, which is
not always the case.
The main di¤erence between Treatment M and Treatment B is that the former
is based on a higher marginal cost of public funds than the latter. Specically, as
stated in table 19 the marginal cost of public funds for Treatment B is  = 1
4
. In
Treatment M this parameter is increased to one half and this has a direct e¤ect on
the alternatives faced by the incumbent. Table 21 summarizes these alternatives
accordingly.
Table 21: First-Period Alternatives faced by Incumbent in Treatment M
Alternative If Unit Cost is Low ( = 1) Alternative If Unit Cost is High ( = 2)
A1 (0:60; 0:60) A1 (0:40; 0:40)
A2 (0:60; 0:40) not applicable*
A3 (2:35; 0:00) A2 (1:35; 0:00)
* There is no comparable alternative due to the "on the equilibrium path" assumption.
The Unit Cost Risk Treatment (Treatment R). Viceisza (2007a) derives
a main proposition with regard to the unit cost of the public good. In particular, it
is shown that a less transparent public goods provision institution (as represented
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by an increase in risk of  in the second-order stochastic dominance sense) is asso-
ciated with an increase in expected equilibrium rent diversion. Furthermore, a less
transparent institution is associated with a decrease in equilibrium voter welfare as
long as the marginal social cost of taxation is less than the inverse of the product of
the marginal cost of public funds and the unit cost of the public good.
Intuitively, this proposition says that in a less transparent institutioni.e., an
institution in which the unit cost of the public good () has a noisier distribution
equilibrium corruption is expected to increase and equilibrium voter welfare is ex-
pected to decrease as long as the marginal cost of taxation is low enough.
The main di¤erence between these two treatments is that Treatment R is based
on a unit cost of the public good that has a riskier distribution than the unit cost
in Treatment B. In particular, the high level of the unit cost is now two and one
half and the low level of the unit cost is one half. So, while the mean of the dis-
tribution of the unit cost has remained the same, the variance is higher. As an-
ticipated, this has a direct e¤ect on the alternatives faced by the incumbent. The
specic alternatives are discussed in table 22.
Table 22: First-Period Alternatives faced by Incumbent in Treatment R
Alternative If Unit Cost is Low ( = 1
2
) Alternative If Unit Cost is High ( = 21
2
)
A1 (2:63; 2:63) A1 (0:49; 0:49)
A2 (2:63; 0:49) not applicable*
A3 (2:85; 0:16) A2 (0:85; 0:16)
* There is no comparable alternative due to the "on the equilibrium path" assumption.
The Yardstick Treatment (Treatment Y). Besley and Smart focus on
symmetric equilibria among incumbents and voters in the two jurisdictions by as-
suming that the joint probability mass function of unit cost shocks Pr (; 0) is sym-
metric. Furthermore, they assume that the cost shocks in the two jurisdictions are
positively correlated. Under such conditions, the voters strategy involves yardstick
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competition when re-election occurs with positive probability if spending is high in
both jurisdictions, but the probability of re-election is zero if domestic spending is
high and foreign spending is low.
Their rst yardstick proposition intuitively tells us that the case with yardstick
competition di¤ers from the one jurisdiction case in three essential ways:
1. A bad incumbent may not be re-elected when he or she charges high taxes, if
the foreign incumbent is good and faces a low unit cost.
2. A good domestic incumbent is retained in o¢ ce when costs are high, and the
foreign politician charges maximum taxes.
3. Pooling may no longer be optimal for the domestic incumbent when the for-
eign incumbent has a poor initial reputation.
Their second yardstick proposition shows that voters who are better informed
about the scal environment may be worse o¤ in equilibrium, since bad incumbents
will make less of an e¤ort to build a reputation when they rst take o¢ ce. Namely,
in some casesin particular, when there are relatively few good incumbentsvoters
would be better o¤ if they could commit to ignoring the scal performance in the
other jurisdiction in the course of a domestic election.
Yardstick competition is welfare decreasing when politiciansreputations are
poor, since rents are increased with little advantage from the improved informa-
tion generated as most politicians who are voted out of o¢ ce are replaced by an
incumbent of the same type.41 These yardstick results guide the data analysis when
comparing Treatment Y to Treatment B.
A nal comment is necessary: This treatment is based on the same parameter-
ization as Treatment B. The di¤erence between this treatment and Treatment B is
the information observed by the votersas explained in the subject instructions. In
41Some evidence of this was observed in the experiments reported by Viceisza (2007a).
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particular, voters in Treatment Y observe additional information over and above
what the voters in Treatment B observe. In each repetition, Y-voters observe a ran-
dom rst-period choice made by some incumbent in a B-session. This is the infor-
mation arising from yardstick competition and it is randomly chosen, since the con-
cept of a neighboring jurisdiction is not necessarily well-dened in this context.
Implementation and Protocol
The experiments took place in the experimental laboratory at the Experimental
Economics Center (ExCEN) at Georgia State University. Subjects were recruited
using ExCENs online recruiter system, which contains names of students taking
courses in many di¤erent areas including but not limited to accounting, actuarial
science, biology, business administration, chemistry, economics, nance, geology,
geography, mathematics, nursing, political science and sociology. The experiments
were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
In each experiment session, half of the subjects were incumbents and half of the
subjects were voters. Each experiment session had at least twenty subjects in or-
der to guarantee that a given politician and voter were never paired for more than
one repetition. In other words, a given politician did not interact with a given voter
for more than one repetition and vice versa. So, re-matching during the experiment
was pre-determined according to the "two-ships-passing-in-the-night" design. Sub-
jects were informed accordingly.
Each experiment session consisted of instructions, a ve-minute trial, a quiz,
a summary of the treatment, the treatment and a post-questionnaire.42 The ex-
periments lasted an average of ninety minutes and average payo¤s were $14.13,
42Note that the appendices comprise subject instructions only for Treatments B and Y, since
the instructions for Treatments M and R are minor variations of B in terms of payo¤s. The sub-
ject instructions consist of a description of the task (treatment), a description of the trial and quiz
and a summary of the task (treatment). Note also that the appendices do not contain the actual
quizzes. The interested reader should contact the author.
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with the highest-paying session having an average payo¤ of $15.95 and the lowest-
paying session having an average payo¤ of $12.70. Subjects were paid $5.00 for
showing up, $3.00 for completing the trial and quiz and $2.00 for completing the
post-questionnaire.
The procedures during the experiment were as follows. Subjects were assigned
a number at sign-in. These numbers were used to randomly enter subjects into the
experimental laboratory. Random entry also determined random assignment to a
xed role and di¤erent pairs during the main treatment.
After entering the experimental laboratory, subjects were handed paper-based
instructions, which were read out loud by the experimenter. They were then put
through the ve-minute trial. This was an opportunity for subjects to interact with
the software and practice making decisions that did not a¤ect their payo¤s. There-
after, subjects were put through the quiz. Contrary to the trial, the quiz was not
timed. Subjects were informed that they would make three dollars for completing
the trial and quiz regardless of how many questions they answered correctly. They
were asked to pay attention to the screens observed in the trial and to the questions
asked in the quiz.
During the quiz, the software informed subjects whether or not they answered
a particular question correctly. In both cases, the quiz gave an overview of the cor-
rect answer and referred subjects to the instructions. After the quiz was completed,
subjects were asked whether they had any questions that they wanted claried in
private. If so, those were claried. The experimenter then summarized the treat-
ment. In doing so, the experimenter elaborated on the main issues and any partic-
ular issues that seemed to be problematic based on the responses in the quiz. The
problematic issues were uniform across sessions.
Once this process was completed, subjects were ready to start the main treat-
ment. At this point, subjects were informed whether they would be Player X (a
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politician) or Player Z (a voter). Subjects were told to note that the room was di-
vided into two "sections" by means of a blank column of computer stations running
from front to back. This blank column divided the room into incumbents and vot-
ers. Everyone on one side of the room was randomly assigned to be an incumbent
and everyone on the other side was randomly assigned to be a voter. Subjects were
reminded that they would keep the same role throughout the entire experiment.
In addition, within each section, subjects were separated from each other by
means of dividers. This guaranteed that subjects could make their decisions in
private. Furthermore, the voter side had higher dividers such that it would be im-
possible for a particular voter to observe the result of the coin toss. This also rein-
forced the nature of the information asymmetry that is crucial to the game. Sub-
jects were told not to communicate with each other during the experiment.
The treatment procedures were as follows. At the beginning of each repetition
and period within a repetition, the experimenter ipped a coin. This represented
the move by nature that determined the unit cost of the public good (), which
was induced. The coin toss took place in front of the rst two politicians. They ob-
served and veried the coin toss and its result. Upon verication, the experimenter
input the result into the computer and the respective period was conducted. Upon
conclusion of the two periods (i.e., a given repetition), the process was repeated un-
til all ten repetitions were concluded. After ten repetitions, subjects completed the
post-questionnaire.
Experimental Findings
Aggregation and Demographics
A total of eight experiment sessions were conducted: two B-sessions, two M-
sessions, two R-sessions and two Y-sessions. The main choice (endogenous) vari-
ables of interest are rst-period choices by incumbents (this variable is named Choice)
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and re-election (acceptance) decisions by voters (this variable is named Accept).43
Full distribution tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, KS and Epps-Singleton, ES) suggest
that there are no statistically signicant di¤erences between the sessions for these
main variables of interest.44
Aggregation across experiment sessions leads to the following number of sub-
jects for the respective treatments: (1) Treatment B has a total of 30 politicians
and 30 voters, (2) Treatment M has a total of 22 politicians and 22 voters, (3) Treat-
ment R has a total of 22 politicians and 22 voters and (4) Treatment Y has a total
of 28 politicians and 28 voters. These numbers represent average number of obser-
vations, since not all sessions within the treatments were of the same size. In par-
ticular, Treatment M and Treatment R both had a session of minimum sizei.e.,
twenty subjects. KS tests and Mann-Whitney tests suggest that behavior in these
sessions is not statistically signicantly di¤erent from behavior in the larger sessions
(p-values are greater than 0.26).
The following descriptive statistics describe the average subject prole. Female
subjects constitute 56.03% of the sample. The average age is 22.11 years with a
standard deviation of 4.04 years. About 13% of subjects are economics majors, 12%
are biology majors, 8% are accounting majors, 4% are political science majors. The
remaining subjects comprise miscellaneous majors including but not limited to lm
and video, sociology, gerontology, chemistry and english. Finally, the maximum self-
43Incumbentssecond-period choices if re-elected are also of potential interest. This variable is
named Choice2 and it is studied descriptively in the summary tables.
44All KS p-values are greater than 0.358. All ES p-values are greater than 0.13. The only ex-
ception is for the variable Choice when comparing the R-sessions. However, after "unconditioning"
rst-period choices on the draw of the unit cost ()i.e., re-coding decisions to be either "equalize"
or "not equalize"we cannot reject the null that incumbentsrst-period decisions in the two ses-
sions are the same (p-value is 0.196.) Furthermore, if we separate rst-period decisions in the R-
sessions by the level of the unit cost, we are once again unable to reject the null that rst-period
choices in the two R-sessions are the same (p-value is 0.270.) This implies that one of the follow-
ing techniques should capture the discrepancy between the R-sessions when running regressions:
(1) partitioning the data into "equalize/not equalize", (2) controlling for the draw of the unit cost
in the regressions or (3) partitioning the data by the level of the unit cost. As a nal control mea-
sure, we also include session-level dummy variables for the respective R-sessions (R1; R2) in the
regressions. The ndings are robust to all these separate controls.
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reported annual income range is $30,001 to $60,000 with a mode annual income
range of $0 to $1,000.
Average Behavior: Tabular Overview
In this subsection, we look at average incumbent and voter decisions for the re-
spective treatments. In particular, we compare average rates across Treatments B,
M, R and Y. We start by discussing the progression of incumbentstypes during
the treatment. We then focus on three main variables: Choice (incumbentsrst-
period choices), Accept (votersre-election decisions) and Choice2 (incumbents
second-period choices conditional on having been re-elected (accepted) for a second
term).
IncumbentsTypes: Good versus Bad. Besley and Smarts (2007) model
denes a good incumbent as one that equalizes payo¤s in both periods. It is inter-
esting to study what percentage of incumbents actually behave in this manner on a
repetition basis. Table 23 answers this question. In particular, the table compares
the progression of good types (in percentages) across treatments conditional on the
unit cost of the public good () by repetition.
The following patterns are distinguishable. First, with some uctuation the per-
centage of good types tends to be higher the rst half of the treatment. This nd-
ing is relatively robust across all treatments and draws of the unit cost. Secondly,
the proportion of good types is overwhelmingly lower in Treatment M compared to
any other treatment. This proportion is relatively higher in Treatment R. Finally,
the proportion of good types is fairly persistent in Treatments B and Yparticularly
when the unit cost is high.
91
Table 23: Proportion of Good Incumbents Across Repetitions and Treatments
Repetition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Treatment Unit Cost Low
B 55.56 40.00 40.00 * 25.00 41.67 33.33 28.57
M 25.00 0.00 0.00 28.57 14.29 25.00 14.29 0.00 0.00
R 71.43 75.00 62.50 16.67 33.33 50.00 50.00
Y 30.77 37.50 16.67 16.67 14.29 10.53 33.33
Unit Cost High
B 33.33 20.00 21.43 33.33 33.33 27.27 25.00
M 75.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67
R 50.00 28.57 62.50 33.33 75.00 87.50 0.00 20.00 0.00
Y 33.33 28.57 33.33 0.00 16.67 33.33 16.67 22.22
All numbers are in percentages. 22  N  30, T = 10
* Blank cells imply that the draw of the unit cost was not realized in a repetition.
IncumbentsFirst- and Second-Period Choices. Another interesting
statistic is the average percentage of incumbents that equalize rst-period payo¤s
within a treatment conditional on the draw of the unit cost of the public good. Ta-
ble 24 looks at this. The following patterns that reinforce previous results seen in
table 23 are distinguishable. First, incumbents are relatively less likely to equal-
ize rst-period payo¤s in Treatment M. Furthermore, incumbents in Treatment
Y equalize rst-period payo¤s at similar rates regardless of the level of the unit
cost. These rates are lower than those in Treatment B. Finally, while incumbents
in Treatment R are more likely to equalize rst-period payo¤s when the unit cost is
low, they are also less likely to do so when the unit cost is high. This is in compari-
son to Treatment B.
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Table 24: IncumbentsAverage First-Period Choices Across Treatments
22  N  30, T = 10 Equalize Not Equalize Equalize Not Equalize
Treatment Unit Cost Low Unit Cost High
B 64.00 36.00 66.67 33.33
M 33.58 66.42 40.70 59.30
R 82.14 17.86 64.71 35.29
Y 58.27 41.73 57.52 42.48
All numbers are in percentages.
As discussed previously, Besley and Smarts (2007) model denes a good type as
one that always equalizes payo¤s and a bad type as one that always diverts rent
i.e., behaves corruptly. Furthermore, the model assumes that agents are either good
or bad. So, it is interesting to ask whether there are incumbents who behave as if
they are good in the rst period and as if they are bad in the second period. Not
only does this mitigate the plausibility of the aforementioned assumption; however,
it shows clear strategic behavior on the part of the incumbent. Viceisza (2007a)
termed choices that follow this pattern theoretically inconsistent according to Besley
and Smarts denition of types.
Table 25 shows this descriptive across the treatments. In particular, the table
shows the percentage of incumbents that equalize payo¤s in the rst period and di-
vert maximum rents in the second period. The following patterns are noteworthy.
First, incumbents in Treatment M are much more likely to divert maximum rents
in the second period after having equalized in the rst period. This holds regardless
of the level of the unit cost. Secondly, a similar pattern is noticeable for Treatment
Y. Third, incumbents in Treatment R are less likely to slam the voter in the second
period after having equalized in the rst. Finally, with the exception of Treatment
B incumbents make these theoretically inconsistent choices at similar rates regard-
less of the draw of the unit cost.
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Table 25: Bad in Second Period Given Good in First Period
22  N  30, T = 10
Treatment Unit Cost Low Unit Cost High
B 56.94 68.75
M 77.42 78.26
R 47.27 48.78
Y 74.58 71.67
All numbers are in percentages.
VotersRe-election Decisions. Thus far, we have mainly studied incum-
bent behavior. The question remains to what extent voters behave di¤erently across
the di¤erent treatments. Table 26 draws this comparison, where equalize, pool and
separate are dened according to altenatives 1, 2 and 3 in tables 20, 21 and 22. In
particular, recall that alternative 1 represents good-type behavior in the sense that
it leads to equal rst-period payo¤s for both players. Alternatives 2 and 3 represent
bad-type behavior in the form of pooling or separating respectively.
The following trends are noticeable. First, voters tend to re-elect at higher rates
in Treatment Y. Secondly, voters are more likely to re-elect in the pooling case in
Treatment M. Finally, voters in Treatment R are least likely to re-elect in the pool-
ing/separating case.
Table 26: VotersRe-election Decisions
22  N  30, T = 10
Treatment Equalize Pool Separate
B 61.89 19.52 11.80
M 67.54 29.40 11.74
R 66.40 9.42 10.00
Y 76.99 21.25 15.48
All numbers are in percentages.
As a nal exercise to conclude this section, we take a look at what we term the
"fooling factor." The fooling factor compares votersactual "beliefs" about incum-
bentsnatures with incumbentsactual natures. Suppose we want to obtain an idea
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of votersbeliefs with regard to incumbentsnatures; i.e., what percentage of in-
cumbents are perceived to be good or bad by voters. Then, a reasonable measure to
capture this is the average re-election rate.
We can in turn compare these rates to incumbentsactual choices. In particular,
we can compare votersre-election decisions to incumbentssecond-period decisions
conditional on their rst-period choice. We can thus come up with a fooling factor,
which is a measure that captures the extent to which incumbents are able to fool
voters and get re-elected when they are not supposed to.
A comparison of the averages in table 25 and the complement probabilities of
those in table 26 (i.e., non-re-election rates) indicates that incumbents are able to
fool voters in all treatments. In other words, voters re-elect more frequently than
they are supposed to on average. Treatment B has a fooling factor of 18.83 percent-
age points.45 Treatment M has a fooling factor of 44.96 percentage points. Treat-
ment R has a fooling factor of 11.67 percentage points. Finally, Treatment Y tops
the list with a fooling factor of 51.57 percentage points.
Treatment E¤ects
This section focuses on the main treatment e¤ects. We discuss the ndings for
each treatment (i.e., Treatment M, Treatment R and Treatment Y) separately. In
each case, we discuss incumbentsand votersregressions. We specify the model
under consideration by (1) expressing the estimation equation and (2) dening the
variables of interest. Then, we perform estimation and inference.
Four main comments apply to the analyses below. First, throughout the discus-
sion we focus on random-e¤ects (RE) estimators. While it is understood that such
45These numbers are calculated as follows. Consider Treatment B. Conditional on equalization,
voters re-elect (accept) at a rate of 61.89%, which in turn implies that they vote out (reject) at a
rate of 38.11%. Given the behavior in table 25, however, they should vote out at a rate of 56.94%.
Thus, voters are fooled at a rate of 18.83 percentage points in this treatment. The other factors
are calculated similarly.
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estimators have more stringent assumptions associated with them than xed-e¤ects
estimators, the choice for RE estimation is dictated by the fact that essentially all
covariates of interest are individually invariant. Thus, if estimation were to occur
via FE, it would wipe out the main partial e¤ects of interest (Wooldrige 2002).
Secondly, a potentially important variable "history" is not completely controlled
for in the regressions below. History of play should not be a major explanatory
variable in our regressions, since the experiments were carefully designed to avoid
repeated-play e¤ects. In particular, subjects were informed that they would never
interact with the same person for more than one repetition.
Nonetheless, we might expect subjects to play ctitiously (Brown 1951, Robin-
son 1951 and others).46 If this is the case, we should control for history accordingly.
This would require instrumental-variable (IV) estimation, since the history of in-
cumbentsand voterschoices are endogenous. Since there are no proper instru-
ments, we partially control for history by including (1) a time trend and (2) the
history of the unit cost (t 1) as explanatory variables in the regressions. The time
trend is intended to capture any upward or downward trends that may be present
in the data. The history of the unit cost acts as an imperfect proxy for history of
choices in both the incumbent and voter regressions.
The historical value of the unit cost is exogenous, since it is randomly deter-
mined by the experimenter by means of a coin ip. Furthermore, it directly im-
pacts incumbentspast rst-period choices and thus it indirectly a¤ects the set of
signals that were observable by the voter in the previous period. So, in this sense,
the history of the unit cost satises both the conditions for an IV or proxy variable
(Wooldridge 2002).
However, contrary to the history of incumbentsand voterschoices, the his-
46The modern game-theoretic usage of the term "ctitious play" can be di¤erent from the def-
initions rst discussed by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). Here we use the term to indicate a
situation in which subjects play as if they are paired with the same player every repetition.
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tory of the unit cost is not individually variant. In other words, the history of the
unit cost is imperfect either as a proxy variable or as an IV. So, the question be-
comes whether to use this variable as a weak instrument or as an imperfect proxy.
We choose the latter approach, since we expect past choices to have relatively lit-
tle e¤ect on incumbent and voter behavior due to the re-pairing design discussed
previously.
Third, as discussed in detail in Viceisza (2007a) and as summarized in the present
work, there are four propositions that inform the experimental designs in this pa-
per. Thus, it is logical to call upon those propositions when formulating hypotheses
for the purpose of statistical inference. Since we have designed the experiments ac-
cording to a specic structure (i.e., a logical game form), we know to a great extent
the data generating processes.
In particular, since the data are generated according to a sequential game of
incomplete information by construction (i.e., by design of the experiments), we can
rule out with certainty the possibility that decisions are being made simultaneously
by the incumbent and the voter. Thus, we estimate separate equations of interest
for each treatmentone for the rst mover (the incumbent) and one for the second
mover (the voter).
Finally, it should be noted that there are some further limitations to the analy-
ses below. First, we can model learning in more formal ways. For example, we can
follow models such as those developed in Roth and Erev (1995) or Camerer and
Ho (1999). Furthermore, we can apply estimation techniques such as those dis-
cussed in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) or Arellano and Bond (1991). However,
as discussed in the original papers, these models have their own set of complications
including feasibility of estimation and sample size requirements. So, we limit our
analysis to the models below.
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Treatment M. An individual incumbents (i) main choice variable in any
given repetition (t) is his rst-period choice, Choiceit. There are two possible ways
to dene this variable. The rst is to let Choiceit be a dummy variable that is equal
to one if the incumbent chooses to equalize rst-period payo¤s (i.e., behave as if
good). The second alternative is to let Choiceit have a range of three possible val-
ues according to separation, pooling or equalization. We report ndings based on
the rst formulation, since it lends itself to easier interpretations of the coe¢ cients;
although the main treatment e¤ects are robust to the alternative formulation.
We estimate the following equation:
Choiceit = 0+1genderi+2t+3dM+4beliefsit+5t 1+6t+7I+"it; (18)
where i = 1; :::; 52, t = 1; :::; 10, 0 represents a constant term, genderi represents
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is female, t represents the
current draw of the unit cost of the public good, dM represents a dummy variable
that is equal to one if the individual is part of the treatment group, t 1 is the past
lag of the unit cost as a proxy for history, t is a time trend, I is a set of interac-
tion terms consisting of (genderi  t), (genderi  dM), (beliefsit  dM), (t 1  dM),
(genderi  t  dM) and (t  t 1) and "it has a one-way error component struc-
ture of the form "it = i + it, where i represents a vector of unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneities and it satises the following strict exogeneity assumption,
E (itjXit; i) = 0, where Xit is the set of explanatory variables in expression 18.
We also include a proxy variable for beliefs in the right-hand side of equation
18. It is expected that when an incumbent makes a rst-period choice, he antici-
pates a particular re-election decision to follow such choice. In other words, an in-
cumbent has some belief towards re-election associated with taxes charged and this
belief is likely to inuence his rst-period choice. So, beliefs can be a statistically
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signicant explanatory variable in the incumbent regressions.
Since beliefs are an inherent characteristic of the incumbent, they are unob-
served. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect beliefs to be correlated with any
of the other explanatory variables in equation 18. So, the correct approach in con-
trolling for beliefs is to use a proxy variable that satises the following conditions:
(1) irrelevance for explaining the dependent variable and (2) correlation with beliefs
(Wooldridge 2002).
We claim that Acceptit constitutes a valid proxy for beliefs. First, this variable
satises requirement (1) since it is chosen by the voter and thus, it should not be
relevant in explaining the incumbents choice. Secondly, the variable satises re-
quirement (2) since it is highly correlated with beliefs. This is testable. Under the
assumptions that the regressors in equation 18 are exogenous and capture all other
unexplained variation in Choiceit, the least-squares residuals from the estimation of
equation 18 represent consistent estimates of the error term and thus of beliefs. A
regression of these estimates on Acceptit nds that this variable is strongly signi-
cant (p-value 0.000).
Table 27 reports the estimates of a linear probability model (LPM).47 The unit
cost of the public good a¤ects incumbent behavior; in particular, if the unit cost is
high, incumbents are more likely to equalize payo¤s in the baseline and marginal
cost treatments. Overall, incumbents in Treatment M are less likely to equalize
rst-period payo¤s in comparison to Treatment B. This is not surprising, since the
marginal cost treatment makes it more costly to equalize rst-period payo¤s.
Beliefs are also important. Specically, if an incumbent associates a higher prob-
ability of re-election with a particular rst-period payo¤, he is more likely to choose
it. In other words, incumbents choose taxes with an eye on re-election. Finally,
note that female incumbents facing a high cost are more likely to behave corruptly.
47The results are robust to alternative estimation methods (i.e., logit and probit).
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Table 27: Incumbent Regression (Treatment M)
Dependent Variable: Choiceit (1=equalize, 0=not equalize)
N = 52, T = 10
constant 0.544 (0.000)*
genderi -0.031 (0.667)
t 0.170 (0.030)
dM -0.382 (0.000)
beliefsit 0.387 (0.000)
history (t 1) -0.052 (0.472)
t -0.007 (0.353)
genderit -0.151 (0.101)
genderidM 0.158 (0.122)
beliefsitdM 0.102 (0.209)
t 1dM -0.038 (0.670)
genderitdM -0.047 (0.656)
tt 1 0.027 (0.764)
overall R2 0.3193
* p-values in parentheses.
In other words, when it is costly to equalize, female incumbents are more likely to
pool or separate and divert rents. This nding is robust across Treatments B and
M.
An individual voters (i) main choice variable in any given repetition (t) is his
re-election decision, Acceptit, which is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
voter re-elects (accepts) the incumbent. We estimate the following equation:
Acceptit = 0+1genderi+2equalit+3poolit+4dM+5t 1+6t+7I+"it; (19)
where i = 1; :::; 52, t = 1; :::; 10, 0 represents a constant term, genderi represents a
dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is female, equalit represents a
dummy variable that is equal to one if the voter observes a payo¤ that signals equal
rst-period payo¤s, poolit represents a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
voter observes a pooling rst-period payo¤, dM represents a dummy variable that is
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equal to one if the individual is part of the treatment group, t 1 is the past lag of
the unit cost as a proxy for history, t is a time trend, I is a set of interaction terms
consisting of (genderi  dM), (genderi  equalit), (genderi  poolit), (t 1  dM) and
(t  dM) and "it has a one-way error component structure of the form "it = i +
it, where i represents a vector of unobserved individual heterogeneities and it
satises the following strict exogeneity assumption, E (itjXit; i) = 0, where Xit is
the set of explanatory variables in expression 19. Note that in the case of the voter,
we are less concerned about controlling for beliefs, since the signal that is observed
by the incumbent (i.e., the rst-period payo¤) is in itself a proxy for beliefs. After
all, the incumbent and the voter are playing a signaling game by construction.
Table 28 reports the estimates of a linear probability model (LPM).48 As ex-
pected, the higher the rst-period payo¤, the more likely the incumbents proba-
bility of re-election. Furthermore, note that voters are more likely to vote out the
incumbent as time goes by. Also, while gender is irrelevant in the baseline treat-
ment, it is not in the marginal cost treatment. In particular, female voters are less
likely to re-elect the incumbent in the marginal cost treatments.
Also, female incumbents are more likely to re-elect when having observed the
pooling equilibrium payo¤. Finally, note that while history is irrelevant in the base-
line treatment, it seems to matter slightly in the marginal cost treatment. In par-
ticular, voters are more likely to re-elect in Treatment M if they re-elected in the
previous repetition.
48These ndings are robust to alternative estimation methods (i.e., logit and probit).
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Table 28: Voter Regression (Treatment M)
Dependent Variable: Acceptit (1=re-elect, 0=vote out)
N = 52, T = 10
constant 0.171 (0.102)*
genderi 0.155 (0.186)
equalit 0.615 (0.000)
poolit 0.234 (0.006)
dM 0.228 (0.328)
history (t 1) -0.059 (0.245)
t -0.017 (0.064)
genderidM -0.522 (0.018)
genderiequalit 0.037 (0.764)
genderipoolit 0.233 (0.046)
t 1dM 0.311 (0.101)
t  dM 0.032 (0.174)
overall R2 0.3012
* p-values in parentheses.
Treatment R. We follow a similar estimation procedure as the one discussed
for the incumbent in Treatment M. We estimate the following equation:
Choiceit = 0+1genderi+2t+3dR1+4dR2+5beliefsit+6t 1+7t+8I+"it;
(20)
where i = 1; :::; 52, t = 1; :::; 10, 0 represents a constant term, genderi represents
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is female, t represents the
current draw of the unit cost of the public good, dR1 represents a dummy variable
that is equal to one if the individual is part of the rst risk session (R1), dR2 rep-
resents a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is part of the sec-
ond risk session (R2), beliefsit are captured by the proxy variable Acceptit, t 1
is the past lag of the unit cost as a proxy for history, t is a time trend, I is a set
of interaction terms consisting of (genderi  t), (genderi  dR1), (genderi  dR2),
(beliefsit  dR1), (beliefsit  dR2), (t 1  dR1), (t 1  dR2), (genderi  t  dR1),
(genderi  t  dR2), (t  dR1), (t  dR2) and (t  t 1) and "it has a one-way er-
ror component structure of the form "it = i + it, where i represents a vector of
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unobserved individual heterogeneities and it satises the following strict exogene-
ity assumption, E (itjXit; i) = 0, where Xit is the set of explanatory variables in
expression 20.
Table 29 reports the estimates of a linear probability model (LPM).49 Notice
that the unit cost of the public good seems to play a signicant role in the unit cost
risk treatments. This is not surprising, since these treatments test the e¤ect of a
mean-preserving spread on incumbent and voter behavior. In particular, the result
suggests that the higher the unit cost, the more likely the incumbent is to equalize
rst-period payo¤s. This conrms the result seen previously.
Overall, the increase in risk seems to leave corrupt behavior unchanged when
comparing the risk and baseline sessions. While the signs of the risk dummies point
in opposite directions for the two sessions, both coe¢ cients are statistically insignif-
icant. In particular, incumbents are neither more nor less likely to behave in a cor-
rupt manner. Finally, beliefs remain a signicant determinant of incumbent behav-
ior in both the baseline and the unit cost risk treatments.
49The results are robust to alternative estimation methods (i.e., logit and probit).
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Table 29: Incumbent Regression (Treatment R)
Dependent Variable: Choiceit (1=equalize, 0=not equalize)
N = 52, T = 10
constant 0.460 (0.000)*
genderi -0.031 (0.682)
t 0.223 (0.030)
dR1 0.218 (0.146)
dR2 -0.142 (0.461)
beliefsit 0.400 (0.000)
history (t 1) -0.009 (0.911)
t -0.000 (0.980)
genderit -0.151 (0.143)
genderidR1 -0.163 (0.256)
genderidR2 0.208 (0.261)
beliefsitdR1 0.063 (0.549)
beliefsitdR2 0.037 (0.713)
t 1dR1 -0.037 (0.735)
t 1dR2 0.028 (0.868)
genderitdR1 0.056 (0.785)
genderitdR2 -0.156 (0.468)
tdR1 -0.240 (0.159)
tdR2 0.028 (0.868)
tt 1 -0.057 (0.554)
overall R2 0.2508
* p-values in parentheses.
We follow a similar estimation procedure as the one discussed for the voter in
Treatment M. We estimate the following equation:
Acceptit = 0+1genderi+2equalit+3poolit+4dR1+5dR2+5t 1+6t+7I+"it;
(21)
where i = 1; :::; 52, t = 1; :::; 10, 0 represents a constant term, genderi represents
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is female, equalit represents
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the voter observes a signal that indicates
equal rst-period payo¤s, poolit represents a dummy variable that is equal to one
if the voter observes a pooling rst-period payo¤, dR1 represents a dummy variable
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that is equal to one if the individual is part of the rst treatment group (R1), dR2
represents a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is part of the sec-
ond treatment group (R2), t 1 is the past lag of the unit cost as a proxy for his-
tory, t is a time trend, I is a set of interaction terms consisting of (genderi  dR1),
(genderi  dR2), (genderi  equalit), (genderi  poolit), (t 1  dR1), (t 1  dR2), (t  dR1)
and (t  dR2) and "it has a one-way error component structure of the form "it =
i + it, where i represents a vector of unobserved individual heterogeneities and
it satises the following strict exogeneity assumption, E (itjXit; i) = 0, where Xit
is the set of explanatory variables in expression 21.
Table 30 reports the estimates of a linear probability model (LPM).50 As ex-
pected, voters are more likely to re-elect as rst-period payo¤s increase. Also, seem
less likely to re-elect as time goes by in the baseline treatment and in the rst risk
session. Finally, while gender seems to be insignicant overall, it plays a role in two
specic contexts: (1) female voters are less likely to re-elect in the second risk ses-
sion and (2) female voters are more likely to re-elect upon observing the pooling
equilibrium payo¤.
Treatment Y. We follow a similar estimation procedure as discussed previ-
ously. We estimate the following equation:
Choiceit = 0+1genderi+2t+3dY +4beliefsit+5t 1+6t+7I+"it; (22)
where i = 1; :::; 58, t = 1; :::; 10, 0 represents a constant term, genderi repre-
sents a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is female, t represents
the current draw of the unit cost of the public good, dY represents a dummy vari-
able that is equal to one if the individual is part of the treatment group, beliefsit
50These ndings are robust to alternative estimation methods (i.e., logit and probit).
105
Table 30: Voter Regression (Treatment R)
Dependent Variable: Acceptit (1=re-elect, 0=vote out)
N = 52, T = 10
constant 0.166 (0.130)*
genderi 0.156 (0.223)
equalit 0.615 (0.000)
poolit 0.241 (0.004)
dR1 0.248 (0.451)
dR2 0.351 (0.220)
history (t 1) -0.057 (0.247)
t -0.017 (0.058)
genderidR1 0.054 (0.838)
genderidR2 -0.486 (0.072)
genderiequalit 0.040 (0.735)
genderipoolit 0.228 (0.045)
t 1dR1 -0.087 (0.683)
t 1dR2 -0.156 (0.205)
t  dR1 -0.069 (0.127)
t  dR2 0.007 (0.727)
overall R2 0.2684
* p-values in parentheses.
are captured by the proxy variable Acceptit, t 1 is the past lag of the unit cost
as a proxy for history, t is a time trend, I is a set of interaction terms consisting
of (genderi  t), (genderi  dY ), (beliefsit  dY ), (t 1  dY ), (genderi  t  dY ) and
(t  t 1) and "it has a one-way error component structure of the form "it = i+it,
where i represents a vector of unobserved individual heterogeneities and it satis-
es the following strict exogeneity assumption, E (itjXit; i) = 0, where Xit is the
set of explanatory variables in expression 22.
Table 31 reports the estimates of a linear probability model (LPM).51 First,
note that in general incumbents behave in a more corrupt manner in the presence
of yardstick competition. Secondly, beliefs are an important determinant of incum-
bentschoices both in the baseline and in the yardstick treatments. Third, while
gender is insignicant overall, it matters in specic contexts. In particular, female
51The results are robust to alternative estimation methods (i.e., logit and probit).
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incumbents are less likely to equalize when the unit cost is high. Finally, female
incumbents are more likely to equalize rst-period payo¤s in the yardstick treat-
ments. So, while the average incumbent increases corrupt behavior in the presence
of yardstick competition, the average female incumbent reduces corrupt behavior.
Table 31: Incumbent Regression (Treatment Y)
Dependent Variable: Choiceit (1=equalize, 0=not equalize)
N = 58, T = 10
constant 0.485 (0.039)*
genderi 0.112 (0.421)
t 0.119 (0.343)
dY -0.313 (0.023)
beliefsit 0.372 (0.000)
history (t 1) -0.097 (0.441)
t -0.004 (0.523)
genderit -0.146 (0.077)
genderidY 0.330 (0.052)
beliefsitdY 0.145 (0.049)
t 1dY -0.008 (0.915)
genderitdY -0.056 (0.561)
tt 1 0.037 (0.618)
overall R2 0.2883
* p-values in parentheses.
We follow a similar estimation procedure as discussed previously with some mi-
nor modications. In particular, we estimate the following equation:
Acceptit = 0 + 1genderi + 2poolit + 3yardstickit + 4t 1 + 5I + "it; (23)
where i = 1; :::; 28, t = 1; :::; 10, 0 represents a constant term, genderi represents
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is female, poolit represents
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the voter observes a pooling rst-period
payo¤, t 1 is the past lag of the unit cost as a proxy for history, I is a set of inter-
action terms consisting of (genderi  yardstickit) and (genderi  poolit) and "it has
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a one-way error component structure of the form "it = i + it, where i repre-
sents a vector of unobserved individual heterogeneities and it satises the following
strict exogeneity assumption, E (itjXit; i) = 0, where Xit is the set of explanatory
variables in expression 23.
There are some subtle di¤erences between the voter equations discussed previ-
ously and equation 23. All of these can be traced back to the yardstick nature of
the Y-sessions. First, the yardstick sessions are identical to the baseline sessions ex-
cept for one minor modication: In addition to their rst-period payo¤s, voters see
one randomly drawn rst-period payo¤ from another B-session. So, the immediate
question arises how to model this subtle change if we want to compare the baseline
and yardstick data.
One alternative is to include a standard dummy variable that is equal to one
if the subject is part of the treatment group and zero otherwise. It turns out that
if we use this formulation, we are led to the conclusion that there is no evidence
of yardstick competition. Another alternative is to dene a yardstick variable that
takes into account the nature of the yardstick information. However, under those
circumstances we are unable to collapse the data from the baseline and yardstick
treatments, since any yardstick variable that incorporates the explicit nature of the
yardstick signal is undened in the baseline treatment.
In other words, if we want to appeal to the yardstick nature of the Y-sessions
by dening a yardstick variable, the above regression will be based only on data
from the Y-sessions (i.e., N = 28). So, the question we ask is whether the yardstick
variable captures any treatment e¤ects given the assumption that Treatments B
and Y are otherwise identical. This is of course not an unreasonable assumption,
since the baseline and yardstick treatments were designed to be identical except for
the yardstick component. So, if we control for a similar set of covariates in equation
23 as we would if we were estimating a baseline regression, we would expect the
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yardstick variable to capture any relevant treatment e¤ects.
The second question is how to dene the yardstick variable. We tried several
alternative denitions and it turns out that the ndings are not robust to all de-
nitions. In particular, treatment e¤ects arise if we dene the yardstick variable
as deviations from the yardstick signal. In other words, yardstickit in equation 23
is dened as the di¤erence between the randomly drawn signal (i.e., 1.50, 0.75 or
0.16) and the actual rst-period payo¤ faced by the voter.
We thus estimate equation 23 for three separate cases. First, we estimate the
equation for the case when the signal is equal to 1.50. Then, we estimate the equa-
tion for the case when the signal is 0.75. Finally, we estimate the equation when
the signal is 0.16. Each such estimation is based on a subset of repetitions, since in
any given repetition the yardstick signal can only take on one particular value.
Table 32 reports the estimates of a linear probability model (LPM) for the three
cases.52 The main result arising from this table is that there is strong evidence of
yardstick competition. In particular, voters pay attention to the di¤erence between
the tax rate in another jurisdiction and their own. Furthermore, any deviation from
the signal that indicates that they are worse o¤ in comparison to the other jurisdic-
tion is punished by voting out (rejecting) the incumbent.
To interpret the yardstick competition coe¢ cient, recall that the yardstick vari-
able is dened as the di¤erence between the yardstick signal and the voters rst-
period payo¤. So, suppose the signal equals 1.50. Then, the yardstick variable has
a nonnegative range. In particular, the variable can take on the values 0.00 (1.50
minus 1.50), 0.75 (1.50 minus 0.75) or 1.34 (1.50 minus 0.16). So, an increase in the
yardstick variable from zero to positive automatically tells us that the rst-period
payo¤ is below the yardstick signal. Thus a negative sign on the yardstickit coe¢ -
cient tells us that the voter is more likely to vote out the incumbent when his rst-
52These ndings are robust to alternative estimation methods (i.e., logit and probit).
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period welfare is below that of another jurisdiction. A similar reasoning holds when
the signals are 0.75 and 0.16 respectively.
Finally, it should be noted that while gender is overall insignicant, female vot-
ers remain sensitive to treatment e¤ects. In particular, while female incumbents are
more likely to re-elect the pooling equilibrium payo¤, they are less likely to re-elect
in the presence of yardstick competition when the signal is 0.75.
Table 32: Voter Regression (Treatment Y)
Dependent Variable: Acceptit (1=re-elect, 0=vote out)
1.50 0.75 0.16
N = 28 T = 2 T = 4 T = 4
constant 0.870 (0.001)* 0.069 (0.650) -0.118 (0.478)
genderi -0.048 (0.769) 0.021 (0.859) -0.064 (0.659)
poolit 0.084 (0.699) 0.143 (0.332) 0.128 (0.234)
yardstickit -0.522 (0.000) -0.235 (0.034) -0.476 (0.000)
history (t 1) -0.033 (0.801) 0.283 (0.001) 0.180 (0.019)
genderiyardstickit -0.051 (0.774) -0.309 (0.037) -0.076 (0.669)
genderipoolit 0.165 (0.546) 0.203 (0.289) 0.057 (0.706)
overall R2 0.4591 0.3827 0.3219
* p-values in parentheses.
Comparison with Viceisza (2007a)
This section presents a main table (table 33) that draws comparisons between
the results in this paper and those discussed in Viceisza (2007a). The table draws
comparisons in two dimensions: (1) experimental implementation and (2) results.
The major di¤erence is the fact that the present experimental design gives rise to
yardstick competition both on the incumbents and the voters side. It should be
noted, however, that there are some subtle similarities such as the fact that voter
welfare tends to be non-increasing with yardstick competition. This is likely due to
the fact that there is a relatively low proportion of good incumbents in the popula-
tion as discussed by Besley and Smart (2007).
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Table 33: Comparison of Current Findings with Viceisza (2007a)
Current Viceisza (2007a)
Implementation
Within  Yes
Between/Across Yes 
Trial Yes Yes
Post-Trial Quiz Yes 
Task Summary Yes 
Post-Questionnaire Yes Yes
Unit Cost Operationalization Physical Devices Virtual
Results
Low proportion of good incumbents Yes Yes
Incumbents theoretically inconsistent Yes Yes
Yardstick: Incumbent Yes No
Yardstick: Voter Yes Limited
Yardstick leaves welfare una¤ected Yes Yes
Voters less likely to re-elect as t " Yes Yes
Gender: Females sensitive to treatment Yes No
Economic Signicance
Thus far, the discussion has mainly focused on statistical signicance. A sep-
arate question is whether any statistically (in)signicant e¤ects are economically
signicant. In fact, it turns out that all treatments are economically signicant
with the exception of Treatment Y. Namely, both in Treatment B and Y voters are
worse o¤ in comparison to incumbents. However, voters are no worse o¤ in Treat-
ment Y than they are in Treatment B. In both cases, voters su¤er on average $2.00
compared to the case in which payo¤s were equalized throughout the whole experi-
ment.
For the other treatments, it is a di¤erent story. In Treatment M, voters are eco-
nomically worse o¤ than they are in Treatment B. They are worse o¤ by an aver-
age of $2.00. In absolute terms, incumbents are worse o¤ as well by an average of
$0.25; however, in relative terms they are better o¤. These results support the re-
sults found in previous sections.
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Finally, in absolute terms both incumbents and voters are better o¤ in Treat-
ment R; however, voters are better o¤ than incumbents in relative terms. Namely,
voters are better o¤ by an average of $1.50 and incumbents are better o¤ by an av-
erage of $0.50 in comparison to Treatment B. This is the case even though we did
not nd any clear-cut statistically signicant treatment e¤ects.
Conclusion
This paper reports theory-testing experiments that answer three main questions.
First, the extent to which tax ine¢ ciencyas represented by an increase in the mar-
ginal cost of public fundsa¤ects corrupt behavior. Secondly, the e¤ect of lack of
a particular form of transparency (as modeled by a mean-preserving spread in the
distribution of the unit cost of public goods) on corrupt behavior. Finally, whether
yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism; particularly, in the
presence of historical forces.
We nd the following results. First, tax ine¢ ciency is an important determinant
of corrupt incumbent behavior. In particular, an increase in the marginal cost of
public funds makes it more costly for incumbents to equalize rst-period payo¤s.
This drives them to separate and divert maximum rents in the rst period. While
voters retaliate slightly by voting incumbents out of o¢ ce, voters tend to be worse
o¤.
Secondly, we nd that increased lack of a particular form of transparency (as
dened in terms of an increase in risk in the distribution of the unit cost) leaves
corrupt incumbent behavior unchanged. If the draw of the unit cost is unfavor-
able, incumbents tend to be less corrupt. So, the results suggest that lack of trans-
parency (as dened in Viceisza 2007a) need not always make voters worse o¤.
Third, the experiments nd strong evidence of yardstick competition. On the in-
cumbents side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if the
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incumbent is female. On the voters side, voters are less likely to re-elect the incum-
bent in the presence of yardstick competition. Specically, voters pay attention to
the di¤erence between the tax signal in their own jurisdiction and the signal in an-
other jurisdiction. As this di¤erence increases, voters re-elect less. Despite these
changes in behavior, voter welfare tends to be non-increasing in the presence of
yardstick competition. This is likely due to the low proportion of good incumbent
present in the population. This is further discussed by Besley and Smart (2007).
Fourth, history can be an important determinant of corruption and of re-election
decisions. Incumbents are likely to make choices as they did in previous repeti-
tions and voters are likely to vote out increasingly as the repetitions go by. In other
words, voters tend to distrust the political system more as time goes by depending
on the institution.
Fifth, we nd that gender plays a signicant role in incumbent and voter behav-
ior. In particular, female incumbents tend to be more sensitive to treatment e¤ects
both on the incumbent and the voter side. Finally, beliefs tend to be an important
factor in decision-making. Incumbents are likely to choose rst-period payo¤s with
which they associate a higher probability of re-election. Voters tend to re-elect the
higher the rst-period payo¤, which is a signal of the incumbents nature.
CORRUPTION IN THE MAIL: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED
FIELD EXPERIMENT IN LIMA, PERU
Introduction
Corruption is an age-old question (see discussions by Aidt 2003 and Bardhan
1997.) While folk wisdom has long recognized its existence, some related questions
have proven di¢ cult to answer scientically. First, there are the questions of deni-
tion and existence. Namely, what actually constitutes corruption? Secondly, what
are its causes? Third, how do we measure it? Fourth, does corruption have any
(negative) consequences and if so, what are they? Finally, if corruption is costly
to society, what can we do to control it?
The rst question was addressed long ago by for example Kautiliya (see Bard-
hans 1997 account of Kautiliyas writings.) However, recently The World Bank
(1997) formally answered this question by dening corruption as the abuse of public
o¢ ce for private gain.53 Although this is a start, the quest to identify corruption
in everyday settings in order to answer the remaining questions has sparked a large
literature on economic approaches to (political) corruptioneven before a formal
denition was available.54
While nding answers to the remaining questions has proven to be more in-
volved, the literature seems to be in widespread consensus on a couple of issues.
53A similar denition was provided by Jain (2001).
54Some general pieces include Martinez-Vazquez, Arze and Boex (2007), Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2005), Aidt (2003) and Bardhan (1997). Furthermore, the following authors just
to name a few have focused on answering the ve corruption-related questions. Tanzi (1998)
looked at causes. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) and Olken (2006) worked on measure-
ment. Considerable time has been spent on consequences. The debate has focused on whether
corruption is e¢ ciency-enhancing in that it "greases the wheels of society" (Le¤ 1964, Huntington
1968, Lui 1985) or whether it is "costly" in that it is e¢ ciency-reducing (Rose-Ackerman 1978,
Klitgaard 1991, Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Djankov et al. 2002.) Furthermore, when it is costly,
the question has been raised whether it is more costly to certain social groups (Gupta, Davoodi
and Alonso-Teme 1998 and Transparency International.) Finally, Klitgaard (1988) has worked on
mechanisms for controlling corruption. Also see discussions by organizations such as the IMF and
the World Bank.
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First, improved answers to the above questions lead to a better understanding of
corruption, which in turn leads to a better understanding of how to counteract
corruption when necessary. Secondly, weak (public) institutions and social history
are at the heart of corruption (Viceisza 2007c) and lack of economic growth (Kauf-
mann, Kraay and Mastruzzi forthcoming.)
This study reports a theory-testing randomized eld experiment that makes
use of an existing semi-public monopolist institutionthe postal system in Lima,
Perúto identify and measure corruption, its potential causes and its consequences.
The study thus contributes to the literature by providing contextual answers to
four of the above ve questions. Furthermore, the experiment provides observa-
tions on a counterfactual that is usually not observed. In particular, it is unusual
to send items of value in the mail. Therefore, day-to-day behavior dictates search-
ing less for these items in the mail. So, any treatment e¤ects that are identied en-
able us to observe behavior o¤ the "equilibrium" path and constitute a lower bound
to what might actually be observed if it were customary to send items of value by
mail.
The study is in the same area of the literature as Olken (2007) and Bertrand
et al. (forthcoming); namely, randomized eld experiments that aim at identifying
and measuring corruption, its causes and consequences. Thus, it contributes to a
fast-emerging literature on eld experiments that are of interest to policymakers
in general with a particular focus on development (Duo 2006) and experimental
economists (Harrison and List 2004.)
Specically, we implement a (2x2)-design in which each household within a
stratied quasi-random sample of households across Lima is sent four birthday-like
envelopes: (1) an envelope with money with same sender and recipient last name,
(2) an envelope without money with same sender and recipient last name, (3) an
envelope with money with distinct sender and recipient last name and (4) an en-
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velope without money with distinct sender and recipient last name. The envelopes
are sent in four batches (on average, one month apart) and for each household the
four envelopes are randomly assigned to batch. The envelopes are also randomly
assigned other systematic characteristics, which are elaborated upon below.
We compare receipt of money and non-money envelopes to learn whether loss
of mail is nonrandom.55 Furthermore, we compare receipt across same and di¤er-
ent sender/recipient last names to learn whether or not family mail is more likely
to be lost because its content is perceived to be of higher value. Also, we control for
household-specic characteristics (such as neighborhood welfare and head of house-
holds gender) to learn whether loss of mail a¤ects social groups di¤erently. Finally,
we quantify the costs of corruption and loss of e¢ ciency based on the value of lost
mail and the costs of an alternative carrierWestern Union.
We nd the following. First, 19.08% of mail is lost. Secondly, money mail is
more likely to be lost at a rate of 20.90% compared to no-money mail which dis-
appears at a rate of 14.37% (this di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 10%
level). This nding suggests that loss of mail is systematic (non-random), which im-
plies that this type of corruption is due to strategic behavior as opposed to plain
shirking on the part of mail handlers.
Third, we nd that loss of mail is non-random across other observables. Cor-
ruption is more costly to certain societal groups. Middle-income neighborhoods are
more likely to experience lost (money) mail (these di¤erences are statistically sig-
nicant at the 10% level). These ndings are informed by the predictions of the
model, which suggest that mail handlers may perceive the benets (costs) of lost
mail to be higher (lower) in middle-income neighborhoods compared to low- and
high-income neighborhoods.
We also nd that female heads of household in low-income neighborhoods are
55Note that since the mail system in Perú is a semi-public institution, (nonrandom) loss of mail
is a form of corruption according to the World Bank (1997) and Jain (2001).
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more likely to experience lost mail. This is not necessarily a surprising result, since
this group may be perceived to be vulnerable (this di¤erence is statistically signif-
icant at the 10% level). Furthermore, female heads of household in high-income
neighborhoods are much less likely to experience lost (money) mail (these di¤er-
ences are statistically signicant at the 5% level).
Finally, this form of corruption is costly to di¤erent stakeholders. The sender of
mail bears a direct and an indirect cost. Corruption is also costly to the intended
mail recipient. Middle-income neighborhoods and female heads of household in low-
income neighborhoods are more likely to su¤er. Finally, corruption is costly the
mail company (SERPOST) in terms of lost revenue and to society in terms of loss
of trust as a form of social capital (Fukuyama 1995). Overall, the ndings suggest
that public-private partnerships need not increase e¢ ciency by reducing corruption;
particularly, when the institution remains a monopoly. Increased e¢ ciency in mail
delivery is likely to require (1) privatization and (2) competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents
the theoretical model. Then, we discuss the experimental design and implementa-
tion. Finally, we present the results and conclude.
Theoretical Model
There are many theoretical models of corruption as categorized by Aidt (2003.)
Our model can be classied under Aidts second categorynamely, models of cor-
ruption in which a benevolent principal delegates decision-making "authority" to a
non-benevolent agent. In particular, our model is based on a game played between
a sender of mail (to be called "the sender") and an average handler of mail (to be
called "a handler.")56 In the next, we rst describe the game. We then proceed to
solving the game and discussing the hypotheses that guide our experimental design.
56Note that the term "sender" is used here to indicate a person sending mail. It is not used in
conventional terms of a signaling game.
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The Mail Game: Players, Actions and Payo¤s
We model the game as a variant of the matching pennies game that has been
discussed in many other contexts (Fudenberg and Tirole 1992.) In particular, we
model the problems facing the sender and a handler as a simultaneous-move game
with complete information, which we call the "the mail game." The strategic form
is in table 34.
Table 34: Strategic-Form Representation of The Mail Game
Sender
No Money Money
Handler Deliver (0; 0) (0; B(x))
Open ( t(x); 0) (R  t(x); C(x))
Consider the problems faced by each player. On the one hand, the sender sends
mail and faces the question whether or not to include items of value in the mail.
Without loss of generality, let the value item be "money" and let the non-value
item be "no money." Then, the actions available to the sender are "money" and
"no money." On the other hand, a handler faces the question whether or not to
open the mail. Thus, the actions available to a handler are "open" and "deliver."
With each such action there is an associated payo¤ conditional on what the
other player does. Consider the sender. The benet of successful delivery of money
mail is B(x) > 0. The cost of lost money mail is C (x) > 0. If it is no-money mail,
the benet/cost to the sender is zero. Next, consider a handler. A handler faces a
cost of being caught when mail is opened, t (x) > 0. Furthermore, a handler faces a
potential reward R > t (x) when money mail is opened. If the mail is delivered, the
benet/cost to a handler is zero.
The benet and the cost to the sender (i.e., B (x), C (x)) and the cost to a han-
dler (i.e., t(x)) are assumed to be functions of x. The reward R is not. In the theo-
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retical game, x strictly represents a set of observable sender characteristics.57 This
formulation is interesting because it allowsamong other thingsfor taste-based dis-
crimination on the part of a handler. For example, money may be of di¤erent value
to a particular sender. This may a¤ect a handlers perceived value of B (x) and
C (x) and thus the likelihood of mail being opened. Furthermore, the likelihood of
getting caught may be higher depending on the observed x. Thus, x sends signals
to a handler and a¤ects behavior via the perceived values of B (x), C (x) and t (x).
Solution
We seek to characterize pure and/or mixed strategy Nash equilibria for the mail
game. Since the game is a variant of the matching pennies game, it should come
as no surprise that there are no pure-strategy Nash equilibria associated with this
game. Namely, suppose the sender chooses "no money." Then, a handler will choose
"deliver." However, knowing that a handler chooses "deliver" induces the sender
to choose "money." This in turn will drive a handler to "open." So, given our non-
trivial parameterization, there are no stable pure-strategy Nash equilibria associ-
ated with this game and both players randomize in equilibrium.
In order to nd the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium associated with this game,
suppose we assume risk neutrality. Then, each player solves an expected payo¤
maximization problem. In particular, the sender chooses "money" if the expected
payo¤ from sending money is greater than the expected payo¤ from not sending
money. Let (1   p) be the likelihood that the mail is delivered. Then, the sender is
indi¤erent between "money" and "no money" if expression 24 is satised:
(1  p) B (x) + p   C (x) = p  0 + (1  p)  0: (24)
57Empirically, x may constitute a larger set of observables such as recipient characteristics, mail
characteristics and a handlers characteristics. This is further discussed below. In the context of
the theoretical game, observables other than those pertaining to the sender are undened.
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Noting that p is the likelihood that the mail is opened, i.e., Pr (open), this leads
to a handlers equilibrium strategy in expression 25:
Pr (open) =
B (x)
B (x) + C (x)
. (25)
Similarly, a handler chooses "open" if the expected payo¤ from opening the mail
is greater than or equal to the expected payo¤ of delivering the mail. Let (1  q) be
the likelihood that the mail contains money. Then, a handler is indi¤erent between
"open" and "deliver" if expression 26 is satised:
q   t (x) + (1  q)  [R  t (x)] = q  0 + (1  q)  0: (26)
Noting that (1  q) is the likelihood that the mail contains money, i.e., Pr (money),
this leads to the senders equilibrium strategy in expression 27:
Pr (money) =
t (x)
R
. (27)
The above shows that both players adopt mixed strategies and thus, randomize
in equilibrium. It is useful to interpret these mixed strategies. After all, the game
theory literature has debated the interpretation and plausibility of mixed-strategy
equilibria for a while (Fudenberg and Tirole 1992). Traditionally, two defenses of
mixed strategies have been o¤ered. Both have intuitive appeal in the context of our
model. First, a mixed strategy represents di¤erent pure strategies used by a large
population of players. This has intuititive appeal in the context of our model since
the sender and a handler in the mail game represent a large population of senders
and handlerssome of which choose "money" and some of which choose "open."
Secondly, a mixed strategy can be interpreted as the result of small, unobserv-
able variations in playerspayo¤s. Formally, Harsanyis (1973) purication theorem
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shows that any mixed-strategy equilibrium can "almost always" be obtained as the
limit of a pure-strategy equilibrium in a sequence of slightly perturbed games. In
particular, mixed-strategy equilibria can be thought of as representing asymmetric
information. Thus, the perturbed games represent Bayesian games with distribu-
tions of types in Harsanyis formulation.
The representation of the strategic-form mail game as a Bayesian game is rel-
evant. First, it allows for infra-marginality which is ruled out by a simple mixed-
strategy equilibrium. This might be important due to the fact that best-response
functions in a nite game are step functions, which implies that the infra-marginal
player (if we think of the game as a "market") will have the same preferences as the
marginal player. This need not be the case in applications. Furthermore, Harsanyis
formulation allows for the simple strategic-form mail game to be interpreted in a
richer contextviz. Bayesian gameswhich also could have been used to describe the
game.
Comparative Results and Hypotheses
From the senders equilibrium strategy in expression 27, it can be noted that
the higher a handlers cost of getting caught t (x), the more likely the sender will
send money mail. Furthermore, the higher the reward R (i.e., benet to a handler),
the less likely the sender will send money mail. Similarly, from a handlers equilib-
rium strategy in expression 25, we note that the higher (lower) the perceived ben-
et B (x) (cost, C (x)) associated with the mail, the higher the likelihood that the
mail will be opened.58
The following hypotheses are informed by the model and guide the experimental
design in the next section.
58Consider Beckers (1968) model of crime and punishment as a starting point for B (x) and
C (x). These represent stylized benets and costs imposed on society by the commitment of a
criminal act. Also, consider Beckers "supply of o¤enses" discussion in relation to R and t (x).
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 H1: Loss of mail is nonrandom and thus constitutes a corrupt activity. In
other words, the likelihood of money mail being lost is higher than no-money
mail. Thus, Pr (openjmoney) > Pr (openjno_money).
 H2: Certain observable characteristics serve as signals to a handler. Certain
signals are associated with a higher (lower) perceived benet (cost) of mail
delivery and thus they induce a higher (lower) likelihood of certain mail being
opened. Thus, Pr(openjx) > Pr(openjx0), where x and x0 represent a distinct
set of observable characteristics. In particular, the above implies that either
B(x) is larger than B(x0) or that C(x) is smaller than C(x0). In other words,
either a handler is more likely to associate more money with x or a handler is
more likely to associate less value of money with x.
Finally, we return to the contents of x. Empirically, x can represent a vector of
observables consisting of more than just sender characteristics. For example, x can
represent the bait itselfi.e., whether or not the mail contains money. In this sense,
H1 is a special case of H2. Furthermore, x can consist of combined sender/recipient
characteristicse.g., whether or not the senders last name is the same as the recipi-
ents last name.
Last, x can comprise several other characteristics such as the recipients neigh-
borhood (which is a representation of income or social status), the recipients gen-
der and possibly, a handlers own personal characteristics in relation to the afore-
mentioned observables. For now, it is important to note that regardless of the exact
information contained in x, all of these aspects may induce the relation between the
above conditional probabilities to move in a particular direction. We appeal further
to the implications of the model once we get to interpretation of the results.
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Design and Implementation
In this section, we discuss the design and implementation. We are strongly driven
by the hypotheses discussed previously in the context of the mail game (i.e., H1
and H2.) We rst discuss the main control treatments that test these hypotheses.
Then, we discuss some additional issues that are controlled by the experimenter.
Finally, we discuss issues related to implementation of the experiments, including
sample selection and data collection.
A recurring theme throughout the discussion will be randomization. We stress
randomization for a couple of reasons. First, while we hypothesize that loss of mail
is nonrandom, we do not know at what point in the mail handling process mail is
actually "lost." In other words, mail may be lost at the central level (i.e., the main
distribution center); however, it may also be lost at the district level (i.e., the dis-
trict o¢ ce) or at the street level (i.e., at the level of the ultimate deliverer of mail.)
So, since we do not know the identity of our treatment and control groups at
any given point in time, we randomize as much as possible. This mitigates any type
of sample selection bias (Banerjee et al. 2006 and Wooldridge 2002.) Secondly, ran-
domization across observable characteristics that are controlled by the experimenter
mitigates any type of bias that may arise on a handlers side. Namely, if certain
types of mail are systematically likely to be characterized by certain observables,
this may "tip o¤" a particular handler, whichin turnmay exacerbate learning and
social (neighboring) e¤ects (Duo forthcoming.)
Design I: Main Control Treatments
To test the main hypotheses discussed in the previous section, we implement a
(2x2)-design consisting of two control treatments. The rst is a "bait" treatment
that randomly assigns money and no money to pieces of mail. The second is a "fa-
miliar" treatment that randomly assigns same and di¤erent sender and recipient
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last names to pieces of mail. We refer to the case in which the sender and the re-
cipient have the same last name as "familiar" and the case in which they do not as
"foreign."
The experimental design is within-households in the sense that each recipient
household is sent four pieces of mail: (1) a familiar money envelope, (2) a familiar
no-money envelope, (3) a foreign money envelope and (4) a foreign no-money en-
velope. This is opposed to a between-households design in which households would
strictly be assigned to one of the following treatments: "money," "no money," "fa-
miliar" and "foreign."59
While a potential benet of a between-households design is that it mitigates any
type of order e¤ects ("red ags"), we choose a within-households design because of
the following reasons. First, a between-households design requires a substantially
larger sample of recipient households; in fact, four times as much as what we cur-
rently have if households are to be randomly assigned to only one of the four treat-
ments and if we seek balanced comparisons. Furthermore, the larger the group of
recipient households, the more we need to be concerned about "tipping o¤" mail
handlers. As discussed previously, this is a legitimate concern when mitigating bias
in the data. So, we choose a within-households design.
To further mitigate any data bias resulting from order and/or subject-pool ef-
fects as well as any sample selectivity bias, we implement the following controls.
First, we send four sets of envelopes to each household. Any set of envelopes to
all households is sent as one batch and the four batches are sent within a range of
three to ve weeks apart.60 The envelopes are identical in terms of size and appear-
ance, and di¤er only by the characteristics of interest, which are (1) the treatment
59Note that the terms within- and between-subjects are traditionally used in the experimen-
tal literature to indicate designs in which subjectsidentities are known. It should be noted that
in this case, subjectsidentities are completely unknown; in particular, the subjects of interest
are handlers of mail whose identities are unobserved. What we observe is a reduced-form of their
actionsi.e., whether or not mail is delivered.
60We deliberately tweak the spaces between mailings to further mitigate any type of bias.
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characteristics (i.e., content and sender last name) and (2) additional observable
characteristics, which include the senders address, the color of the envelope and the
senders handwriting. We discuss the treatment characteristics below. The addi-
tional observable characteristics are discussed in the next subsection.
The main treatment characteristics are implemented as follows. First, all pieces
of mail comprise a birthday-like envelope containing a card with enscription "Fe-
liz Día" or "Happy Birthday" depending on whether the sender is familiar or for-
eign. Secondly, if the mail is money mail, it contains two U.S. dollar bills ($2.00)
folded in half. This serves as bait. If the mail is no-money mail, it obviously does
not contain money. However, it does contain a small lottery number in the lower
right-hand corner. The relevance of the lottery number is explained later.
Secondly, since the mail is sent in four batches, we need four names (two famil-
iar and two foreign) if we are to randomize (i.e., sample without replacement from)
sender last names across batches. The familiar names are "L. Last Name" and "M.
Last Name." The foreign names are "P. Thomson" and "J. Scott."61 So, for exam-
ple, if for a particular batch an envelope is randomly chosen to go to a household
with last name Perez coming from familiar1, then the sender is L. Perez. If famil-
iar2, then M. Perez. The enscription in the envelope is adjusted according to the
sender last name.
For each household, we randomize the main treatment observables across batches
by sampling without replacement and keeping in mind that each household must be
sent a money and a no-money envelope from both a familiar and a foreign sender.
So, ultimately, each household is sent two money and two no-money envelopes at
random points in time and each envelope randomly comes from one of the four
senders.
61The experiment was conducted in two stagesa pilot stage and a large stage. In particular,
the pilot stage only comprised money mail. In the pilot stage, we did not randomize across all
observables. Furthermore, the foreign name was Mike Tucker. We control for these discrepancies
in the empirical analysis.
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According to the theoretical model, if loss of mail is random, then there should
be no di¤erence between the probability that money is opened and the probability
that no-money mail is opened; i.e., Pr(openjno_money) = Pr(openjmoney). So, by
comparing the likelihood of delivery across money and no-money envelopes ceteris
paribus, we are able to test H1. Furthermore, if variants of a particular observable
characteristic x have no e¤ect on the likelihood of mail delivery, then Pr(openjx)
= Pr(openjx0). In particular, if x represents the senders last name and a handler
infers nothing from the fact that mail has the same sender and recipient last name
(familiar) as opposed to a distinct last name (foreign), there should be no discrep-
ancy between the above conditional probabilities controlling for other factors. So,
by comparing the likelihood of delivery across familiar and foreign ceteris paribus,
we are able to test a special case of H2.
Two nal comments are necessary. First, note that as the experimenter we con-
trol two main aspects given what we want to learn from conducting the experiment.
In particular, the theoretical model tells us that two aspects determine corruptibility
bait and an observable characteristic such as matching of sender/recipient last name.
Thus, we control those and vary them systematically to tease apart any treatment
e¤ects. Under usual circumstances a sender of mail does not observe the counter-
factuals, which can be a confounding e¤ect.
Secondly, note that the theoretical model is a one-shot simultaneous-move game
of complete information. So, strictly speaking, it does not allow for repeated inter-
actions between the sender and a handler. However, with an average of one month
between mail batches, we nd that the model represents a reasonable approxima-
tion. Furthermore, since di¤erent senders randomly send di¤erent pieces of mail
at di¤erent points in time, it is not unreasonable to expect that distinct handlers
handle distinct pieces of mail. This is consistent with the mail game and with the
interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibrium discussed earlier.
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Design II: Other Control Issues
The theoretical model denes x as a particular observable characteristic of the
sender. However, empirically, x may encompass a much larger set of observables. In
particular, the following are observable to a handler over and beyond mail content
and the senders last name: (1) the senders address, (2) the color of the envelope,
(3) the senders handwriting, (4) the recipients neighborhood (as a sign of income
and social status), (5) the recipients gender and (6) a handlers personal character-
istics.
Consider rst the last observablea handlers personal characteristics. This is
less of an observablecertainly a priori. As a consequence, it is less controllable by
the experimenter. In particular, we do not have a clear picture of a handlers per-
sonal characteristics, mainly because his or her identity is completely unknown.
Two comments are relevant. First, once the study is completed, we can seek more
consistent information on an average handlers personal characteristics by district.
For now, we refrain from doing so in order not to "poison the well." Secondly, since
we are ultimately interested in the di¤erential e¤ect between treatments, the per-
sonal characteristics of a handler are of slightly lesser importance.
As for the rst ve characteristics, these are a priori observable by the exper-
imenter. Thus, they are controlled for both a priori and ex post. For now, we are
concerned with a priori controls, which are instituted as follows. Given that there
are four batches of envelopes, we use four variants for each observable similarly
to sender namei.e., we use four sender addresses (two in Atlanta, GA and two in
Washington, D.C.), four distinct colors and four di¤erent handwritings. For each
household we then randomize colors across batches by sampling without replace-
ment. We randomize sender addresses and handwriting across batches in a similar
manner. In the next subsection, we discuss how we control a priori for the remain-
ing observablesi.e., the recipients neighborhood and gender.
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Implementation I: Sample Construction
In order to be able to implement the eld experiment, we rst need a represen-
tative sample of households in Lima, Perú that are willing to serve as mail recipi-
ents.62 This sample is not the actual sample of interest; however, it represents the
means to an end. In particular, this sample enables us to observe the result of mail
handlersactions. Consequently, its representativeness is of extreme importance to
the unobserved sample of interestespecially, if mail is lost at the district o¢ ce or
street level.
Thus, controls relating to the recipients neighborhood and gender were of pri-
mary importance when constructing the sample of recipient households. The rst
step to construct a random sample of households in Lima was to gather a rela-
tively large number of potentially interested households from which we would draw
a random subgroup. To do so, we hired recruiters that usually work as surveyers for
Grupo de Análisis para el Desarollo (GRADE) and those recruiters were in charge
of gathering potential recipient households.
The recruiters were asked to solicit willingness to participate from recipient
households. In doing so, they mainly pulled from their standard survey-takers,
which are representative of a large range of social strata. Both recruiters and po-
tential recipient households were informed of the basics of the study; however, they
were not informed of the exact purpose of the study. In particular, potential partic-
ipants were informed that the study would entail conrming receipt or non-receipt
of pieces of mail. This rst step led to a total of 206 potential recipient households.
We then performed four checks for consistency and representativeness of the
data. First, we used GIS to map all addresses. This had two main purposes: (1) it
served as a check whether or not the addresses were correct and active and (2) it
62The choice of Lima, Perú was dictated by a couple of main factors. First, this is where there
is a hypothesized treatment e¤ectbased on experiences with sending mail. Secondly, this is where
there is a network to realize a study of this magnitude.
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gave a rst look at the geographical distribution of addresses. This rst test ren-
dered fteen (15) addresses invalid and thus brought the group of potential house-
holds to 191. These 191 households were relatively representative of Lima.
Secondly, we performed a GIS-based "radius test." Basically, we traced a one
kilometer (i.e., 0.62 miles) radius around each household.63 Then, we calculated the
total number of households within each households radius including the household
itself. Each household that had ve (5) or more households within its radius was
dropped from the sample. This avoided that we had locational clusters within the
sample of potential households and it reduced the group of potential households to
154.
Thirdly, we performed a check at the district post o¢ ce level. Since each dis-
trict has a xed number of post o¢ ce branches, we compared the total number of
potential households within a district to the number of post o¢ ces in the respec-
tive district. In cases where the total number of post o¢ ces were small compared
to the total number of households within a district, we randomly chose a subset of
households to be eligible for the study.
Finally, we did a manual check to see whether any neighboring households sur-
vived the above eliminations. These nal two checks led to a total number of 147
eligible recipient households, all of which were willing to participate in the study.64
So, the ultimate sample of recipient households is in some sense a stratied quasi-
random sample as discussed in Banerjee et al. (2006). An approximate distribution
of the households across Lima is portrayed in gure 5. Of these households, 47% of
the mail recipients are male and 53% are female. These households are representa-
tive of 77.27% of Limas postal districts.
63As a reference point, a one-kilometer radius represents a radius of approximately ten (10)
blocks.
64The data analysis is based on N = 138. The discrepancy is due to some ex post attrition
caused by (1) nonresponse and (2) changed/invalid addresses.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Households Across Lima
Implementation II: Data Collection
All batches of mail were sent by airmail through the United States Postal Ser-
vice (USPS.) After a batch was sent, each household was informed via email that
they had been sent an envelope. The English translation of the email that was sent
to the households is included in the appendix. In particular, they were informed of
the contents of the envelope and were requested to conrm receipt or non-receipt
via email within a two- to three-week period.65 If they did not, the recruiters were
requested to track down responses. Households were also asked to report the fol-
lowing aspects if applicable: (1) the condition and contents of the envelope, (2) the
65Typically, USPS and Royal Mail consider international postal mail to be lost once fteen
business days (i.e., three weeks) have past. According to the Universal Postal Union (UPU), there
is no international standard for lost mail.
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senders name and address and (3) the date received.
Furthermore, they were told to keep the two dollars that were in the money
mail. This was done to mitigate any incentives to lie about non-receipt. Also, house-
holds were informed that they should hold onto the lottery tickets included in no-
money mail, since these lottery tickets would be used to randomly give additional
rewards at the end of the studyi.e., once all four batches were sent. Households
were asked to report the lottery number when conrming receipt of no-money mail
and they were informed of the terms of the lottery. In particular, there would be
ve prizes of U.S.$ 50.00, ve prizes of U.S.$ 25.00 and ten prizes of U.S.$ 10.00.
Those who did not receive no-money mail were entered into a separate lottery com-
prising ve prizes of U.S.$ 25.00.
The purpose of the lottery tickets was twofold: (1) to reward households that
did not get the money-mail (since money mail is expected to be lost more frequently)
and (2) to ensure that households had su¢ cient incentive to participate in the study
from start to nish and report accordingly. Finally, households were requested not
to go to the post o¢ ce or to inquire about the mail with the postal carrier, since
this could introduce bias in the data.
To further mitigate attrition and non-response, the recruiters followed up with
their participant households. A recruiters task was twofold: (1) to recruit poten-
tial recipient households and (2) to follow up with participating households. There
was one main recruiter who was in charge of nine other recruiters. All recruiters
were paid a at fee for their services. The main recruiter was rewarded about half a
months salary. The remaining recruiters were rewarded about a third of a months
salary.
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Results
The Mail in Perú
Public mail in Perú is run by Servisios Postales del Perú S.A., also known as
SERPOST S.A.66 SERPOST has a concession that obliges it to provide mail ser-
vices both domestically and internationally to the Peruvian society as established in
legislative decree number 685. Based on 2001 data, SERPOST is not the only mail
operator in Perú; although it remains the main actor. In particular, SERPOST can
be considered a semi-public monopolist.
The following descriptives (based on 2005 data) characterize SERPOST. SER-
POST operates 2054 permanent post o¢ ces and has a total full-time sta¤ of 1959
employees, of whom 41% are female. A permanent post o¢ ce serves an average of
13,600 inhabitants. On a daily basis, SERPOST handles close to 32,000 letter-post
items domestically and receives an average of 13,500 letter-post items from interna-
tional destinations.
Treatment E¤ects and Interpretations
In this subsection, we identify the main treatment e¤ects based on non-parametric
means comparison tests, viz. Mann-Whitney (MW) tests. We resort to this form of
analysis primarily due to nonlinearities in the data. These will become evident as
we discuss the main e¤ects below.
Identication, Measurement and Causes. We start with the question
whether there is loss of mail. We nd that 17.93% of mail is lost. While there are
no international statistics on lost mail according to the Universal Postal Union, this
percentage is substantial compared to the 0.052% reported by Royal Mail on an an-
66The statistics reported in this section are based on one of the following sources: (1) the Uni-
versal Postal Union (http://www.upu.int) or (2) SERPOST (http://www.serpost.com.pe.)
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nual basis. Next, we ask whether loss of mail is systematic (i.e., non-random). A
comparison of loss rates across money and no-money envelopes nds that 14.37% of
no-money mail is lost, while 20.90% of money mail is lost. This di¤erence is statis-
tically signicant at the 10% level (MW p-value is 0.10).
The above result indicates that loss of mail is systematic and supports H1. It
indicates that there is strategic behavior taking place, since the type of mail that is
sent a¤ects the probability of loss. It should be noted that the discrepancy between
loss rates allows us to distinguish this form of sophisticated or strategic behavior
from the case in which all types of mail are equally likely to be lost due to for ex-
ample shirking. While shirking can also be argued to be a form of corrupt behavior,
it is di¤erent from the type of strategic behavior that we identify here.
Having established systematic loss of mail, we ask whether loss of mail di¤ers
across other observable characteristics. So, we now consider H2. The set of observ-
ables in x can contain many variables. We focus on the following: (1) neighbor-
hood e¤ects, (2) gender e¤ects, (3) close social distance e¤ects (i.e., whether the
mail is familiar or foreign) and (4) combinations hereof. For now, we abstain from
discussing other characteristics such as the color of the envelope, the senders hand-
writing or the senders address, since these are more complicated to interpret.67
We start with neighborhood e¤ects. Using poverty rates across (postal) districts
in Lima, we classify neighborhoods as (1) high income if they have less than ten
percent poor, (2) middle income if they have between ten percent and thirty per-
cent poor and (3) low income if they have more than thirty percent poor. We nd
that loss rates di¤er across neighborhoods. Middle-income neighborhoods are more
likely to experience lost mail overall at 22.07% compared to the poor (16.95%) and
the rich (13.33%). This di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 10% level (MW
p-value is 0.096).
67Recall that these controls were mainly instituted a priori in order to avoid "red ags."
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Furthermore, middle-income neighborhoods are more likely to have money mail
lost. Specically, money mail disappears at a rate of 27.27% compared to 18.18%
for the poor and 15.52% for the rich. This di¤erence is also statistically signicant
at the 10% level (MW p-value is 0.08). These results indicate that middle-income
neigborhoods are more likely to experience lost mail, particularly if the mail con-
tains money.
The theoretical model discussed previously lends itself to a nice interpretation
of this nding. Recall that the probability of loss is driven by the benet and the
cost of opening mail as follows: Pr (openjx) = B(x)
B(x)+C(x)
. So, if handlers are more
likely to open mail conditional on observing x, where x represents a middle-income
neighborhood, they must perceive B (x) to be higher or C (x) to be lower.
The benets of middle-income mail may be perceived to be higher than low-
income mail, since middle-income mail is more likely to be valuable. Furthermore,
middle-income neighborhoods may be perceived to lack proper alternatives for se-
curely transferring money in comparison to high-income neighborhoods. In turn,
the costs of opening middle-income mail may be perceived to be lower compared to
high-income mail, since security is likely to play a bigger role in high-income neigh-
borhoods. This indirectly a¤ects the likelihood of getting caught. So, indirectly this
nding tells us something about unsatised markets in middle-income neighbor-
hoods.
Next, we turn to gender e¤ects. While gender is not signicant by itself, if we
interact it with neighborhoods it becomes signicant. In particular, low-income fe-
males are more likely to experience lost mail at a rate of 21.62% compared to low-
income males (9.09%). This di¤erence is signicant at the 10% level (MW p-value
is 0.08). Furthermore, high-income females are far less likely to experience mail
loss at a rate of 2.63% compared to 24.66% in middle-income neighborhoods and
21.62% in high-income neighborhoods (MW p-value is 0.01). High-income females
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are also more likely to receive money mail at a rate of 95.65% compared to 75.00%
otherwise (MW p-value is 0.03).
Finally, we consider the close social distance aspect. We nd limited evidence
that familiar envelopes are more likely to be lost if they contain money at a rate of
20.65% compared to 12.36%. This nding is not signicant at the 10% level (MW
p-value is 0.13).
Consequences. We now consider the question why we should care about
the nding that a substantial percentage of mail is lost. The fact that we nd ev-
idence of corruption is in itself interesting; however, it need not be reason for con-
cern. After all, there are forms of corruption that tend to increase e¢ ciency. Our
main argument in this section is that this form of corruption reduces e¢ ciency
since loss of mail represents loss of information and information is important for
a well-functioning market mechanism and for economic e¢ ciency (see discussions by
Stigler 1961 and Smith 1982).
Furthermore, corruption is costly to several small- and stakeholders in society.
First, this form of corruption impacts the sender of mail. Suppose we consider each
of the four senders of mail in our mail experiment. On average, each sender sends
68 envelopes. The cost of lost mail to each sender consists of three components:
(1) the direct costs of the envelope, card and postage, (2) the direct costs of the
contents (U.S.$ 2.00 for money envelopes) and (3) the costs of alternative mail ser-
vices.
Components (1) and (2) are real costs and amount to U.S.$ 29.20 (23.10 plus
6.10) per sender.68 These costs represent 19.08% of the total gross cost of the mail.
Component (3) is a hypothetical cost. It is likely that a sender whose mail is lost
will seek alternative modes of sending value mail. Suppose a sender compares the
68This amount is derived from 34 money envelopes at U.S.$ 3.25 and 34 no-money envelopes at
U.S.$ 1.25 multiplied by the respective loss rates.
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costs of sending an envelope containing U.S.$ 68.00 by mail or via an alternative
carrier such as Western Union. The cost discrepancy is relatively substantial at
U.S.$ 18.75.69
Secondly, this form of corruption is costly to the intended mail recipient. These
costs are less problematic from an aggregate economy perspective, since any lost
funds are likely to be used in other forms of economic activity. Nonetheless, they
constitute a direct cost to the intended mail recipient. We saw previously that this
form of corruption is more costly to female heads of low-income neighborhoods and
middle-income neighborhoods. Especially, the former group can be a particularly
vulnerable group to begin with.
Third, this form of corruption is costly to SERPOST. In particular, SERPOSTs
2005 operating revenues were U.S.$ 4,186,764.05. If 19.08% is representative of loss
of mail across Perú and this percentage resorts to alternative modes of communi-
cation, then this form of corruption costs SERPOST U.S.$ 798,834.58 of revenues
on annual basis. This can also have further ramications for the Peruvian economy
if there are other competitors in the mail sector whose revenues do not necessarily
benet the Peruvian economy (e.g., Western Union, FEDEX etc.)
Finally, perhaps the greatest cost of this form of corruption is not quantiable.
It is the loss of trust that arises within and towards the Peruvian society due to
this type of corruption. There have been many works on trust as a form of social
capital and as a driving force of (economic) prosperity (e.g., Fukuyama 1995.) This
form of corruption attacks trust within the society directly and a¤ects not only how
people perceive the mail system, but also how they perceive government, account-
ability, transparency and society. While these costs are not quantiable, they may
be the most signicant.
69The costs for sending money via Western Union have been calculated using the pricing ser-
vices at www.westernunion.com. The prices were calculated both for Georgia and the District of
Columbia. The cost discrepancy is the same regardless of point of origin. The money transfer fee
is U.S.$ 20.00 and the costs of envelope and postage are U.S.$ 1.25.
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Implications and Interpretations. The ndings discussed previously have
further implications. In particular, they indicate that privatization may not work
as an e¢ ciency-enhancing measure. SERPOST is a public-private partnership and
thus can be considered part private. It is clear that the privatized component has
not led to better service; particularly for middle-income neighborhoods. This relates
to arguments raised against privatization as a corruption-taming mechanism (see
for example Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1997).
At the same time, we must ask why this form of corruption persists. One possi-
ble explanation is the fact that there is little competition in the postal sector. SER-
POST remains the largest actor in the mailing sector and it is essentially a monop-
olist by concession. Thus, poor quality of service persists, since there are no incen-
tives to change.
Conclusion
This paper reports a theory-testing randomized eld experiment that makes use
of an existing semi-public monopolist institutionthe postal system in Lima, Perú
to identify and measure corruption, its potential causes and its consequences. We
nd the following. First, 19.08% of mail is lost. Secondly, money mail is more likely
to be lost at a rate of 20.90% compared to no-money mail which disappears at a
rate of 14.37% (this di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 10% level). This
nding suggests that loss of mail is systematic (non-random), which implies that
this type of corruption is due to strategic behavior as opposed to plain shirking on
the part of mail handlers.
Third, we nd that loss of mail is non-random across other observables. In par-
ticular, corruption is more costly to certain societal groups. Middle-income neigh-
borhoods are more likely to experience lost mail. They are also more likely to ex-
perience loss of money mail (both di¤erences are statistically signicant at the 10%
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level). This result is informed by the predictions of the model, which suggests that
mail handlers may perceive the benets (costs) of lost mail to be higher (lower) in
middle-income neighborhoods compared to low- and high-income neighborhoods.
For example, middle-income neighborhoods may be thought to be more likely
to "receive" items of value in comparison to low-income neighborhoods. They may
also be thought to be less likely to report lost mail compared to high-income neigh-
borhoods. This in turn a¤ects the likelihood of handlers getting caught. So, these
two e¤ects likely lead to (money) mail being lost at a higher rate in middle-income
neighborhoods.
We also nd that female heads of household in low-income neighborhoods are
more likely to experience lost mail. This is not necessarily a surprising result, since
this group may be perceived to be vulnerable to begin with (this di¤erence is sta-
tistically signicant at the 10% level). Furthermore, female heads of household in
high-income neighborhoods are much less likely to experience lost (money) mail
(these di¤erences are statistically signicant at the 5% level). This may be due to
the fact that this demographic is more likely to report lost mail.
Finally, this form of corruption is costly to di¤erent stakeholders. The sender
of mail bears a direct and an indirect cost. The direct cost is the value of the mail.
The indirect cost is the cost of having to switch carriers once mail has been lost.
Corruption is also costly to the intended mail recipient. In particular, middle-income
neighborhoods and female heads of household in low-income neighborhoods are
more likely to su¤er. Finally, corruption is costly the mail company (SERPOST)
in terms of lost revenue and costly to society in terms of loss of trust as a form of
social capital (Fukuyama 1995).
Overall, the ndings suggest that public-private partnerships need not increase
e¢ ciency by reducing corruption; particularly, when the institution maintains a
monopoly by form of government concession. This goes back to arguments against
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privatization as discussed in Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997). Increased e¢ ciency
in mail delivery is likely to require (1) privatization and (2) competition. Without
external competition, the monopolist has no incentive to provide better service and
loss of mail is likely to persist.
CONCLUSION
This dissertation consists of three essays. The rst essay addresses the extent to
which yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism in an exper-
imental environment. The study nds the following. First, there is an initial non-
trivial proportion of good incumbents in the population. This proportion goes down
as the experiment session progresses. Secondly, a large proportion of bad incum-
bents make theoretically inconsistent choices given the assumptions of the model
and the manner in which preferences are theoretically specied. Finally, there is
mild evidence of yardstick competition. In particular, an institution with low pro-
portion of good incumbents has little room for yardstick competition, since bad in-
cumbents are likely to be replaced by equally bad incumbents. This is also the case
in which (1) yardstick competition leads to non-increasing voter welfare (as is ob-
served in these experiments) and (2) voters are more likely to re-elect bad domestic
incumbents due to the presence of equally bad foreign incumbents.
The second essay addresses three main questions related to the determinants
and control of corruption. First, whether an increase in the marginal cost of public
funds gives rise to more or less corruption. Secondly, whether a decrease in trans-
parency (as modeled by a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of the unit
cost of public good provision) a¤ects corrupt behavior. Finally, whether an exper-
imental environment with yardstick competition gives rise to more or less corrup-
tion. The study nds the following. First, tax ine¢ ciency is an important determi-
nant of corrupt incumbent behavior. In particular, an increase in the marginal cost
of public funds makes it more costly for incumbents to equalize rst-period payo¤s.
This drives them to separate and divert maximum rents in the rst period. While
voters retaliate slightly by voting incumbents out of o¢ ce, they are worse o¤. Sec-
ondly, we nd that increased lack of a particular form of transparency (as dened
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in terms of an increase in risk in the distribution of the unit cost) leaves corrupt
incumbent behavior unchanged. If the draw of the unit cost is unfavorable, incum-
bents tend to be less corrupt. So, the results suggest that lack of transparency (as
dened in Viceisza 2007a) need not always make voters worse o¤. While this nd-
ing may seem counterintuitive, it is not given the parameterization of the experi-
ments. First, we must not ignore the importance of assumptions on types and pref-
erences as discussed in Viceisza (2007a). Contrary to Besley and Smarts (2007) as-
sumption that incumbents are either good or bad, incumbents are known to behave
strategically. Since the mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the unit cost
reduces the cost of equalizing rst-period payo¤s in the favorable state, it makes
sense why incumbents behave less corruptly if the unit cost is low. Furthermore,
Viceisza (2007a) models lack of transparency on the incumbent side. This can be
contrasted with lack of transparency on the voters side as discussed in Besley and
Smart (2007). Third, the experiments nd strong evidence of yardstick competi-
tion. On the incumbents side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming
mechanism if the incumbent is female. On the voters side, voters are less likely to
re-elect the incumbent in the presence of yardstick competition. Specically, voters
pay attention to the di¤erence between the tax signal in their own jurisdiction and
the signal in another jurisdiction. As this di¤erence increases, voters re-elect less.
Fourth, history is an important determinant of corruption and of re-election deci-
sions. Incumbents are likely to make choices as they did in previous repetitions and
voters are likely to vote out increasingly as the repetitions go by. In other words,
they distrust the political system more signicantly as time goes by and yardstick
competition does not a¤ect that. Finally, we nd that individual-specic factors
such as gender and beliefs play a signicant role in incumbent behavior. In particu-
lar, female incumbents are more likely to divert rent when the unit cost is unfavor-
able. Furthermore, incumbentsbeliefs are more important than votersbeliefs in
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decision-making. Voters focus mainly on taxes charged (payo¤s) and the history of
those taxes.
Finally, the third essay in this dissertation reports a theory-testing randomized
eld experiment that makes use of an existing public institutionthe postal system
in Lima, Perúto identify and measure corruption, its causes and its consequences.
The study nds the following. First, 19.08% of mail is lost. Secondly, money mail is
more likely to be lost at a rate of 20.90% (this is signicant at the 10% level). This
nding suggests that loss of mail is systematic (non-random), which implies that
this type of corruption is due to strategic behavior as opposed to plain shirking
on the part of mail handlers. Third, we nd that loss of mail is non-random across
other observables. Middle-income neighborhoods are more likely to experience lost
(money) mail. Also, female heads of household in low-income neighborhoods are
more likely to experience lost mail while female heads of household in high-income
neighborhoods are much less likely to experience lost (money) mail. Finally, this
form of corruption is costly to di¤erent stakeholders. The sender of mail bears a
direct and an indirect cost. The direct cost is the value of the mail. The indirect
cost is the cost of having to switch carriers once mail has been lost. Corruption is
also costly to the intended mail recipient as discussed above. Finally, corruption
is costly the mail company (SERPOST) in terms of lost revenue and to society in
terms of loss of trust. Overall, the ndings suggest that public-private partnerships
need not increase e¢ ciency by reducing corruption; particularly, when the institu-
tion remains a monopoly. Increased e¢ ciency in mail delivery is likely to require
(1) privatization and (2) competition; otherwise, the monopolist has no incentive to
provide better service and loss of mail is likely to persist.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Note: This proof assumes that  and G are continuous. This is done to be con-
sistent with expression 5. It is implied that when  and G are discrete, the appro-
priate denitions and notation apply.
Existence of Equilibria. The good types equilibrium behavior is by assumption
unchanged when the distribution of  undergoes a mean preserving spread. The
more complicated question is whether the bad typesin particular, type (b; L)s
equilibrium behavior (as in expressions 15 through 17) remains unchanged.70
Consider type (b; L)s restraint formulation rule in expression 12. The magni-
tude of r1 is crucial. Recall that r1 = t1   1G1, where the subscript 1 indicates
the time period. It follows that if 1G1 is large enough, type (b; L) is left no choice
but to charge maximal taxes to divert at least some rent. Furthermore, if r1 = 0 a
priori the game becomes trivial.
So, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for existence of the equilibria discussed
in expressions 15 through 17 is that r1 > 0, which holds if and only if t1 > 1G1.
So, assuming a starting point for which t1 > 1G1 , a change in  must give rise to
the relationship dt1
d1
>
d(1G1)
d1
, which is satised as long as the inverse relationship
between  and G is su¢ ciently bounded. To know when this is the case, compare
the interaction between a change in  and a change in G. In other words, consider
the magnitude of the derivative of G. Recognizing that
d(G)
d
= G + 
dG
d
, it is
clear that the magnitude of this expression depends on the magnitude of dG
d
. From
70Note that the voters re-election rule is a¤ected only by  since q is unchanged. in turnis
dictated by type (b; L)s restraint formulation.
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expression 5, we have
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While the sign of expression 28 is known, its magnitude is not. The magnitude
will depend on the empirical parameterization of the tax cost function. However,
given that dt1
d1
>
d(1G1)
d1
must hold, some bounds for the magnitude of expression
28 can be established.
Noting that dt1
d1
T 0 depending on the level of , we have the following cases:
Proof.
 Case 1: dt1
d1
 0. This implies that G1 + 1 dG1d1  0 such that
dG1d1   G11 .
 Case 2: dt1
d1
> 0. This implies that G1 + 1
dG1
d1
T 0 such that the above holds
or
dG1d1  < G11 .
Thus, the derivations below assume that  and G are such that either case 1 or
case 2 is satised. This will guarantee a priori existence of all three types of equilib-
ria.
Equilibrium Rent Diversion. Expected equilibrium rent diversion in this case is
given by
ER = (1  ) qT + (1  ) (1  q) [ ((H   L)GH + T ) + (1   )T ]
= (1  ) (qT + (1  q) [ ((H   L)GH + T ) + (1   )T ]) (29)
which increases as (H   L) increases, which is the case here since H2 > H1 and
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L2 < L1.
Equilibrium Voter Welfare. From Besley and Smart we know that equilibrium
welfare is
Proof.
EW = (1 + ) [qWH +  (1  q)WL + (1  )WT ] +
(1  ) (1  q) (WH  WT ) +
 [ (1  ) [q + (1  q) (1   )]]  (30)
(qWH + (1  q)WL  WT ) (31)
whichrecalling that W = G   C (G) for  = fH;Lghas rst-order partial
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The sign of expression 32 depends on the sign of any term

@G
@
  @C
@t
(:)   G +  @G@ 
for  = fH;Lg, since all coe¢ cients are positive for the equilibrium congurations
discussed.
Rearranging this expression, we have
@G
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
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which is negative as long as

1  @C
@t

> 0 ()
@C
@t
<
1

(34)
since @G

< 0 by expression 5 and the discussion on page 18.
APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS I
Note: The experiment instructions have been slightly adapted for presentation in
the paper. In particular, the following changes have been made: (1) the gures have
been renumbered as part of the paper and (2) the gures have been "reshaped" (i.e.,
made smaller).
Instructions
Preliminaries
 Hello and welcome.
 You are now taking part in an economics experiment.
 Please read these instructions carefully.
 We ask thatas of this pointyou no longer talk to each other.
 Please turn o¤ all cellular phones, two-way pagers and any other electronic
devices.
 This set of instructions will explain the steps that are involved in taking part
in this economics experiment. Everything you need to know to participate in
this experiment is explained below.
 If you have any questions about these instructions or about any issue during
the experiment, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer your
questions at your cubicle.
General
 This experiment consists of a trial, four tasks and a questionnaire.
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 Each task requires interaction between two players: Player X and Player Z.
 Before you make any decisions, you will randomly be assigned a role. Once
you are assigned a role, you will maintain that role throughout the whole ex-
periment.
 So, please pay very close attention to all of the instructions.
Task B
Instructions for Player X
 There are ve periods in this task. Each period has two parts.
 In this task, each period Player X will be paired with a NEW Player Z. So,
Player X will NOT be paired with the same Player Z each and every period.
First Part of the Period
1. In the rst part of the period, Player X makes a choice between THREE al-
ternatives or TWO alternatives.
2. The computer will "toss a coin." If the coin lands "HEADS," Player X chooses
between THREE alternatives. If the coin lands "TAILS," Player X chooses
between TWO alternatives.
3. Each alternative is a payo¤ pair. The rst number is Player Xs payo¤. The
second number is Player Zs payo¤.
4. Suppose the coin lands "HEADS." The screen Player X will see is shown in
gure 6. Please take a moment to look at the layout of the screen and the
payo¤s. The rst column indicates the respective alternative. The second and
third columns indicate Player Xs and Player Zs payo¤s under those alterna-
tives. For example, if Player X chooses alternative 1, Player X gets a payo¤ of
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1.50 experimental dollars and Player Z also gets a payo¤ of 1.50 experimental
dollars. On other hand, if Player X chooses alternative 2, Player X gets a pay-
o¤ of 1.50 experimental dollars and Player Z gets a payo¤ of 0.75 experimen-
tal dollars. Finally, if Player X chooses alternative 3, Player X gets a payo¤
of 2.35 experimental dollars and Player Z gets a payo¤ of 0.16 experimental
dollars.
Figure 6: Player X Sample Screen: First Part of Period (THREE alternatives)
5. Suppose the coin lands "TAILS." The screen with the TWO alternatives Player
X chooses from is shown in gure 7. Please take a moment to look at the lay-
out of the screen and the payo¤s. The screen is similar to the previous; how-
ever, Player X now chooses between TWO rather than THREE alternatives.
Also, note that the payo¤s are di¤erent.
6. Once Player X decides on the preferred alternative, Player X selects the cor-
responding radio button at the bottom of the screen. Player X clicks OK to
conrm this choice. This choice will determine both Player Xs and Player Zs
payo¤s for the rst part of the period.
Second Part of the Period
1. Player Z will get to "accept" or "reject" Player Xs choice for the rst part
of the period. If Player Z "rejects" Player Xs choice, Player X and Player
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Figure 7: Player X Sample Screen: First Part of Period (TWO alternatives)
Z STILL get the payo¤s that Player X chose for the rst part of the period.
However, Player Xs payo¤ for the second part of the period will be ZERO
and Player X will NOT get to play during the second part of the period.
2. If Player Z "accepts" Player Xs choice, Player X and Player Z STILL get the
payo¤s that Player X chose for the rst part of the period. However, IN AD-
DITION, Player X will get to make another choice in the second part of the
period. This choice will determine Player Xs and Player Zs payo¤s for the
second part of the period. Player Z will NOT get to "accept" or "reject" this
choice at the end of the second part of the period.
3. The alternatives that Player X chooses from in the second part of the period
IF Player Z "accepts" the rst-part choiceare determined at random.
4. The computer will "toss a coin." If the coin lands "HEADS," Player X sees
the screen in gure 8. Please take a moment to look at the layout of the screen
and the payo¤s.
5. If the coin lands "TAILS," Player X sees the screen in gure 9. Again, please
take a moment to look at the layout of the screen and the payo¤ pairs.
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Figure 8: Player X Sample Screen: Second Part of Period
Figure 9: Player X Sample Screen: Second Part of Period
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Task Payo¤s
Player Xs payo¤ in each period is the sum of the payo¤ in the rst and the sec-
ond part of the period. At the end of each period, Player X will see how much he
or she earned during that period and any previous periods. All payo¤s shown in
this task are in experimental dollars. Each experimental dollar is a quarter of a real
U.S. dollar. So, for example, if Player X makes 8 experimental dollars in this task,
Player X will get paid 2 real U.S. dollars for this task at the end of the experiment.
Waiting Involved...
Note that each decision round is complete when everyone participating in the
experiment (i.e., all Players X and all Players Z) has submitted a decision. Only
at that point will the program advance to the next decision round. This means
that the delay of a single participants decision can prevent the next round from
starting. Please take time to make your decision, but please also keep the above in
mind.
Questions
Are there any questions so far?
Task B
Instructions for Player Z
 There are ve periods in this task. Each period has two parts.
 In this task, each period Player Z will be paired with a NEW Player X. So,
Player Z will NOT be paired with the same Player X each and every period.
First Part of the Period
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1. Player Z will NOT get to see whether Player X chose between THREE alter-
natives (i.e., gure 6) or TWO alternatives (i.e., gure 7).
2. Player Z sees a screen of the type shown in gure 10. Figure 10 assumes Player
X chose a payo¤ of J experimental dollars for Player Z. In this task, J can be
1.50, 0.75 or 0.16 experimental dollars. Please take a moment to look at the
layout of the screen in gure 10.
 The rst cell in the rst row indicates Player Zs payo¤ as chosen by
Player X. In this case, the payo¤ chosen is J.
 The second cell in the rst row indicates the possible payo¤s for Player
X. In this case, the possible payo¤s are K and L. In the actual task, the
numbers for K and L will vary depending on the alternative chosen by
Player X.
 The second row is BLANK.
 The rst cell in the third row instructs Player Z to "Please indicate your
choice BELOW."
 Finally, the rst cell in the fourth row gives the option for Player Z to
"accept" or "reject" Player Xs choice.
Figure 10: Player Z Sample Screen: Accept/Reject Screen (Example: Payo¤=J)
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3. Once Player Z has selected the preferred radio button at the bottom of the
screen, Player Z clicks OK to conrm this choice.
4. Remember that Player Zs payo¤ in the rst part of the period is determined
by Player Xs choice REGARDLESS of whether Player Z "accepts" or "re-
jects" Player Xs choice.
5. Player Zs decision to "accept" or "reject" Player Xs choice a¤ects payo¤s in
the second part of the period. This is explained further below.
Second Part of the Period
1. If Player Z "accepts" Player Xs choice, Player X gets to make another choice
in the second part of the period. Player Z will NOT get to "accept" or "re-
ject" this choice in the second part.
2. If Player Z "rejects" Player Xs choice, Player X does NOT get to make a
choice in the second part of the period. INSTEAD, Player X gets ZERO pay-
o¤ and Player Zs payo¤ is determined at random as follows:
 With 25% chance, Player Zs payo¤ is 1.50 experimental dollars.
 With 25% chance, Player Zs payo¤ is 0.75 experimental dollars.
 With 50% chance, Player Zs payo¤ is 0.16 experimental dollars.
Task Payo¤s
Player Zs payo¤s are calculated in the same way as Player Xs. Player Zs pay-
o¤ in each period is the sum of the payo¤ in the rst and the second part of the pe-
riod. At the end of each period, Player Z will see how much he or she earned dur-
ing that period and any previous periods. All payo¤s shown in this task are in ex-
perimental dollars. Each experimental dollar is a quarter of a real U.S. dollar. So,
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for example, if Player Z makes 8 experimental dollars in this task, Player Z will get
paid 2 real U.S. dollars for this task at the end of the experiment.
Waiting Involved...
Remember that each decision round is complete when everyone participating
in the experiment (i.e., all Players X and all Players Z) has submitted a decision.
This means that the delay of a single participants decision can prevent the next
round from starting. Please take time to make your decision, but please also keep
the above in mind.
Questions
Are there any questions before we discuss the Trial?
Trial
Now, we will have ve minutes of what is called a trial. During this trial, you
will NOT be assigned a role. This means that you will get to make choices as if you
were Player X. Then, you will get to observe those choices as if you were Player Z.
During this process, you will get to see the screens that both Players X and Z will
get to see once Task B starts. During this trial, you will NOT be playing against
any other player. So, the trial is an opportunity for you to interact and familiarize
yourself with the software.
The trial will last ve minutes. You will be paid 2.00 REAL U.S. dollars for this
trial REGARDLESS of how many periods you complete. So, please take your time
and pay attention to the screens you see in the trial.
If you have any questions during the trial period, please raise your hand. We
will come to your cubicle and answer your questions.
Are there any questions before we start the Trial?
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Task Y
Instructions for Player X
1. For Player X, this task is NO di¤erent than the previous task.
Instructions for Player Z
1. For Player Z, this task is SLIGHTLY di¤erent than the previous task.
2. As shown in gure 10, in this taskTask Ythe second row of the "accept/reject"
screen is NO LONGER BLANK.
3. The second row now indicates two additional pieces of information:
 First, the second row indicates the total number of rst-part o¤ers made
by ALL Players X during ALL periods in the previous task. This num-
ber does NOT include second-part o¤ers. This information is indicated
in the rst cell of the second row.
 Secondly, the second row summarizes the distribution of these rst-part
o¤ers. In other words, the second row ALSO summarizes how many
times ALL Players X o¤ered Player Z (*) a rst-part payo¤ of 1.50, (*) a
rst-part payo¤ of 0.75 or (*) a rst-part payo¤ of 0.16 during ALL peri-
ods in the previous task. This information is indicated in the second cell
of the second row.
 For instance, in the example below (gure 1), ALL Players X together
made 30 rst-part o¤ers during ALL periods in the previous task.
 Of these 30 rst-part o¤ers, 10 were associated with a Player Z payo¤
of 1.50, another 10 were associated with a Player Z payo¤ of 0.75 and
another 10 were associated with a Player Z payo¤ of 0.16.
 This is the ONLY di¤erence between this task and the previous task!
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Figure 11: Player Z Sample Screen: Accept/Reject Screen (Example, Payo¤=J)
Task Payo¤s
In this task, payo¤s for both players are calculated in the same way as in the
previous task.
Waiting Involved...
As in the previous task, RECALL that each decision round is complete when
everyone participating in the experiment has submitted a decision. Only at that
point will the program advance to the next decision round.
Questions
Are there any questions?
APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS II
Note: The experiment instructions have been slightly adapted for presentation in
the paper. In particular, the following changes have been made: (1) the gures have
been renumbered as part of the paper, (2) the gures and text have been reduced in
size, and (3) the preliminaries section has only been included for Task B.
Instructions
Preliminaries
 Hello and welcome.
 You are now taking part in an economics experiment.
 Please read these instructions carefully.
 We ask thatas of this pointyou no longer talk to each other.
 Please turn o¤ all cellular phones, two-way pagers and any other electronic
devices.
 This set of instructions will explain the steps that are involved in taking part
in this economics experiment. Everything you need to know to participate in
this experiment is explained below.
 If you have any questions about these instructions or about any issue during
the experiment, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer your
questions at your cubicle.
General
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 This experiment consists of four sections: (1) a trial, (2) a quiz, (3) a task
called Task B and (4) a questionnaire.
 Task B requires interaction between two players: Player X and Player Z.
 Before you make any decisions, you will be told whether you are Player X or
Player Z. You will keep the same role for the entire experiment.
 Please pay very close attention to all of the instructions.
Task B
1. There are ten periods in this task. Each period has two parts, a rst and a
second part.
2. Each period you will be paired with a DIFFERENT person in the room. So,
you will NOT interact with the same person for more than one period.
3. At the beginning of the rst part of the period, a coin is ipped. Player X
knows the result of the coin ip. Player Z does not. Player X should NOT
reveal the result of the coin ip to Player Z. The coin ip takes place in front
of the rst Player X. He veries the coin ip and I input it into the computer.
4. If the coin ip is "HEADS," Player X chooses between THREE alternatives;
if it is "TAILS," TWO alternatives.
5. Each alternative is a payo¤ pair: The rst is Player Xs; the second is Player
Zs.
6. Suppose the coin lands "HEADS." Player X sees the screen in gure 12. Please
look at the screen and the payo¤s. The rst column is the respective alterna-
tive. The second and third columns are Player Xs and Player Zs payo¤s. If
Player X chooses alternative 1, Player X and Player Z get 1.50. If Player X
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chooses alternative 2, Player X gets 1.50 and Player Z gets 0.75. Finally, if
Player X chooses alternative 3, Player X gets 2.35 and Player Z gets 0.16.
Figure 12: Player X Sample Screen: First Part of Period (THREE alternatives)
7. Suppose the coin lands "TAILS." Player X sees the screen in gure 13. The
screen is similar to the previous; but, Player X chooses between TWO rather
than THREE alternatives. Also, the payo¤s are di¤erent.
Figure 13: Player X Sample Screen: First Part of Period (TWO alternatives)
8. Player X selects his choice and clicks OK to conrm. This choice determines
payo¤s for the rst part of the period.
9. Player Z does NOT see the coin ip. So, Player Z does NOT see whether
Player X chose between the THREE alternatives in gure 12 or the TWO
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alternatives in gure 13.
10. Player Z sees a screen like the one in gure 14. Figure 14 is a sample screen.
Please look at the screen in gure 14.
 The rst cell in the rst row indicates Player Zs payo¤. In the sample
screen, the payo¤ is indicated as "BLANK." This number can be either
1.50, 0.75 or 0.16 depending on the alternative chosen by Player X.
 The second cell in the rst row indicates Player Xs possible payo¤s. In
the sample screen, the possible payo¤s are indicated as "BLANK." In
the actual task, Player Xs possible payo¤s depend on Player Zs payo¤s
as shown in the following table.
If Player Z has... Then, Player X has...
Case a 1.50 1.50
Case b 0.75 1.50 OR 0.75
Case c 0.16 2.35 OR 1.35
 So, if Player Z has a rst-part payo¤ of 1.50, then Player X has a rst-
part payo¤ of 1.50 also. If Player Z has a rst-part payo¤ of 0.75, then
Player X could also have a rst-part payo¤ of 0.75, but Player X could
have a rst-part payo¤ of 1.50 instead. This depends on the number of
alternatives that Player X chose from. Finally, if Player Z has a rst-
part payo¤ of 0.16, then Player X either has a rst-part payo¤ of 2.35
or 1.35. This depends on the number of alternatives that Player X chose
from.
11. Player Z "accepts" or "rejects" at the end of the rst part of the period. Player
Z selects his choice at the bottom of the screen and clicks OK to conrm. The
decision to "accept" or "reject" determines whether or not Player X makes
another choice in the second part of the period. It does NOT determine or af-
fect rst-part payo¤s for either player. First-part payo¤s are whatever Player
X chose them to be.
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Figure 14: Player Z Sample Screen: Accept/Reject Screen
12. So, if Player Z "rejects," both players still get the payo¤s chosen by Player X
in the rst part of the period. However, Player X does NOT make a choice
in the second part of the period. Instead, Player Xs payo¤ for the second
part of the period is zero and Player Zs second-part payo¤ is determined ran-
domly as indicated in the following table.
:
If Player Z "rejects," Player Zs Second-Part Payo¤ is:
1.50 with 25% chance
0.75 with 25% chance
0.16 with 50% chance
13. On the other hand, if Player Z "accepts," both players still get the payo¤s
chosen by Player X in the rst part of the period. But, in addition, Player
X makes a choice in the second part of the period and this choice determines
second-part payo¤s for both players. The computer will pause and I will ip
the coin again. This second coin toss a¤ects the alternatives that Player X
chooses from in the second part of the period. This second coin ip will be
veried in the same way as the rst coin ip. Players Z will NOT see the re-
sult of this coin ip.
14. If the coin lands "HEADS," Player X sees the screen in gure 15. Please look
at the screen and the payo¤s.
15. If the coin lands "TAILS," Player X sees the screen in gure 16. Please look
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Figure 15: Player X Sample Screen: Second Part of Period
at the screen and the payo¤s.
Figure 16: Player X Sample Screen: Second Part of Period
16. Player Xs second-part choice determines Player Xs and Player Zs payo¤s for
the second part. Player Z will NOT get to "accept" or "reject" at the end of
the second part of the period.
17. The above steps describe the two parts within a period. This task consists of
ten of these periods.
Task Payo¤s
Payo¤s in each period are the sum of the payo¤ in the rst and the second part
of the period. At the end of each period, you will see how much you earned during
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that period and any previous periods. You will be paid your total earnings for all
periods. All payo¤s shown are in experimental dollars. Each experimental dollar
is a quarter of a real U.S. dollar. So, for example, if you make 8 experimental dol-
lars in this task, you will get paid 2 real U.S. dollars for this task at the end of the
experiment.
Waiting Involved...
Note that each decision round is complete when everyone participating in the
experiment (i.e., all Players X and all Players Z) has submitted a decision. This
means that the delay of a single participants decision can prevent the next round
from starting. Please take time to make your decision, but please also keep the
above in mind.
Questions
Are there any questions before we discuss the Trial?
Trial & Quiz
Now, we will have ve minutes of what is called a trial. During this trial, you
will NOT be assigned a role. This means that you will get to make choices as if you
were Player X. Then, you will get to observe those choices as if you were Player
Z. During this process, you will get to see the screens that both Players X and Z
will get to see once Task B starts. During this trial, you will NOT be interacting
with any other player. So, the trial is a practice opportunity for you to familiarize
yourself with the software and the instructions.
The trial will last ve minutes. If you have any questions during the trial pe-
riod, please raise your hand. We will come to your cubicle and answer your ques-
tions.
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After the trial is completed, you will be given a quiz on the computer to make
sure you understand the procedures and how your earnings are determined. The
questions in the quiz are based on the trial and the instructions.
You will be paid 3.00 REAL U.S. dollars for participating in this trial and com-
pleting the quiz REGARDLESS of how many trial periods you complete or how
many quiz questions you answer correctly. So, please take your time and pay atten-
tion to the screens you see in the trial and the questions you are asked in the quiz.
Are there any questions before we start the Trial?
Task B Summary
1. You will randomly be Player X or Player Z. You will keep the same role for
the entire experiment.
2. At the beginning of the rst part of the period, a coin is ipped.
3. Player X knows the result of the coin ip and knows his alternatives. If the
coin toss is "HEADS" there are THREE alternatives; if the coin toss is "TAILS"
there are TWO alternatives.
4. Player X makes his rst-part choice. For each possible choice, Player X knows
the rst-part payo¤s for himself AND for Player Z.
5. Player Z does NOT know the result of the coin toss and does not know the
number of alternatives faced by Player X.
6. Player Z knows his rst-part payo¤ for sure, but does not know Player Xs
rst-part payo¤. The following tablewhich is also displayed on the screen at
the front of the roomshows the possible rst-part payo¤s for Player X de-
pending on Player Zs rst-part payo¤.
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If Player Z has... Then, Player X has...
Case a 1.50 1.50
Case b 0.75 1.50 OR 0.75
Case c 0.16 2.35 OR 1.35
7. Player Z "accepts" or "rejects." This decision determines whether or not Player
X makes another choice in the second part of the period. It does NOT deter-
mine or a¤ect rst-part payo¤s for either player. First-part payo¤s are what-
ever Player X chose them to be.
8. If he "accepts," both players get the rst-part payo¤s chosen by Player X, but
in addition Player X sees another coin toss and makes a choice that deter-
mines payo¤s in the second part. Player Z does NOT "accept" or "reject" for
a second time.
9. If he "rejects," both players get the rst-part payo¤s chosen by Player X, but
Player Xs second-part payo¤ is zero. Player Zs second-part payo¤ is deter-
mined randomly. The possibilities are shown in the table below.
If Player Z "rejects," Player Zs Second-Part Payo¤ is:
1.50 with 25% chance
0.75 with 25% chance
0.16 with 50% chance
10. The above describes the two parts within a period. This task consists of ten
of these periods.
Task Y
1. There are ten periods in this task. Each period has two parts, a rst and a
second part.
2. Each period you will be paired with a DIFFERENT person in the room. So,
you will NOT interact with the same person for more than one period.
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3. At the beginning of the rst part of the period, a coin is ipped. Player X
knows the result of the coin ip. Player Z does not. Player X should NOT
reveal the result of the coin ip to Player Z. The coin ip takes place in front
of the rst Player X. He veries the coin ip and I input it into the computer.
4. If the coin ip is "HEADS," Player X chooses between THREE alternatives;
if it is "TAILS," TWO alternatives.
5. Each alternative is a payo¤ pair: The rst is Player Xs; the second is Player
Zs.
6. Suppose the coin lands "HEADS." Player X sees the screen in gure 17. Please
look at the screen and the payo¤s. The rst column is the respective alterna-
tive. The second and third columns are Player Xs and Player Zs payo¤s. If
Player X chooses alternative 1, Player X and Player Z get 1.50. If Player X
chooses alternative 2, Player X gets 1.50 and Player Z gets 0.75. Finally, if
Player X chooses alternative 3, Player X gets 2.35 and Player Z gets 0.16.
Figure 17: Player X Sample Screen: First Part of Period (THREE alternatives)
7. Suppose the coin lands "TAILS." Player X sees the screen in gure 18. The
screen is similar to the previous; but, Player X chooses between TWO rather
than THREE alternatives. Also, the payo¤s are di¤erent.
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Figure 18: Player X Sample Screen: First Part of Period (TWO alternatives)
8. Player X selects his choice and clicks OK to conrm. This choice determines
payo¤s for the rst part of the period.
9. Player Z does NOT see the coin ip. So, Player Z does NOT see whether
Player X chose between the THREE alternatives in gure 15 or the TWO
alternatives in gure 16.
10. Player Z sees a screen like the one in gure 19. Figure 19 is a sample screen.
Please look at the screen in gure 19.
 The rst cell in the rst row indicates Player Zs payo¤. In the sample
screen, the payo¤ is indicated as "BLANK." This number can be either
1.50, 0.75 or 0.16 depending on the alternative chosen by Player X.
 The second cell in the rst row indicates Player Xs possible payo¤s. In
the sample screen, the possible payo¤s are indicated as "BLANK." In
the actual task, Player Xs possible payo¤s depend on Player Zs payo¤s
as shown in the following table.
If Player Z has... Then, Player X has...
Case a 1.50 1.50
Case b 0.75 1.50 OR 0.75
Case c 0.16 2.35 OR 1.35
 So, if Player Z has a rst-part payo¤ of 1.50, then Player X has a rst-
part payo¤ of 1.50 also. If Player Z has a rst-part payo¤ of 0.75, then
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Player X could also have a rst-part payo¤ of 0.75, but Player X could
have a rst-part payo¤ of 1.50 instead. This depends on the number of
alternatives that Player X chose from. Finally, if Player Z has a rst-
part payo¤ of 0.16, then Player X either has a rst-part payo¤ of 2.35
or 1.35. This depends on the number of alternatives that Player X chose
from.
 The rst cell in the second row shows information from a session simi-
lar to the one that you are in today. This session was called session B.
The cell shows a particular Player Zs rst-part payo¤ in session B. This
was the result of a choice made by the Player X that he was paired with.
Session B was the same as todays session in terms of procedures: A coin
was ipped and veried by the rst Player X and Player Z did NOT get
to see the coin ip. Furthermore, if the coin landed "HEADS," Player X
chose from the screen in gure 17. If the coin landed "TAILS," Player
X chose from the screen in gure 18. However, session B was potentially
di¤erent from todays session in terms of the result of the coin ip: In
other words, while you see another Player Zs rst-part payo¤ coming
from session B, you do NOT know whether the Player X that made this
choice saw the same coin ip as the Player X you are paired with. So,
your Player X could have observed "HEADS" while the other Player X
observed "TAILS" or vice versa. In the sample screen below, the other
Player Zs rst-part payo¤ is indicated as "BLANK." During the task,
this number is either 1.50, 0.75 or 0.16. The rst-part payo¤ shown in
the cell has been chosen at random from all Player Z rst-part payo¤s in
session B in any given period.
11. Player Z "accepts" or "rejects" at the end of the rst part of the period. Player
Z selects his choice at the bottom of the screen and clicks OK to conrm. The
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Figure 19: Player Z Sample Screen: Accept/Reject Screen
decision to "accept" or "reject" determines whether or not Player X makes
another choice in the second part of the period. It does NOT determine or af-
fect rst-part payo¤s for either player. First-part payo¤s are whatever Player
X chose them to be.
12. So, if Player Z "rejects," both players still get the payo¤s chosen by Player X
in the rst part of the period. However, Player X does NOT make a choice
in the second part of the period. Instead, Player Xs payo¤ for the second
part of the period is zero and Player Zs second-part payo¤ is determined ran-
domly as indicated in the following table.
If Player Z "rejects," Player Zs Second-Part Payo¤ is:
1.50 with 25% chance
0.75 with 25% chance
0.16 with 50% chance
13. On the other hand, if Player Z "accepts," both players still get the payo¤s
chosen by Player X in the rst part of the period. But, in addition, Player
X makes a choice in the second part of the period and this choice determines
second-part payo¤s for both players. The computer will pause and I will ip
the coin again. This second coin toss a¤ects the alternatives that Player X
chooses from in the second part of the period. This second coin ip will be
veried in the same way as the rst coin ip. Players Z will NOT see the re-
sult of this coin ip.
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14. If the coin lands "HEADS," Player X sees the screen in gure 20. Please look
at the screen and the payo¤s.
Figure 20: Player X Sample Screen: Second Part of Period
15. If the coin lands "TAILS," Player X sees the screen in gure 21. Please look
at the screen and the payo¤s.
Figure 21: Player X Sample Screen: Second Part of Period
16. Player Xs second-part choice determines Player Xs and Player Zs payo¤s for
the second part. Player Z will NOT get to "accept" or "reject" at the end of
the second part of the period.
17. The above steps describe the two parts within a period. This task consists of
ten of these periods.
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Task Payo¤s
Payo¤s in each period are the sum of the payo¤ in the rst and the second part
of the period. At the end of each period, you will see how much you earned during
that period and any previous periods. You will be paid your total earnings for all
periods. All payo¤s shown are in experimental dollars. Each experimental dollar
is a quarter of a real U.S. dollar. So, for example, if you make 8 experimental dol-
lars in this task, you will get paid 2 real U.S. dollars for this task at the end of the
experiment.
Waiting Involved...
Note that each decision round is complete when everyone participating in the
experiment (i.e., all Players X and all Players Z) has submitted a decision. This
means that the delay of a single participants decision can prevent the next round
from starting. Please take time to make your decision, but please also keep the
above in mind.
Questions
Are there any questions before we discuss the Trial?
Trial & Quiz
Now, we will have ve minutes of what is called a trial. During this trial, you
will NOT be assigned a role. This means that you will get to make choices as if you
were Player X. Then, you will get to observe those choices as if you were Player
Z. During this process, you will get to see the screens that both Players X and Z
will get to see once Task Y starts. During this trial, you will NOT be interacting
with any other player. So, the trial is a practice opportunity for you to familiarize
yourself with the software and the instructions.
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The trial will last ve minutes. If you have any questions during the trial pe-
riod, please raise your hand. We will come to your cubicle and answer your ques-
tions.
After the trial is completed, you will be given a quiz on the computer to make
sure you understand the procedures and how your earnings are determined. The
questions in the quiz are based on the trial and the instructions.
You will be paid 3.00 REAL U.S. dollars for participating in this trial and com-
pleting the quiz REGARDLESS of how many trial periods you complete or how
many quiz questions you answer correctly. So, please take your time and pay atten-
tion to the screens you see in the trial and the questions you are asked in the quiz.
Are there any questions before we start the Trial?
Task Y Summary
1. You will randomly be Player X or Player Z. You will keep the same role for
the entire experiment.
2. At the beginning of the rst part of the period, a coin is ipped.
3. Player X knows the result of the coin ip and knows his alternatives. If the
coin toss is "HEADS" there are THREE alternatives; if the coin toss is "TAILS"
there are TWO alternatives.
4. Player X makes his rst-part choice. For each possible choice, Player X knows
the rst-part payo¤s for himself AND for Player Z.
5. Player Z does NOT know the result of the coin toss and does not know the
number of alternatives faced by Player X.
6. Player Z knows his rst-part payo¤ for sure, but does not know Player Xs
rst-part payo¤. The following tablewhich is also displayed on the screen at
173
the front of the roomshows the possible rst-part payo¤s for Player X de-
pending on Player Zs rst-part payo¤.
If Player Z has... Then, Player X has...
Case a 1.50 1.50
Case b 0.75 1.50 OR 0.75
Case c 0.16 2.35 OR 1.35
7. Player Z also knows the rst-part payo¤ of some Player Z in another ses-
sion. The procedures in this session were the same as in the experiment to-
day. While Player Z sees this other Player Zs rst-part payo¤, he does NOT
know whether the Player X that chose it saw the same coin ip as the Player
X that he is paired with.
8. Player Z "accepts" or "rejects." This decision determines whether or not Player
X makes another choice in the second part of the period. It does NOT deter-
mine or a¤ect rst-part payo¤s for either player. First-part payo¤s are what-
ever Player X chose them to be.
9. If he "accepts," both players get the rst-part payo¤s chosen by Player X, but
in addition Player X sees another coin toss and makes a choice that deter-
mines payo¤s in the second part. Player Z does NOT "accept" or "reject" for
a second time.
10. If he "rejects," both players get the rst-part payo¤s chosen by Player X, but
Player Xs second-part payo¤ is zero. Player Zs second-part payo¤ is deter-
mined randomly. The possibilities are shown in the table below.
If Player Z "rejects," Player Zs Second-Part Payo¤ is:
1.50 with 25% chance
0.75 with 25% chance
0.16 with 50% chance
11. The above describes the two parts within a period. This task consists of ten
of these periods.
APPENDIX D: EMAIL TO HOUSEHOLD RECIPIENTS
From: labgsu@gmail.com
To: First Name, Last Name
Subject: Research StudyMail Sent (Conrmation Necessary)
This email is to inform you that you have been selected to participate in our re-
search study.
As mentioned in the original invitation, we will send you a total of four (4) en-
velopes in the mail, each of which has di¤erent content.
Every time we send you an envelope, we will notify you via email. The ________
envelope was sent on ________ and you should receive it soon.
All envelopes contain a card. In addition, some contain two U.S. dollars and some
contain lottery numbers. You should keep the contents of the envelopes. In partic-
ular, you should hold onto the lottery numbers, since they will be used to award
further prizes at the end of the research study. The two dollars are yours to keep.
The research study requires that you inform us no later than ________ whether
or not you have received the envelope. Furthermore, it requires that you answer the
following questions:
1) The senders name and senders address (not yours.)
2) The date of receipt.
3) The envelopes conditioni.e., whether or not the mail arrived in good condition,
open, wrinkled.
4) The contents of the envelopei.e., whether or not the envelope contained the
card and/or they money and/or the lottery number.
5) If the envelope contained money, how much was it? If the envelope contained a
lottery, what was the number?
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Due to the condential nature of the research study, it is extremely important that
neither you (nor any member of your household) inquire about arrival of the enve-
lope to either the mail carrier or the postal o¢ ce. If you do, you will jeopardize the
purpose of the research. All you need to do is inform us whether or not the enve-
lope has arrived and answer the above questions.
To reward you for your time and cooperation, all participants will be entered into a
lottery that contains ve prizes of 50 U.S. dollars, ve prizes of 25 U.S. dollars and
10 prizes of 10 U.S. dollars.
The lottery numbers that we are sending you will be used for this purpose and you
will only be part of the lottery drawing if you send responses to our questions be-
fore ________.
Those of you who do not receive mail will be entered into a separate lottery consist-
ing of ve prizes of 25 U.S. dollars. The winning lottery numbers will be announced
via email.
Many thanks for your collaboration,
Angelino Viceisza
Georgia State University
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